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 VOORWOORD (PREFACE IN DUTCH) 
Op de voorkant van dit proefschrift staat een go-bord met stenen. Go is een prachtig 
bordspel uit Azië dat ik begon te spelen in mijn studententijd. Het siert de voorkant van mijn 
boek, omdat ik het een mooi esthetisch plaatje vind, maar ook vanwege de parallellen die ik 
zie met de bevindingen in dit proefschrift. Go is een spel van balans, harmonie en dualiteit. 
Je kunt een strategie ontwikkelen, maar de uitkomst van de partij is onvoorspelbaar. De 
mogelijkheden zijn ontelbaar en het spel zeer complex. Je speelt binnen een bepaalde 
structuur, maar de ‘agency’ van de spelers, in interactie met de stenen, bepalen het spel. 
Ook managers kunnen een management control structuur ontwerpen, maar de uitkomsten 
in de praktijk zijn onzeker.  
Werken aan dit proefschrift heb ik ervaren als een ontdekkingsreis waarin ik veel geleerd 
heb. De promotie is ook weer het startpunt van nieuwe reizen en ik kijk uit naar een nieuwe 
fase in mijn carrière waarin ik bezig kan gaan met interessante onderzoeken en het schrijven 
van nieuwe artikelen. 
Ik ben veel dank verschuldigd aan mijn promotoren. Ed bedankt voor je inspirerende 
begeleiding gebaseerd op vertrouwen. You practice what you preach. Paula, jouw feedback 
deed me altijd weer even met een andere bril naar mijn proefschrift kijken. Een betere 
combinatie van promotoren kon ik me niet wensen. 
Bedankt aan al mijn accounting collega’s van de Radboud Universiteit, Open Universiteit, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam en Universiteit Groningen voor alle interessante en gezellige 
seminars die we gehad hebben onder de vlag van het Research Centre on Accounting and 
Control Change (RACC). Ik heb veel gehad aan de feedback op de vele presentaties die ik 
tijdens onze ontmoetingen heb gegeven. 
De leden van de promotiecommissie bedank ik voor de tijd die ze hebben gestoken in het 
lezen en beoordelen van mijn dissertatie. 
Zonder de casusbedrijven zou het onderzoek niet mogelijk zijn geweest. Bedankt aan alle 
geïnterviewden voor hun tijd en medewerking. 
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Kaleem bedankt voor de prettige samenwerking tijdens ons, vaak lastige, proces van 
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vruchtbare toekomst met publicaties. Leuk dat je ook bij mijn verdediging als paranimf aan 
mijn zijde staat. 
Als laatste wil ik mijn familie en gezin bedanken voor al hun steun. Julius, bedankt voor je 
belangrijke rol in het toegang krijgen tot mijn eerste casus en dat je mijn paranimf wilt zijn. 
Pa en Ma, op alle fronten staan jullie aan de basis van wat ik heb bereikt. Bedankt voor jullie 
liefde en vertrouwen. Lorraine, Annabelle en Mickey jullie zijn de beste kinderen die ik me 
kan wensen. Jullie geven me altijd energie, ook al is een dag nog zo zwaar. Lieve Daphne, 
bedankt dat je altijd in mij gelooft en me ondersteunt in alles wat ik doe. Deze mijlpaal 
hebben we samen bereikt. 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Looking across rather than up and down 
Emerging new organisational forms give rise to interesting research opportunities in the 
scientific management accounting and control discipline. One of these opportunities is the 
study of governance and control in lateral relations (Busco, Quattrone & Riccaboni, 2007; 
Scapens & Bromwich, 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). Lateral relations are 
connected to rather flat structures in which managers mainly work with other managers at 
similar levels within the organisation (i.e. other business unit managers) or with managers at 
similar levels in other organisations (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). One of the 
new organisational forms involving lateral relations is a shared service centre (SSC). Although 
the first SSCs already started in the mid-nineties, today organisations still struggle with the 
introduction of this construct and the way to govern it (Herbert & Seal, 2012). The quote 
below from an SSC manager illustrates some elements of this struggle: 
You can make a rational plan to outsource your administration, but you face 
all kinds of emotional issues. From: ‘Am I still in control?’ to ‘It’s my wallet 
others can look into.’ You are dealing with very confidential information; of 
course as outsourcing organisation you want to know if your administration is 
in safe hands1. 
This quote is about Accounting Plaza, the financial shared service centre of Ahold. As one of 
the first in the Netherlands, Ahold transformed its decentralised accounting and finance 
departments into one independent SSC. The issues raised in this quote are rational planning, 
control and trust. These issues are typically the ones managers face during an organisational 
change towards outsourcing relations and are the main topics of this thesis.  
Management accounting and control research is traditionally preoccupied with hierarchical 
and vertical relations, rather than more horizontal relations. Hopwood (1996, p. 589) 
therefore made a call for “looking across rather than up and down”. He proclaimed a need 
to explore the lateral processing of information within organisations (intrafirm) and between 
organisations (interfirm). Since then a number of studies have been conducted but in-depth 
studies that focus on control and governance structures for such lateral organisational forms 
are still scarce (see Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006; 
Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006a, for recent reviews).  
1  Jeroen Huisman, Commercial Director of Accounting Plaza. In: Chief financial officer. March-April, 2005. 36-39. Quote 
translated from Dutch. 
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This study builds on this research stream and provides two in-depth case studies. The first 
case is about an internal outsourcing relationship between business units and an SSC. The 
second case is about an external outsourcing relationship between an industrial organisation 
and a facility management provider. In general, this research aims to add to the knowledge 
of accounting and control aspects of outsourcing relationships between and within firms. 
1.2 Theoretical background 
A widely used theoretical framework for studying lateral relations is transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (see review of Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). TCE is to a large extent developed by 
Williamson (1979, 1981, 1996) and is applied to interfirm and intrafirm research. TCE offers 
an ex ante calculative choice perspective on the structuring of governance in transactional 
relationships. It suggests that the relationships are governed by contracts incorporating 
control structures that provide solutions for coordination problems and anticipated 
opportunism.  
A governance structure is defined by Williamson (1979, p. 239) as “the institutional matrix 
within which transactions are negotiated and executed”. Different kinds of transactions 
require different kinds of governance c.q. contracting. One ‘generic’ governance structure is 
the hierarchy. Within a hierarchy, management designs a management control structure 
that aims to influence (constrain, monitor and incentivise) other members of the 
organisation to implement the organisation’s strategies (Anthony, 1965, 1988). A 
management control choice is for instance decentralisation. When an organisation chooses 
for decentralisation, decisions are allocated to organisational subunits or divisions. 
Managers of the divisions can, to a large extent, make their own operational decisions. An 
important decision is whether organisational processes or activities are executed within the 
boundaries of the division or whether they are delegated to a third party. By choosing for 
external outsourcing the decision is to delegate processes to a third party outside the 
organisation, in which case an interfirm relationship arises. By choosing for internal 
outsourcing activities are delegated to specialised divisions inside the organisation, such as 
an SSC which is called internal outsourcing. In this case one can speak of an intrafirm 
relationship. 
As for the control and governance of internal outsourcing this thesis starts from a TCE 
approach, viewing the control and governance structures as the result of rational decision 
making by individual human beings. By taking a TCE-perspective the focus is on the design 
and choice of structures (governance structures and control structures) that involve the 
relationship between an SSC and other departments or business units.  
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This thesis also reflects on the limitations of a TCE approach in studying processes of change 
in control and governance related to the development of an SSC. This is done by bringing TCE 
under the loop of empirical examination and critical evaluation, since not much research has 
been done on the actual usefulness of TCE in explaining intrafirm relations. It is 
acknowledged that a TCE approach does not study the real processes of change, but focuses 
on equilibrium and optimal solutions (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  
From a TCE viewpoint governance and control structures in internal and external 
outsourcing relationships are means to mitigate risks. A negotiated contract between two 
parties can contain management control structures which lead to control practices, such as 
measuring performance, reporting, evaluating and rewarding. However, in contradiction 
with neo-classical economics views, trust is emphasised as an important aspect of inter-
organisational relationships (Macaulay, 1963; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Zucker, 
1986). Since accounting research is traditionally based on economic assumptions, the role of 
trust in relation to control is often neglected (Baldvinsdottir, Hagberg, Johansson, Jonäll & 
Marton, 2011; Free, 2008). This study tries to fill this gap by emphasising the role of trust 
and the way it develops in the external outsourcing case study. It explores not only how an 
outsourcing relationship is built around contractual arrangements and control processes, but 
also how interaction between control practices and trust shapes the outsourcing 
relationship.  
A characteristic of TCE is that it takes an ostensive perspective. From an ostensive 
perspective, research focuses on detecting and explaining order and stability (Latour, 1986, 
2005). The ostensive conceptualisation of governance structures and control structures as 
stable, orderly and predictable structures ascribes subordinate instrumental roles to such 
structures. There is no acknowledgement of a more active transformative role of these 
structures. This is different from a performative perspective that views a governance 
structure as an active force in a relationship or network, as an actor that is made to act by 
many other actors and that mediates in shaping that very relationship or network. 
Performative perspectives in general draw on actor-network theory (ANT) kind of research 
(e.g. Boedker, 2010; Latour, 2005) and gained popularity in accounting research during the 
last ten to twenty years. It has been used in a variety of ways (e.g. Alcouffe, Berland & 
Levant, 2008; Chua & Mahama, 2007; Gendron & Barrett, 2004; Mouritsen, Hansen & 
Hansen, 2001; Mouritsen, Hansen & Hansen, 2009; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Thrane & 
Hald, 2006). Although it is acknowledged that the ostensive and performative perspectives 
start from distinct paradigms, this study aims to connect and complement them, as is 
suggested by Hansen (2011) and Vosselman (2012). From an ostensive viewpoint, 
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governance and control structures in an outsourcing relationship are related to individual 
rationality. This view is not disputed in this study, but this research also acknowledges that 
governance and control structures might play a role in the shaping and formatting of the 
outsourcing relationship (Law, 1992).  
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
The former section revealed that accounting research on lateral relations and particularly 
those that include trust is still scarce and that the research that has been done is mainly 
ostensive. This thesis tries to fill this gap by adding two case studies that research control 
and governance, including trust in lateral relationships. The overall aim of this research is to 
understand developments in control and governance in internal and external outsourcing 
relationships with a specific focus on the shaping and working of governance structures, 
management control structures, control practices and trust. 
In this thesis three main research questions are answered in two successive case studies. The 
first case study involves intrafirm governance structure change toward an SSC and addresses 
the following question: 
1. How does change in governance and control structures relate to the development 
of an internal outsourcing relationship? 
The second case study addresses interfirm governance structure change and explores how 
trust building through relational signals (Lindenberg, 2000) may be connected to both 
contracting and control practices. In particular, the study addresses two main questions.  
2. How can contracts and control structures act as vehicles for trust building? 
3. How do control practices relate to trust? 
Although the overarching topic in the case studies is the shaping and working of control and 
governance, the two case studies differ in their focus. As, for instance, the intrafirm study 
reveals that trust is more or less a neglected issue, the interfirm study focuses more on the 
relationship between trust and control.  
1.4 Research method 
Essentially, the research is field research. The research of outsourcing relationships will 
include such activities as the review of contracts, service level agreements (SLA’s), the 
analysis of other documents, the participation in meetings, open interviews, presentations 
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and reflections. The views of the most prominent actors involved in the lateral relationships 
are interpreted by drawing on a qualitative research methodology and using qualitative 
research methods. The number of semi-structured interviews amounts to eleven in the 
intrafirm case study and twenty-three in the interfirm case study. Moreover, there were a 
number of feedback meetings and a documentary analysis was performed. An on-going 
reflection on the data and its positioning against different theories is conducted to 
contribute to theory. The aim is to gain an in-depth understanding of the changes in the 
governance structures, the control structures and practices of internal and external 
outsourcing relationships. To capture the developments over time in both cases the research 
is spread over a longer period. The first internal outsourcing case study lasted from October 
2007 until November 2008. In the second external outsourcing case study there were two 
rounds of interviews from October 2008 until September 2009 and from June 2010 until 
November 2010.  
1.5 Research contributions 
Scientific relevance 
This research adds to the knowledge of control and governance of lateral relationships 
within and between firms. The focus on internal lateral relations (first case) induces the 
development of a broader concept of management control. Rather than a mere vertical 
control relationship between managers at different organisational levels, management 
control may also include horizontal governance relationships between managers at the same 
organisational level. The horizontal governance is in fact the governance of client-supplier 
relationships and is an element in the overall management control system in the 
organisation. The construction of such internal client-supplier relationships also offers a 
possibility for top management to introduce a market mechanism as a mechanism to control 
the management of the service unit (i.e. the management of the SSC). Exit threats are at the 
heart of such a mechanism and extends extant management control frameworks as for 
instance developed by Anthony (1965, 1988), Zimmerman (2011) and Simons (1995) and 
further contributes to a line of research that was set out by Speklé (2001) and Vosselman 
(2002). Although the rationalists TCE-approach offers additional insights in management 
control change, this empirical investigation challenges the calculative approach of the 
change and show that change in management control is to a large extent a drifting process. 
A drifting process is not based on clear decisions and guided action and does not show 
identifiable movements between origins and outcomes (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001). In this 
sense the empirical intrafirm research supports the claim that more performative research is 
needed in order to broaden perspectives and research insights. A TCE model for SSCs with 
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standard archetypes does not adequately capture the complexity of developments in 
practice towards SSC governance.  
Extant accounting literature repeatedly called for more research on the relationship 
between trust and control. It is still unclear whether trust is similar to, or different from 
control and how trust can manage the uncertainties of inter-organisational structures 
(Emsley & Kidon, 2007). Another gap in the literature is related to the role accounting can 
play in generating trust and trustworthiness (Free, 2008), or how the sharing of accounting 
information can help in the establishment of trusting relationships (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). 
There is also a lack of empirical insight into the way accounting acts in processes of relational 
signalling (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) and in processes of trust development 
during contracting (Meira, Kartalis, Tsamenyi & Cullen, 2010). 
The interfirm part of this research tries to fill some of these research gaps. It contains a rich 
description of a real life contractual relationship which provides in-depth insights into the 
development of trust and control. Control practices and trust developments are studied 
during a complete contracting period with all changes, discussions, ups and downs that are 
common in dynamic interfirm relationships. The study demonstrates the role that 
contracting (inter alia resulting in formal control structures) and control practices can play in 
both safeguarding and trust building. The main contribution is an empirical illustration of 
(re)-contracting as an essential phase for the (further) development of the interfirm 
relationship because it produces commitment and trust. Furthermore, the control practices, 
related to contractual control structures, are shown to serve the safeguarding of interests as 
well as cooperative behaviour. Trust can be related to individual decisions leading to 
relational signals, but can also be associated to a relational network in which trust plays a 
role in the shaping of control and governance. These insights broaden the significance of 
contracting and control practices from formal safeguarding to the building of positive 
expectations and intentions in the relationship.  
Practical relevance 
This research has practical relevance for parties involved in both internal and external 
outsourcing. Managers face complex decisions regarding the governance and control of 
horizontal relationships in practice. The internal outsourcing case study provides a TCE based 
model that can be used by managers to base their decisions on, but does also emphasise the 
limitations of such economic reasoning. The external outsourcing case study shows that it is 
important to be aware of the role that (re)-contracting, the contract and control practices 
can play in trust building processes. Especially ownership and commitment of key people 
involved come into view as important in the contract phase in order to enable a trust 
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building process. In addition, the study makes visible how control structures and practices 
can be vital as vehicles for signalling commitment to the collaborative relationships.  
1.6 Thesis structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured in six chapters as depicted in Figure 1-1. The figure 
shows the flow of the chapters, the main theories used and how the chapters relate to each 
other. The two case studies both have their own research focus, but conclusions about 
control and trust in the internal outsourcing field study provided input for the external 
outsourcing study. 
 
Figure 1-1: research outline 
Chapter two deepens the concepts of control, governance and trust. It starts with the 
differences between governance and control and the concept of SSCs, followed by a review 
of trust research in accounting literature.  
In chapter three the methodology and methods are discussed. The chapter outlines the 
methodological background and the choices that are made in the two field studies into 
internal and external outsourcing. It is explained why the choice is made for qualitative 
Control and governance of internal and external outsourcing
Case study 1: Internal outsourcing 
(chapter 4)
TCE
Control
Trust
The development of an SSC 
in relation to governance 
structure change
Case study 2: External outsourcing 
(Chapter 5 and 6) 
Trust
Relational 
signalling
Control
The interaction between 
control and trust during a 
contractual period
Conclusion (chapter 7)
Introduction (Chapter 1)
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interpretive field studies and how the connection between ostensive and performative is 
made. It furthermore describes in detail the natural development of the research in a 
personal way.  
Chapter four describes the intrafirm lateral relationships between an internal SSC of a 
newspaper publisher and its newspaper divisions. This chapter is the integral version of a 
published paper that came out of this case study (Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013). It starts with 
a deepening of the concepts of SSCs and lateral relations and discusses the concepts of a 
management control structure and a governance structure. Then based on TCE, a model is 
developed, that relates Vosselman’s (2002) archetypes of management control to the 
control of SSCs. This is followed by a discussion about the limitations of a TCE approach. A 
significant part of the chapter describes and analyses the case study and, on the basis of this 
analysis, reflects on the theoretical model. The chapter ends up with a conclusion. 
In chapters five and six the external outsourcing relationship is described between a semi-
conductor organisation and a facility management agent. The research is conducted in two 
rounds of interviews. The focus of chapter five is on the first round of interviews. After a 
methodological justification and case description the main part of the chapter addresses the 
interaction between control and trust. The chapter ends with the main implications and 
conclusions. Chapter six focuses specifically on events after the contract-review which 
became more apparent after the second round of interviews. These interviews gave insight 
in the processes of control and trust when an outsourcing relationship is in a new 
negotiations phase for extending a contract.  
The thesis ends with a conclusion in chapter seven, where the main topics of the research 
are summarised and the researched questions are addressed. The main findings of the two 
case studies are brought forward, and the differences and similarities of the cases are 
discussed. The chapter ends up with a reflection on the research, its limitations and offers an 
agenda for further research. This thesis now turns to the literature on governance, control 
and trust in Chapter two. 
 
  
 
 CHAPTER 2:  GOVERNANCE, CONTROL AND TRUST 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to governance, control and trust. This 
chapter is divided in three main sections. Section 2.2 starts with discussing the overarching 
concept of this thesis, i.e. internal and external outsourcing including the concept of shared 
service centres. Section 2.3 continues with the way these lateral relations are governed. 
Finally section 2.4 addresses the research on trust and the relation with control. 
2.2 Internal and external outsourcing 
A quick review of outsourcing definitions makes clear that they are quite similar. DeRose 
(1999, p. 1), for example, defines outsourcing as “the idea of using external resources or 
products to meet business needs”. Referring to an external resource makes this a definition 
of external outsourcing which is traditionally just called outsourcing. Another definition of 
external outsourcing is “the contracting out of an internal business process to a third party 
organisation2”. However, the third party can also be another division within the same 
organisation, normally referred to as a shared service centre (SSC). Then it is also possible to 
speak of internal outsourcing. The research in this thesis on internal outsourcing focuses on 
such an SSC.  
An SSC is a unit within an organisation that delivers services to other units of that (and 
sometimes other) organisation(s). Inter alia because of the rapid development of Enterprise 
Resource Planning systems, SSCs enable efficiency improvement by standardisation and 
concentration of services such as administration, customer service, finance, human 
resources, information technology, real estate & physical plant and sales and marketing 
(Bergeron, 2003). According to professional journals3, the adoption of the concept of an SSC 
is perceived as an essential business strategy decision. As a consequence of an increased 
(internal) client-oriented attitude not only the costs decrease, but also the quality of the 
services increases. Therefore, for a large population of organisations, adoption of the 
concept is expected to be a matter of time (Strikwerda, 2005). In order to assist practitioners 
in developing the construct, the articles in these professional journals merely focus on the 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outsourcing (22 February 2013) 
3 For instance Management control en accounting, Chief Financial Officer, Financieel-Management.nl, Jaarboek Financial 
Shared Service Centers 
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steps that have to be taken to implement SSCs. An interesting question that remains is how 
governance and control changes as a consequence of an SSC. 
When an SSC is introduced, control changes from vertical hierarchical control to a more 
horizontal or lateral relationship (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Vosselman, 
2002). In lateral relations managers work primarily with other managers at similar hierarchal 
levels and essentially involve co-operation and co-ordination, rather than command and 
control. The notions of lateral or horizontal organisations refer primarily to intrafirm 
relationships, but can also refer to interfirm relationships. Sometimes it is even difficult to 
make a strict distinction between intra- or interfirm relationships. Thrane and Hald (2006) 
for instance, studied the relationship between management control and boundaries of firms 
in supply fields and suggested “that the complex system of relations between entities and 
the emergence of boundaries is much more fluid, multidimensional and dynamic than 
usually suggested in the literature. This fluid conceptualisation of the supply field has the 
consequence that we do not distinguish sharply between intra- and inter-organisational 
controls” (Thrane & Hald, 2006, p. 295). This approach was advocated earlier by Berry (1994) 
who examined the organisational and control problems of organisations that are linked by 
contracts to both suppliers and to purchasers in a complex chain of organisations. In such 
embedded networks, activities span the traditional and legal boundaries of the firm, and as a 
result new forms of governance and control are needed. The next section discusses the 
concepts of governance and control. 
2.3 Governance and control 
2.3.1 Relationship between governance and control  
A relationship needs to be governed and controlled, but it is not always clear how 
governance and control refer to each other. Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008) 
follow Nooteboom (2002) and use the term governance for lateral intrafirm relationships 
because senior management is not in the position to exercise control, since knowledge 
about the processes is present at the parties in the relationship. Subordinates are expected 
to ‘govern’ their own lateral relationship and senior management facilitates this process. 
Van Veen-Dirks and Verdaasdonk (2009) use the concept of governance for interfirm control 
in a supply chain and include local management control of the participating companies as 
part of the overall governance. In both cases management control is subordinate or part of 
governance. For this research a conceptualisation of governance and control is made that 
helps in analysing outsourcing relations. 
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A starting point for analysing governance and control in interfirm relations is transaction cost 
economics (TCE). In TCE terms, the basic unit of analysis is the transaction. Transactions 
“contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality and order” (Commons, 1932, p. 
4). Building on this idea Williamson (1979, 2000) described governance as the institutional 
frameworks to craft order, mitigate conflicts and realise mutual gains. Within this framework 
“transactions are negotiated and executed” (Williamson, 1979, p. 239). In a generic sense, 
such transactions may be governed by a hierarchy (an organisation), but may alternatively 
also be governed by a market or a hybrid form between a market and a hierarchy. Markets, 
hierarchies and hybrids are thus conceived of as alternative generic governance structures, 
each having its own transaction costs. In a specific situation, a governance structure is 
considered to be the result of a purposeful choice by rational human actors who are 
efficiency-seeking (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006b). Given that choice, there is a 
need for systems, procedures and processes that influence different managers to act 
effectively and efficiently, which are called management control structures. As a 
consequence the concepts of governance and management control should be treated 
distinctively.  
Figure 2-1 Starts from the generic TCE distinction of Williamson where the governance 
structure is a choice between a hierarchy, a hybrid or a market. The basic question here is if 
the transactions are executed only by the organisations itself or together with third parties. 
When organisations are considering internal or external outsourcing on a long term 
contractual basis, the choice for market governance is not prevalent. Market governance is 
the main governance structure for nonspecific transaction, that can easily be purchases 
elsewhere, simply called a sale (Williamson, 1979). So the main governance structure 
solutions for lateral relations are the hierarchy or the hybrid. 
When a hierarchy is chosen as a generic governance structure subsequently a management 
control structure has to be designed that drives the behaviour of the managers of the 
organisation towards goal congruence. The management control structure choice concerns 
whether top management will exclusively exercise top down control by the design of vertical 
relationships or whether control is also exercised through horizontal client-buyer 
relationships. Whenever SSC’s are established, there is an inherent choice for the design of 
horizontal client-buyer relationships. An important additional choice problem then is if the 
transactions are with captive buying or selling (b/s) or free b/s. Or in other words, if the 
divisions are obliged to buy products or services from the SSC or if they are free to purchase 
their goods or services from another party outside the organisation.  
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After these management control structure choices, the horizontal transactions need to be 
governed again which lead to a new level of governance of transactional relations. This is 
only necessary for the horizontal transactions, because the horizontal transactions have to 
be negotiated between equal partners. In a vertical management control design, top 
management can make its own decisions. The horizontal transactional relations between an 
SSC and other divisions are in general governed by contractual frameworks called service 
level agreements (SLA’s). When divisions may choose to contract an external party (in the 
case of free b/s), a hybrid governance structure arises, which also has to be governed with a 
contractual arrangement. 
The final layer at the bottom of Figure 2-1 is the specific management control of the vertical 
or horizontal relationship. For vertical management control, top management has to make 
choices regarding the decentralisation of decision rights, the measurement of performance 
and the setting of targets (Zimmerman, 2011). Also within horizontal arrangements, such as 
an SLA, similar management control structures can be agreed on, for example in the form of 
key performance indicators and certain incentive systems. Thus, both governance structures 
and control structures can be present at different levels within an organisation. 
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Figure 2-1: Different levels of governance and management control structures 
2.3.2 Ostensive and performative perspectives of governance and control 
In the section above, governance and control structures are perceived as static mechanisms 
which are designed and implemented by management. But they may also be perceived as 
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ostensive and the second perspective performative (Latour, 2005). 
From an ostensive perspective a governance and control structure is the result of rational 
decision making by individual human actors. The governance structure (and management 
control structure) is a solution for a governance (or control) problem. Both the governance 
structure and the control structure are viewed as stable, orderly and predictable structures. 
However, Thrane (2007, p. 248) argues that an organisation, seen as a complex inter-
organisational system, is a “source of instability rather than stability, a source of emergent, 
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A performative perspective is characterised by a focus on processes of becoming and 
enacting in a relational network; a network consisting of humans and other-than-humans 
such as contracts and control technologies. The governance and control structures are also 
active forces in a relationship or network, forces that are made to act by many other actors 
and that help to mediate, shape and construct the structures. 
Only in the last decade accounting studies started to research performative processes 
through which new accounting systems and practices have emerged (or failed to emerge) 
through time (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Burns & Vaivio, 2001; Busco et al., 2007). An example 
is for instance actor-network theory (ANT). From an actor-network approach, governance 
and control structures are framed and shaped in a relational and heterogeneous network; a 
network of humans and things (other-than-humans). A certain governance structure or 
control structure may be accepted by the actors and may become “taken for granted”. This 
may lead to some form of temporary stability, but never for long because the actors act 
upon the governance structure, but the governance structure also enacts upon them. Thus 
in this way governance and control are in a continuous change over time and are 
performative.  
Although the ostensive perspective and the performative perspective are distinct from each 
other, it may be possible to study both the ostensive and performative aspects of 
governance and control. The distinction between ostensive and performative aspects comes 
from Feldman and Pentland (2003) who describe them as aspects of organisational routines. 
The ostensive aspect is the ideal or schematic form of a routine, while the performative 
aspect can best be understood as inherently improvisational. Performative aspects fit with a 
conceptualisation of organisations and relationships as social-material networks that are in a 
continuous state of flux. Since routines are regarded by Feldman and Pentland as the 
primary means to generate change, merely by its on-going performance, this thesis regards 
control practices as having the same capabilities as routines. Thus, also the ostensive and 
performative aspects of control practices can be studied. 
This thesis adopts the viewpoint that one research may combine understandings of both 
ostensive and performative aspects. Such understandings complement each other4. The 
thesis suggests that there may be a duality between the solutions stemming from rational 
decisions to design and the choice of governance and control structures, and the shaping 
and enactment of governance and control structures in concrete social-material networks. 
Following an avenue set out by Feldman and Pentland (2003), Thrane and Hald (2006), 
4 Chapter 3 discusses in more detail how this is applied in this thesis 
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Thrane (2007), Boedker (2010), Hansen (2011) and Vosselman (2012) this research tries to 
complement an ostensive understanding with a more performative understanding. This 
ambition rests upon the assumptions that in organisations and organisational relationships 
there are both attempts for rational decision making and instrumentality (for example by 
top management) and processes of unintended an emerging change in a relational network. 
Top management of an organisation, for example, may position itself as the calculative 
centre of the organisation, and may show rational decision making and instrumental 
behaviour. Other managers that are more or less in the periphery may on the other hand 
experience that they are in the network. They may experience the performativity of the 
actors that enter the network as a consequence of top management’s decisions, but also 
experience the influence of many other relations in the network.  
2.4 Trust and control 
Since Hopwood’s (1996) call to look across rather than up and down, many contributions on 
lateral relations have been published in the management accounting literature, but a 
relative unexplored area is the sharing of accounting information and the establishment of 
trusting relations (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). Reviews on accounting research in lateral relations 
specifically critique TCE because of the absence of the dimension of trust (Van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006b). This absence of 
trust in TCE research originates from the seminal work of Williamson (1993a, 1996) who 
states that the choice for a governance structure is based on calculated risks and that trust 
does not add anything to that analysis. However, other authors argue that trust should play 
an important role in theorising about governance and management control (De Man & 
Roijakkers, 2009; Nooteboom, 1996, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006b).  
This research on control and governance of internal and external outsourcing further 
explorers the importance of trust in lateral relationships and therefore the remainder of this 
chapter provides an overview of trust research and the relation with control. 
2.4.1 Reviews of trust in the field of accounting 
Two reviews of trust and accounting have been published. The most recent ones are by Free 
(2008), who did a combination of a review and a case study and by Baldvinsdottir et al. 
(2011). From the reviews it can be concluded that trust has been an emerging topic in the 
accounting discipline. Free (2008) found that between 1985 and 2005 nineteen papers were 
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published with trust as a significant concept5. Baldvinsdottir et al. (2011) found sixteen 
management accounting papers that somehow contributed to knowledge on the relation 
between trust and control 6. 
Both papers suggest that trust has a lot of potential for knowledge production in accounting, 
but until now the research still indicates a lack of clarity in the conceptualisation of work in 
the accounting discipline dealing with trust. Free (2008, p. 653) aims to start “a 
conceptualisation of trust that has both academic and practical benefit”, but he warns 
researchers to be aware of the difference between generated trust and the use of trust as a 
discursive resource, or in other words, just talk about trust. Moreover, more understanding 
is needed of the relationship between trust, trustworthiness and the role of power in 
relations between trading partners, because asymmetrical power relations are widespread. 
This can be achieved by conducting research with a time horizon of several years so that the 
actual development of the relationship can be studied in more depth. 
Also more general reviews about developments in management accounting research, with 
trust as one of the topics have been published. Similar to Free (2008), Caglio and Ditillo 
(2008) emphasise the importance of the development of the relationship. Did partners start 
with or without a formal contract and how did this influence the control choices? By only 
studying the relationship at a particular point in time these developments and the influence 
on control gets lost, they state. Also Meira et al. (2010) argue that the accounting-trust-
contract nexus needs examinations since most interfirm relationships are based on 
contracts. They also find that the process of trust building has not been given much 
attention in research until now. Finally Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2006) 
conclude that “there is a complex relationship between trust and control. Further research 
into this relationship is needed to enhance our understanding” (p. 232). 
From the different reviews it can be concluded that the issue of trust has gained importance 
in accounting research, but that it remains relevant to conduct more research, particularly 
into the interactive development of trust, control and contracts. The research presented in 
this thesis is contributing to this field by studying the contracting process and the control 
practices and trust building in an outsourcing relationship. The next section is about the 
different definitions of trust. 
5  Based on 11 influential accounting journals 
6  Based on a research in 20 influential accounting journals 
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2.4.2 Definitions of trust 
Baldvinsdottir et al. (2011) made a list of definitions in their review and distinguished thirty-
five definitions. Many definitions share common characteristics such as positive expectations 
that a partner will not behave opportunistically, and the willingness to be vulnerable (e.g. 
Tomkins, 2001). Most definitions used are developed outside the field of accounting. Trust is 
researched in psychology, sociology and economy. In psychology it is about the individual 
attributes of the trustor and the trustee. Accounting scholars for instance refer to Zand 
(1972) (e.g. Lau & Sholihin, 2005), who builds on existing definitions within the psychological 
literature. His definition of trust is “the conscious regulation of one's dependence on 
another that will vary with the task, the situation, and the other person” (Zand, 1972, p. 
230). Sociologists often define trust as a socially embedded property of relationships. In this 
perspective a characteristic of trust is the result of institutional arrangements (e.g. Zucker, 
1986). Within economics, trust is viewed as an institutional aspect (North, 1990), or it is just 
calculative behaviour to mitigate the risks of self-interested behaviour (Williamson, 1993a). 
According to Williamson (1993a) calculative trust is a contradiction in terms. The language of 
risk is already in place to describe calculative relations and there is no need to include the 
'misleading' notion of trust. If trust obtains at all, it is reserved for personal relations 
between family, friends and lovers. He calls this kind of trust however not noncalculable but 
near noncalculable. Risk is also an important component in trust research for Das and Teng 
(2001, p. 255) who argue that “trust is about positive expectations regarding the other in 
risky situations” and conclude that without risk, trust is not needed. They follow Coleman 
(1990) in this respect who states that he would not research trust without analysing risks.  
In an attempt to formulate a multi-disciplinary definition Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer 
(1998, p. 395) combined definitions from psychology, sociology and economics and 
formulated trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another”. This definition 
is also used by management accounting researchers (e.g. Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 2003). 
Accepting vulnerability is important within alliances according to De Man and Roijakkers 
(2009), but also the willingness to act in the common interest of the relationship. When 
partner are intrinsically motivated to make an alliance successful, they will automatically act 
in the interest of the alliance and there will be less need for control.  
2001, p. 165) defines trust as “the adoption of a belief by one party in a relationship that the 
other party will not act against his or her interests, where this belief is held without undue 
doubt or suspicion and in the absence of detailed information about the actions of that 
other party”. Baldvinsdottir et al. (2011) observe that in the field of accounting Tomkins' 
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definition is used in four other papers. This focused attention of researchers may indicate 
the emergence of a consensus within which it is possible to develop more complex theories.  
According to Free (2008) trust cannot be universally defined to suit any theoretical purpose, 
but in the context of inter-organisational relations he found that the definition of Mayer et 
al. (1995), is used widely. They define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that other party” (p. 172). This definition will be used in this thesis as it brings the positive 
attitude of being vulnerable and having positive expectations to the foreground. 
Trust should be distinguished from trustworthiness. Coletti, Sedatole and Towry (2005, p. 
481) defines trustworthiness as “an innate personal characteristic reflecting one’s 
preference for upholding some social norm of behaviour, regardless of economic 
incentives”. Trust is then one’s perception of another’s trustworthiness. Also Mayer et al. 
(1995) describes trustworthiness as the foundations for the development of trust, based on 
the trustee’s ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability has to do with the perception of skills 
and competences, benevolence is the perception of having the intentions to do good and 
integrity is the perception that the trustee adheres to a set of accepted principles. The effect 
of integrity on trust will be most salient early in the relationships, prior to the development 
of benevolence. Effects of perceived benevolence on trust are expected to increase over 
time as the relationships develop. 
2.4.3 Aspects and categorisations of trust 
Individual trust and organisational trust 
In the literature trust is discussed between individuals and between organisations Das and 
Teng (2001). According to Free (2008) trust is most often conceived of as a construct that 
occurs through interaction between individuals and when is spoken of inter-organisational 
trust it is trust between two sets of individuals, each of which is trusting the organisation of 
which the other is a member (based on Blois, 1999, p. 210). Nooteboom (1996) warns for an 
emphasis on personal trust as this is not a good basis for business relations. He states that 
personal motives and organisational goals can differ, which may lead to goal incongruence. 
Trust can also disappear when people remove from organisations, especially when trust 
depends on these persons. That is why it is important that there is more than personal trust. 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2006a) discuss this as well and argue that it is the 
organisation that enters into a transactional relationship. They refer to Tomkins (2001) who 
shows that it is possible to have organisational trust. An organisation is a group of actors and 
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such a group can conclude that other things, persons or groups can be trusted. They also 
warn for the risk of changes in staff, but they conclude that the principle that trust can 
develop and grow remains intact (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2006a, p.326). 
Contractual trust, Competence trust and goodwill trust 
Trust can be categorised in many ways, but a few categorisations of trust are recurring 
among many authors. One of these categorisations is the one by Sako (1992) who 
differentiates between contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust (e.g., Emsley 
& Kidon, 2007; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Vélez, 
Sánchez & Álvarez-Dardet, 2008). 
Contractual trust adheres to specific written or oral agreements and is based on the 
universalistic ethical standard of keeping promises. Partners may also trust on the 
institutional environment, where it should be possible to enforce the contract. To a certain 
extent it can be expected that the other party will honour the contract because otherwise 
there will be legal consequences. This enforcement of a contract will however not often 
happen as this will damage the relationship and that is in nobody's interest. It is really a last 
resort. 
Competence trust is about the expectation that a partner is performing his or her role 
competently. It is about both technical and managerial competence. Competence trust may 
find its sources in the institutional environment and/or may be a result of past performance. 
Firms who proved to be competent in other relationships build a reputation of competence 
(Das & Teng, 2001; Sitkin & Roth, 1993).  
Goodwill trust “refers to mutual expectations of open commitment to each other” (Sako, 
1992, p. 38). An open commitment is defined by Sako as the willingness to do more than is 
formally expected. Das and Teng (2001) call it the establishment of mutual objectives and 
interests. It is based on shared norms and values, a common bond and willingness to help 
each other, established through interpersonal interaction and friendship in dealing with 
uncertainty. Similar to goodwill trust is intentional trust (Nooteboom, 1996, 2002). 
Intentional trust is the approach of partners towards the relationship, particularly in 
refraining from opportunism. 
Fragile trust and resilient trust 
A categorisation made by Ring (1996) is between fragile and resilient trust. Fragile trust is 
about the way parties characterise their deal and not the way they characterise each other. 
Fragile trust equates with risk, as parties need some confidence that they can predict the 
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outcome of the transactional relationship. A contract may be a foundation for developing 
stability in social and economic relationships. It may help parties lay the groundwork for 
creating more efficient governance mechanisms for future transactions. Resilient trust is 
very similar to goodwill trust and is described as the kind of trust that “survives the 
occasional transaction in which the calculative expectations of economic actors regarding a 
specific economic exchange, and the outcomes of that exchange, do not fully converge” 
(Ring, 1996, p. 152).  
Cognition-based and affect-based trust 
McAllister (1995) distinguishes between cognition-based and affect-based trust. He 
describes the amount of knowledge necessary to trust as a continuum from total knowledge 
to total ignorance. In the first situation trust is not needed and in the last situation there is 
no basis upon which to rationally trust. The cognition-based part is based on available 
knowledge and 'good reasons' to decide whom to trust. Available knowledge and ‘good 
reasons’ serve as foundations for trust decisions. Past performance, for instance, could, just 
as competence trust, be a basis for cognition based trust. 
Affect-based trust is based on emotional ties between individuals. "People make emotional 
investments in trust relationships, express genuine care and concern for the welfare of 
partners, believe in the intrinsic virtue of such relationships, and believe that these 
sentiments are reciprocated” (McAllister, 1995, p. 26). This description has many 
characteristics of goodwill trust which is also about mutual expectations, interpersonal 
interaction and friendship and the willingness to help each other; however goodwill trust is 
not described in term of emotions. McAllister links affect-based trust also with altruistic 
behaviour which "cannot easily be attributed to enlightened self-interest" (Ibid, p.29). 
Weak, semi-strong and strong forms of trust 
Barney and Hansen (1994) distinguish three forms of trust: weak form trust, semi-strong 
form trust and strong form trust. The weak form trust exists in a situation where trust is 
hardly needed because of the limited opportunities for opportunism. This is the case when 
full information is available about the other parties' products or competences. Semi-strong 
trust exists when opportunities are mitigated through governance devices. So this is 
comparable with contractual trust. Strong form trust, or also called hard-core trust does 
have similarities with goodwill trust and is described as trust that emerges when 
opportunistic behaviour would violate values and principles that have been internalised by 
parties to an exchange. 
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Deterrence, calculus, relational and institutional trust 
Rousseau et al. (1998) differentiate deterrence-based trust, calculus-based trust, relational 
trust and institution-based trust as different origins of trust. Firstly, deterrence-based trust is 
based on the expectation that the other party shall not behave opportunistically, as this will 
be disadvantageously for that party. The party might for instance incur switching costs 
because of asset specificity. Rousseau et al. (1998) conclude however that this may not be 
trust at all but may be closer to low levels of distrust. This kind of trust is more related to 
asymmetrical power relations and interdependence as is suggested by Free (2008).  
Secondly, calculus-based trust is based on rational choice and "derives not only from the 
existence of deterrence but also because of credible information regarding the intentions or 
competence of another" (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 399). Examples of credible information 
can come from others in the form of reputational accounts or as proof of competence, 
reflected in diplomas or certificates.  
Thirdly, relational trust arises from repeated interaction between parties within the 
relationship itself which give rise to positive expectations about the others intentions. 
Rousseau et al. (1998) follow McAllister (1995) by acknowledging that emotions enter into 
the relationship, because a long-term relationship leads to the formation of attachments. 
Dekker (2004), who also uses the distinction of Rousseau et al. (1998), refers to relational 
trust as an emergent characteristic that cannot simply be implemented, but over time it can 
be built. Examples of trust building activities are joint goal setting, problem solving, decision 
making and partner development activities. 
Fourthly, institution-based trust is described by Rousseau et al. (1998) as a form of trust that 
can "ease the way to formulating both calculus-based and relational trust" (p. 400). 
Institutions can exist at the organisational level, such as teamwork culture or at the societal 
level such as legal systems. 
Thin and thick trust 
Another not so widely used distinction is that between thin and thick trust. Nooteboom 
(1996) used the term thick trust for bonds of friendship, kinship or empathy. In a later paper, 
he described the term thin trust as a general starting point of trust that can develop into 
thick trust (Nooteboom, 2002). Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2005) used the 
term thin trust as a synonym for institution-based trust and thick trust as a personal form of 
trust, but they did not develop it any further. Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) 
extended the idea of thin and thick trust by theorising on the accounting-control-trust nexus 
in interfirm transactional relationships. They define thin trust as trust “based on a contract 
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and the institutional environment that compensates for negative behavioural expectations, 
without by itself producing positive behavioural expectations” (p. 271). Thick trust is defined 
as trust that produces positive behavioural expectations regarding the behaviour of other 
parties. Thin trust is produced by formal control structures incorporated in a governance 
structure and thick trust by relational signals through voluntary local decisions. They model 
the building of trust as an interactive process where thin trust is established first as a basis 
for a transactional relationship, thus providing input for the building of thick trust.  
The building of thick trust is achieved through relational signalling. Lindenberg (1997) argues 
that parties who are dependent of each other are watchful for relational signals that indicate 
continued willingness to cooperate. In a process of mutual signalling they interpret their 
partners’ behaviour and try to ensure that their intentions are cooperative. When parties 
perceive this positive intentions as cooperative they are both in a normative frame 
(Lindenberg, 2000). This process is based on enlightened self-interest (Chaserant, 2003), 
which is a precarious equilibrium between gain seeking and the compliance with 
cooperation norms. Trust in this situation is the consideration that your partner will 
cooperate, according to the signals involved in his behavior and the prevailing cooperation 
norms. Trust, then, will not be violated, neither through strategic opportunism nor through 
myopia (Chaserant, 2003, p. 174). 
Trust and control as a duality 
An alternative view to the relationship between trust and control is offered by Möllering 
(2005). The author states that most researchers view the connection between control and 
trust as a dualism. This means that they view the concepts of control and trust as two 
distinct principles that can substitute, complement or create one another. Moreover, the 
dualism view suggests that trust and control somehow belong together, but remain distinct 
concepts. An increase or decrease of the level of trust does not automatically change the 
level of control. It can stay the same or change upwards or downwards. However, Möllering 
(2005) believes that the view of trust and control as a dualism is overly simplistic. It ignores 
the attributes that do occur in reality in modern social relations. The author argues that the 
concepts of trust and control are not as dissociated from one another as is perceived by 
many researchers. He rather views the relationship as a form of duality. This means that 
trust needs control, and vice versa, control needs trust. He suggests that “trust and control 
each assume the existence of the other, refer to each other and create each other, but 
remain irreducible to each other.” (p. 284). The duality approach offers an interactive 
perspective on the relationship between trust and control and challenges more traditional 
views about this relationship being only substitutable or complimentary. Vosselman and Van 
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der Meer-Kooistra (2009) also adopted an interactive perspective, because they think it 
accounts for the interrelated dynamics of control and trust. They perceive the interactive 
perspective as similar to the duality perspective of Möllering, but they “argue that an 
interaction perspective leaves more room for the influence that control has on the level of 
trust, and vice versa” (p.269). 
Ostensive and performative aspects of trust 
Similar to governance and control, trust does have both ostensive and performative aspects. 
Researchers may differentiate between ostensive and performative aspects of trust because 
this may help to explain contradictory findings between the abstract, objective and 
generalised idea of trust and the trust in practice (see Feldman & Pentland, 2003, for a 
similar reasoning regarding organisational routines). Organisational members objectify and 
generalise trust when they are asked about their idea of trust within an organisational 
relationship, but also have subjective and performative understandings of trust. The many 
definitions and categorisations of trust described above refer to ostensive aspects of trust. 
Research on performative aspects of trust is still scarce.  
A notable exception is the research by Mouritsen and Thrane (2006). They observe that trust 
research is mostly about how much trust can be established and less about how trust is 
mobilised. By observing the activities of actors in a relationship they describe the shaping of 
trust in a performative way. The conclusion by Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) is that trust can 
work in two ways. (1) It can provide predictability, for instance about agreements that are 
made. In this sense it is comparable with forms of contractual or thin trust. (2) Trust is a 
relation to people in the network, meaning that it is mobilised when problems in the 
relationship arise. They observe that trust may circulate, but that it becomes particularly 
important when it is absent. It is problematised when the actions of some actors contradict 
with the norms and values of other actors in the network. 
Conclusion trust review 
Based on recent reviews, trust seems still a topic that needs more research in accounting. 
This section illustrates that many different categorisations of trust do exists, but it also 
shows that there is overlap between the different types of trust. The definition of Mayer et 
al (p. 712) is most applicable for this thesis: 
Trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party.  
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Using this definition of trust as a reference point, not all types of trust fit within this 
definition. The following distinction can be made (Table 2-1): 
Table 2-1: Distinction between types of trust 
Types of trust that fit within trust 
definition 
Types of trust that do not fit within 
trust definition 
thick trust thin trust  
goodwill trust contractual trust 
resilient trust competence trust 
strong trust fragile trust 
affect-based trust weak trust 
relational trust semi-strong trust 
competence trust cognition based trust 
 
The types of trust that not fit within the chosen trust definition contain forms of trust that to 
a certain extent ‘protects’ parties against opportunistic behaviour by the other party, simply 
because there is no possibility of opportunistic behavior, or there is a contract or there is 
some kind of evidence that the other party can be trusted. The different types of trust in 
each category of Table 2-1 have only slightly different meanings, but they fit quite well 
within the definitions of thick and thin trust. So the distinction between thick and thin trust 
may be practical for future research on trust. However, all the discussed types of trust are 
emphasising ostensive aspects with properties that can be linked to social phenomena. 
Research that studies performative aspects of trust as they are related to accounting is still 
scarce. Therefore that will be one of the objectives of this research. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
With this chapter the fundamental concepts of this thesis are explained. These concepts are 
internal and external outsourcing, shared service centres, governance, control and trust. For 
this research a precise conceptualisation of a governance structure and a management 
control structure is presented and a deeper insight is gained about the multiple categories of 
trust. A special emphasis is given to the ostensive and performative aspects of these 
concepts.  
 
  
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
Methodology has a more flexible meaning in qualitative research than its 
quantitative sister" (Silverman, 2005, p. 306). 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about the methodology of my research. In the social sciences methodology is 
related to both different theoretical perspectives and to “issues of specific research 
techniques, concepts and methods” (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007, p. 6). The first section 
explains the choice for selecting qualitative field research in this thesis and how this differs 
from quantitative research. The second section discusses the theoretical distinction between 
ostensive and performative research and explains how this research tries to connect these 
two perspectives. Section 3.1 describes the natural history of my research. This section is a 
methodological discussion in which I describe the actual course of my decision making from 
collecting data to writing up the research. The chapter ends with a summary. 
3.2 The choice for qualitative research 
Qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the 
world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 3). 
The choice between qualitative or quantitative research is a methodological choice. It is 
about the general approach to studying research topics and has to be distinguished from the 
choice of methods. Methods are particular research techniques such as interviews, 
observations or questionnaires which can be used for different methodologies (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006). The question whether qualitative research is the appropriate approach for 
a research problem depends on what exactly the researcher aims to achieve (Silverman, 
2005). Qualitative researchers aim to gather an in-depth understanding of the why and how 
of phenomena, not just what, where or when. Another important question according to 
Silverman (2005) is what seems to work best for the researcher. The choice between 
quantitative research and qualitative research is often based on the background and 
methodological approach of the researcher, or, as Yin (2003, p. 15) states "on the basis of 
wholly different philosophical beliefs." One philosophical belief is positivism, which makes 
the ontological assumption of an objective reality that can be accessed independent of those 
observing it. Another philosophical belief is the interpretative perspective, which makes the 
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ontological assumption of a subjectively created, emergent social reality that can only be 
accessed in relation with those observing it (Chua, 1986; Shah & Corley, 2006). The most 
common methodology for positivists is quantitative research, while the interpretative 
perspective can best be accessed through qualitative research (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006) 
and tends to work with a small number of cases (Silverman, 2005). 
Since this study investigates how and why a certain control and governance structure comes 
into place, a qualitative research approach for this thesis is appropriate. It preserves 
complexity and integrity of the phenomenon under study, offers views and experiences of 
the study participants and examines the views and perceptions in an interpretive manner (cf. 
Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1986). It starts from the belief that social reality is objectified through 
the interaction between actors, which might be human or non-human. It responds to calls 
for in depth and process studies on interfirm relationships (e.g. Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). This 
field research involves the use of qualitative data for describing, analysing and theorising the 
phenomenon. It exceeds the level of mere description, but aims at positioning data against 
theory in order to contribute to further theory building (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). Extant 
theoretical knowledge on TCE, contracting, controlling and trust together with field data are 
used to draw plausible conclusions.  
Having made the choice for qualitative research a research strategy has to be selected. 
According to Yin (2003) the choice of a research strategy is based on the following three 
conditions: (1) the type of the research question: how and why questions can be answered 
by case study research whereas quantitative questions like how many and how much are 
rather used for quantitative methods such as surveys and archival analysis; (2) the extent of 
control over behavioural events: case study analysis does not require control over the 
investigated behavioural element as for example experimental study does; (3) the degree of 
focus on contemporary events: case studies are predominantly used to investigate 
contemporary phenomena. For this study, the nature of the research questions (how and 
why questions), the absence of a need or desire to control behavioural events as well as a 
focus on a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, make case study research the 
most appropriate strategy (Silverman, 2005; Yin, 2003). Chua states that for interpretive 
understanding, “‘thick’ case studies conducted in the life-world of actors are preferred to 
distant large-scale sampling or mathematical modelling of human intention” (Chua, 1986, p. 
615). Since this study addresses organisational phenomena and accounting practices in 
specific organisations, the research can be described as field research. Ahrens and Chapman 
define qualitative field study as studies that "collect data in the domain 'field' and employ 
'qualitative' methodology" (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006, p. 821). This field research will involve 
R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y  A N D  M E T H O D  | 45 
such activities as the review of contracts, the analysis of other documents, the participation 
in meetings, open interviews, presentations and reflections. By gaining understanding of the 
changes in governance and control structures and practices, and of the way in which they 
can be related to TCE or trust, this study tries to make a contribution to theory. 
To summarise, this study offers illustrations of processes of control and governance in 
outsourcing relationships in the field. Essentially, in this thesis, the notion is adopted that 
reality is subjectively created and objectified through human and non-human interaction. By 
adopting such a notion scientific explanations are sought that match intentions and other 
motivational forces with the events in the field under study. These explanations add to 
extant knowledge on the governance and control in interfirm and intrafirm relationships. 
The next section describes two perspectives to approach this notion methodologically. 
3.3 Ostensive and performative research 
Methodologically there is a difference between ostensive and performative research. In this 
thesis I try to connect these approaches. I will further explain this by discussing ontological 
and epistemological issues.  
Hansen (2011) addresses performative and ostensive management accounting research with 
the aim to explore the possibilities for performative researchers to move closer to ostensive 
research. The presumption of ostensive research is that "in principle, it is possible to 
discover properties which are typical of life in society, and could explain the social link and 
its evolution, though in practice they might be difficult to detect" (Latour, 1986, p. 272). TCE 
research is a typical example of ostensive research as it tries to discover properties that 
explain the choice of a governance structure. A governance structure is seen as a 
phenomenon with characteristics that can be discovered piece-by-piece to accumulate 
knowledge about this phenomenon. Properties of transactions such as complexity, 
uncertainty or asset-specificity are used to explain governance structures, but in practice 
they are hard to observe. 
Performative research presumes that "it is impossible in principle to define the list of 
properties that would be typical of life in society, although in practice it is possible to do so" 
(Latour, 1986, p. 373). According to this viewpoint, "knowledge is performed and thereby 
inconstant and labile. The characteristics of phenomena are always situated, fragmented, 
and partial” (Hansen, 2011, p. 115). A governance structure studied from a performative 
viewpoint is a situated, fragmented and partial phenomenon, a structure that is rarely in one 
stable state, but changes over time when the nature of agreements (formal or informal) 
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changes (Thrane, 2007). Studying the governance and control of outsourcing relations in this 
way can create new insights that could not have been created by ostensive research.  
Performative research differs from ostensive research. In ostensive TCE-based research the 
focus is on the transaction or the transactional relation. Parties in a transactional relation 
stay at a relative distance of each other and they focus on their own interests. However, in 
transactional relations there is also more close interaction between parties. It is this 
interaction or movements between (human) actors, creating a certain social (dis)order that 
is studied using a performative approach (Callon, 1998; Callon, Law & Rip, 1986; Latour, 
1987, 1999; Law, 1999). In this approach a governance and control structure is not the result 
of decision making by (bounded) rational individual actors who have a priori intentions, but 
is the effect of the performative relations of humans and other-than-humans within a 
network (Vosselman, 2012). From a performative view, the formal governance and control 
structure is an actor by itself, produced and reproduced by the network. New hybrid forms 
and practices might arise through such processes.  
An example of performative research on accounting change, is that by Quattrone and 
Hopper (2001), who bring up the concept of fluidity. They suggest to use the term ‘drift’ 
instead of change to reflect that in the process of reaching desired ends the decision maker 
is not able to control all contextual factors. Based on two case studies and drawing upon the 
sociology of translation (or actor-network theory) they challenge the modernist belief that 
organisational space and time are unique and linear. Change is not simply guided action 
based on clear decisions, not an identifiable movement between origins and an outcome.  
Andon, Baxter and Chua (2007) extend the notion of drift towards ‘relational drift’. By 
focusing on 'interconnectedness' of (human and non-human) entities the relational quality 
of a drift is stressed. They conclude by stating that "the 'performativity' of accounting and 
the concept of 'relational drifting' raises questions about the ontological status of accounting 
as a knowledge object. In particular, how viable is it to conceive of accounting as a stable 
and singular knowledge object, when drift reflects the incomplete, polymorphous and 
unfolding nature of accounting 'in the making'?" (p. 279). In this thesis the notion of 
(relational) drift will be drawn upon in trying to understand change processes towards 
internal or external outsourcing structures. 
The question remains if it is possible to combine the ostensive and performative viewpoints. 
The argument by Hansen (2011, p. 132) is that:  
The theoretical abstractions and conceptualisations developed in ostensive 
research are key elements in integration between the two types of research 
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and suggests that performative researchers can do much more to expand the 
scope of the abstractions and conceptualisations from ostensive research they 
refer to. 
Although it is true that phenomena from an ostensive and performative viewpoint are 
different 'things', they are connected (Hansen, 2011, p. 128):  
At another level, they are similar because the things addressed in ostensive 
research and performative research can be considered as two sides of the 
same coin (Latour, 1987); the former outlines the general character of a given 
phenomenon, for example an ABC system, whereas the latter exposes its 
concrete mobilisation in specific episodes from practice (Pentland & Feldman, 
2007). 
Since this thesis seeks to relate performative research more closely to ostensive research, 
there are methodological implications. Hansen (2011) does some suggestions to achieve 
this. One suggestion is (p. 130): 
If the performative researcher spends more time in the research process on 
studying what Yin calls "the domain literature", an increasing awareness of 
the orientation and decomposability of theoretical concepts and abstractions 
developed in ostensive research will emerge. 
In this study this is applied by taking abstractions and conceptualisations from ostensive 
research, such as complexity, uncertainty, asset specificity, trust and control, and detect 
their performative effects in practice. This does not change the research strategy, but 
provides another viewpoint while collecting and analysing data. During interviews, for 
instance, questions focused more on interactions and processes. It offers opportunities for 
new insights in organisational change processes. How the research is conducted will be 
described in detail in the next section. 
3.4 The natural history of my research 
We believe that anyone who wants to advance the craft of qualitative analysis 
owes it to colleagues to communicate what they have learned to others (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994, p. 310). 
Methodology chapters are often written in a technical way and written in a passive voice. 
However, in this section, I like to follow Silverman's (2005) advice and write a natural history 
section. A natural history chapter offers the reader field notes about the developments of 
one's thinking. The readers of this thesis will in general be interested in qualitative research, 
so they probably would also appreciate the narrative way of describing my research 
48 | C H A P T E R  3  
development. Similar advice is given by Miles and Huberman (1994) when they write about 
the natural history of the inquiry. Main reasons for this way of describing are (1) to avoid a 
boring formalised chapter, (2) to acknowledge that qualitative research methods are more 
flexible than quantitative methods, and (3) a PhD researcher has to demonstrate the making 
of a competent researcher (Silverman, 2005).  
This does not mean that everything goes. To engage the reader in my research process I 
divide this section in topics that are common in qualitative research, i.e. background, design, 
case selection, data collection, analysis and write up. I will address, among others, the 
following questions (see Silverman, 2005, p. 305): What was actually done with regard to 
choosing a case, a method, collecting data and analysing data? What data did I study? How 
did I obtain the data? What is my claim of the data? Which methods did I use to gather the 
data? How did I analyse my data? What were the advantages and limitations of using the 
method of data analysis? I will give explanations and justifications of each of my decisions 
provide a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the steps I made during the 
research, explain what helped me and what held me back. I will make it personal by 
explaining the problems I faced and the methodological lessons I have learnt. 
Writing my research narrative is only possible if a precise diary is kept during the research 
project. This project started in 2006 and it is impossible to remember all the choices made 
regarding the research during these years. A research diary, therefore, is one of the most 
important tools of a qualitative researcher (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Latour, 2005; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005). I started my research diary from the very first 
beginning of this PhD project. On a regular basis I recorded everything that was happening 
and the choices I made. Sometimes I wrote on a daily bases, sometimes with some larger 
gaps in between. Besides the research diary I had an articles file, which contained summaries 
and idea's I had about the articles I read. Furthermore I made notes and wrote memo's in my 
qualitative data analysis software when reading and coding the interviews, and I made notes 
in my electronic calendar. All these sources were drawn upon when writing up this chapter. I 
chronologically summarised this material in an excel file, making a row for every date I 
recorded something, with a description of the recording, and coded each row just as in a 
qualitative analysis. The codes correspond with the headings of this section. 
A secondary aim of this section is to contribute to the validity of my results. It strengthens 
the plausibility of the analysis and it can help other researchers doing qualitative research. 
R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y  A N D  M E T H O D  | 49 
3.4.1 Background 
During the nineties private organisations adopted strategies that focused on core business. 
At that time, when a relative of mine explained how his successful media department of an 
insurance company was outsourced and became a supplier of that same insurance company, 
I became interested. Moreover, a paper by Vosselman (2002) attracted my attention as it 
was about this movement of organisations of either concentrating supporting services in 
SSCs or outsourcing them. He wrote: 
Many supporting and facilitating activities like housing, IT cleaning services, 
maintenance and security tend to be separated from the core activities of 
other organisational units and to be concentrated in so-called shared service 
centres (Vosselman, 2002, p. 131). 
When Vosselman came to our department in 2006, we discussed the possibilities of a PhD 
project. He told me he was surprised about the small number of papers addressing the 
movement towards SSCs after his 2002 paper. To me, this provided an opportunity to start 
studying this topic and write a research proposal. 
3.4.2 Research design 
Contrary to what you might have heard, qualitative research designs do exist 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 16). 
I had to work the rough idea up into a worthwhile and viable form to present it to the 
research committee. I had to make a research design. As reflected in the quote above, 
qualitative research designs do exist, but there is by no means a standard procedure. The 
conventional image is to keep pre-structured designs to a minimum; the research design 
should emerge from the field during the study. This is, however, a very loose approach of 
making designs. According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) most qualitative researchers 
choose a design that lies somewhere between loose and tight. Usually, the research starts 
with at least a basic conceptual framework, some general research questions, some notions 
about sampling and some preliminary plans on gathering data. But the initial design almost 
always leads to a redesign. This was also the case during this PhD project. The conceptual 
model in chapter one is the result of developments of the first model I initially presented for 
the proposal committee. The original model was only about horizontal governance 
structures in intrafirm relations, based on Vosselman’s 2002 paper.  
Vosselman (2002) argues that the implementation of an SSC leads to buyer-supplier 
relationships and inter alia to horizontal forms of control. The paper by Vosselman (2002) 
was largely conceptual and was in need of more empirical material. Questions to answer 
were how changes towards an SSC affect the governance and control structure of an 
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organisation? How do these changes emerge? To what extent can organisational economics 
be used to understand these changes? 
During a RACC7 conference I presented my initial ideas of the research project8 and 
modelled them as in Figure 3-1. This figure explains that the contribution of the research 
was to be on management control (MC) change in intrafirm relations. Such research may be 
informed by different theoretical perspectives, such as economic perspectives (e.g. TCE or 
evolutional economics) or sociological perspectives (e.g. new institutional economics (NIS) or 
old institutional economics (OIS)). It may also be informed by research contributions of the 
field on interfirm relations. In this research a TCE perspective is chosen as, to a large extent, 
this is the theory in economics that informed research into the governance and control of 
transactional relations. By conducting a theory-informed case study the theory is interacting 
with practice.  
 
Figure 3-1: Embedding of the intrafirm research project 
A problem with TCE is that it does not explain the real-life processes that bring about the 
governance structure (Burns & Scapens, 2000). It also does not include trust as a factor, 
7  Research center on accounting and control change. A collaboration between the accounting departments of the Radboud 
University, Open University and University of Amsterdam.  
8  Minnaar, R. (2007). Management control towards shared service centres: Preliminary ideas on a research project. RACC 
conference January 2007, Study Centre Soeterbeeck, the Netherlands. 
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while the relationship between control and trust is also an important factor to consider in 
lateral relationships (De Man & Roijakkers, 2009; Nooteboom, 1996, 2004; Van der Meer-
Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Vosselman & Van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2006b). During the development of the research design these elements were 
included. As mentioned in section 3.3, a TCE-based research approach can be seen as an 
ostensive approach that theorises options to efficiently structure transactions in rather static 
situations. However, the process of change could best be studied from a performative 
perspective. These thoughts and insights resulted in a design where, first, the scope and 
limitations of TCE in an internal outsourcing setting was explored and, second, trust and 
control aspects in an external outsourcing relationship were further explored (as is depicted 
in Figure 1-1). 
So, the research design developed over time. During informative meetings with people from 
the organisation that externally outsourced the facility services and their management I 
gained preliminary insights into contractual developments. It then gradually became 
possible to formulate better structured research questions. Since the research inter alia 
aimed to understand the development of control and trust, the model constructed by 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) containing the distinction between thin and 
thick trust and developing the connection between trust and relational signalling, became a 
basis to approach the case. The research questions that emerged were about the 
significance of the contract in producing both thin trust and thick trust in coping with both 
appropriation concerns and the need for relational signalling, but also about the influence of 
accounting and control changes during the contracting period and how these changes 
influenced the outsourcing relationships.  
Access to these two cases and the developed research questions demarcated the scope of 
the research. It was not my intention to shed light on the specific performance 
measurement instruments and additional incentive schemes used by the different case 
organisations, nor on operational control issues within the lateral relation. The focus was on 
changes in the governance and control structure at large. I also did not intent to come up 
with generalised conclusions, but sought to get a first empirical insight in governance and 
control structure change related to developments in (internal and external) outsourcing 
relations. I tried to be clear about the research question at the outset, while recognising that 
these questions could only be tentative when approaching the field (Eisenhardt, 1989). This 
also had to do with the many uncertainties that came with dealing with the case 
organisations. The next section describes the process I went through in getting (and keeping) 
access to case organisations. 
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3.4.3 Getting and maintaining access 
The most fundamental issue that any field researcher confronts is an ability to 
gain access to the field, that is, an ability to get into contemporary 
organisations (Baxter & Chua, 1998, p. 70). 
Without access to an organisation, it is not possible to do field research; it is as simple as 
that. An important argument for the acceptance of my research proposal was the fact that I 
had access to a case organisation. According to Baxter and Chua (1998) getting access relies 
on the way the field researchers effectively use their opportunities. They advise to make the 
most of your relationships with professionals, friends, students et cetera, and this is exactly 
what I did for this research. 
I started exploring the field with a colleague PhD student. We tried to find an organisation 
that we both could use for our individual PhD research projects. We made a letter containing 
an overview of the research project which we used for approaching organisations. We used 
contacts of our supervisor and made first contacts with Accounting Plaza, a financial shared 
service centre, and later with PwC, an organisation that provides organisations with all kinds 
of financial and organisational advice, amongst other about SSCs. Although these options 
had potential and indeed resulted in case studies by some of our master students, my first 
case organisation revealed itself by coincidence. During a visit to a relative, it seemed that 
the organisation he recently jointed matched the criteria for my research. He just started at 
a publisher of newspapers, called PCM, and this organisation was in a process of 
decentralisation. More autonomy for the divisions and their SSC were the intended 
outcomes. This organisation had to make difficult decisions about the division of tasks 
between the divisions and the SSC. Therefore, after the acceptance of my research proposal 
in the fall of 2007 I started with the PCM case. 
At that point in time I was not sure if I needed a second case organisation, but experienced 
field researchers advised me that it is important to have a backup organisation when things 
go wrong. Furthermore, I was also interested in organisations that had externally outsourced 
their service activities. So I continued searching and I contacted an FM manager who was 
interested in Vosselman’s research on horizontal relations. In June 2008 he came to the 
university for a meeting with my supervisor, and I attended that meeting as well. The FM-
Manager worked at the facility management department of a semi-conductor fabrication 
plant (Semco9) that had outsourced the management of facility services to a managing 
agent. He was receptive to a case study and wanted to make a second appointment. 
9 Semco comes from Semi-conductor. The real name of the company is disguised on request. 
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Also this case organisation seemed to fit the research criteria and after a second meeting, 
the manager agreed to give access to the company. He received an approval by top 
management, so the Semco case study could start. 
Gaining entry to a setting is one thing, but does not solve the whole problem of access. A 
field researcher also needs access to the relevant data available within the organisation 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Furthermore, this access needs to be maintained for a long 
period. Baxter and Chua (1998) state that all access is provisional, that access must be 
constantly negotiated (and renegotiated) by field researchers. They point to the possibility 
that gatekeepers can resign from their organisation position. I experienced all of this in both 
cases. Some internal disagreements at PCM, with my relative and gatekeeper as one of the 
actors, hindered access to some of the organisational participants. Only by deploying the 
goodwill of my gatekeeper with some of his colleagues, and through the interference of my 
supervisor through mail and telephone calls, I could complete most of my planned 
interviews and other data collection. And as for the other (interfirm) case study, our contact 
person and gatekeeper left, and above all, the CEO passed away. New management seemed 
to be less receptive to our research and gaining access to a second round of interviews 
required quite some efforts. More about this data collection is described in the next section. 
3.4.4  Data collection 
The main sources of data to qualitative researchers are interviews, documents and 
observation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). This research heavily draws on interviews and 
to a lesser extent on documents. Observations were not a systematic part of data collection 
but notes were taken after each interview about every noteworthy observation. 
The quality and relevance of the data produced depends on different aspects such as 
selection of informants, interview techniques and relations in the field (Baxter & Chua, 
1998). These issues will be addressed below in the description of the data collection of the 
two cases: PCM and Semco. This section provides the reader with a background of data 
collection in the case studies. It adds to the information provided in the case study chapters 
in this thesis. 
Data collection at PCM 
PCM was a publisher of newspapers in the Netherlands, i.e. de Volkskrant, NRC and Trouw. 
The case study concerns a change towards decentralisation. This decentralisation changes 
the relationships between the newspaper divisions and the SSC that is responsible for the 
sales of advertisements space in the newspapers. 
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I entered the field while this organisation was in the middle of the change process. Data 
were collected from October 2007 until November 2008. The research started with a 
meeting with PCM’s CEO and the director of PCM-Media (the SSC). Next, ten semi-structured 
interviews with the key players in the change process were conducted. 
It was not possible to collect the data in a shorter period of time because of a heavy teaching 
load and because the managers at PCM were very busy. It could take weeks or months 
before a manager found some time for an interview. Furthermore, some managers 
disagreed with top management or with SSC management about the new policy, and were 
not very cooperative towards this research. So, being a relative of the SSC director 
sometimes worked out disadvantageously.  
At the start of the research it was not clear which persons to select as informants. According 
to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) the selection of informants must be based on the best 
judgments one can make in the circumstances, but these circumstances can change on the 
basis of experience. In my situation not everybody was immediately willing to participate. 
The SSC director made a list with possible candidates, the second interviewee gave me some 
more suggestions, but the third interviewee made clear to me that it might become very 
difficult to speak to the persons on my list. During the third interview the division heads, i.e. 
the publishers, were described as headstrong who tent to behave in opposite positions as 
top management wanted them to. The fact that I got permission by top management to do 
research, was more of a disadvantage than an advantage. But the interviewee was willing to 
help me since she had good contacts with the publishers. She sent an email to the publishers 
with the kind request to cooperate in my research. Although this did not help immediately, 
after some emails and telephone calls I had a list of division heads and other persons I could 
interview.  
The advantage of the independent attitudes of the publishers was that they were not 
reluctant to speak up their minds about top management policies. I did not experience 
getting political correct answers. 
Before each meeting I sent a letter on university paper to the interviewee explaining the 
meaning of the interview and providing some background of the research project. I only 
stated the general themes and topics, because I did not want to restrict myself too much in 
data gathering. I was conscious of the possibility that unexpected explanations can emerge 
at unexpected moments. It is the ‘anomalies’ or ‘breakdowns’ that can provide new insights 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). I also kept it a bit at a general level as I did not want to “give 
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the game away” (Baxter & Chua, 1998, p. 72). Participants might be tempted to say how 
they would like it to be instead of saying just as how they experienced it (Silverman, 2005). 
During the interviews I tried to create an open and trustworthy atmosphere. I started with a 
brief description of the research and specifically stated that the interview was completely 
confidential, that nothing would be discussed with anyone in the organisation and that in 
reports no real names would be used. I tried to express my respect for the participants, my 
learning attitude, listened carefully and repeated answers for mutual understanding. These 
interview techniques seemed to work since I experienced fruitful conversations with 
interviewees who were willing to talk.  
Interviews lasted approximately between 40 and 90 minutes. For recording I used a 
multimedia player with 8GB memory, long battery life and good quality recording. I never 
had to worry about malfunctioning recording tools, which could be a problematic issue 
according to the examples given by Baxter and Chua (1998). 
During the research period, ten semi-structured interviews were conducted, amongst others 
with the CEO, the financial director, two successive directors of PCM Media, publishers of 
the newspapers and other persons who were closely involved with the change in the 
management control structure (see Appendix A). Immediately after each interview I always 
recorded my own observations. I tried to find a quiet place outside or in my car and 
recorded my observations about the person I interviewed, such as clothes, posture, if they 
were nervous or not, what kind of room they had, who interrupted, but also my first 
interpretations of what they said. What was interesting, special, noticeable or something I 
should continue with next time? These observations were typed out completely and 
complemented with some first theorising. 
At the start of the interviews I had a list of questions, derived from the general themes and 
topics. It was not my intention to ask these questions in a sequential way, but they were 
meant as a backup, in case I had forgotten something really important. I soon found out that 
a good interview becomes a dialogue, and checking the list with questions to see if they all 
have been covered was just disturbing the course of the conversation. However, these first 
interviews were difficult for me as I had doubts about the relevance of all the material. 
Sometimes I wondered if the dialogue didn’t deviate too much from my main research 
interest. But after typing out the interviews I realised that it contained enough interesting 
material. But, to be sure to remain on track, for the other interviews I wrote down my main 
research questions. These questions proved to be very helpful in keeping focus during the 
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interviews. In this way the research questions were used as a “basic navigation device” 
(Baxter & Chua, 1998, p. 73). 
My first contact with PCM was on the first of October 2007. My supervisor and I met the CEO 
of PCM and the director of PCM-Media (the SSC) in their office building in Amsterdam. After 
our introduction the CEO was positive and agreed with my case study. He also gave us a 
some background information about the organisation and about the change process towards 
decentralisation. After this meeting I conducted all the interviews alone. This started with an 
interview with the head of the SSC. Although the interviewee was my relative, the whole 
setting made the conversation more formal than expected, but it provided me with the 
necessary information to continue with. 
After the second interview I wanted to transcribe and analyse the interviews first before 
continuing with other interviews. However I made a wrong estimation about the time it 
would take. At the time I started planning new interviews it seemed that the intended 
participants had full calendars, so it took until March 2008 before I could do the third 
interview. I learned that I should try to plan interviews as soon as possible as you never 
know what can happen in the course of the research. Interviews transcription and analysis 
then have to take place between the interviews. 
The third interview was illuminating. The interviewee proved a great source of information. 
The interviewee had worked at PCM for 25 years and knew everything about the internal 
problems, culture and politics. However, the reluctance of organisation participants to 
cooperate was another reason for a second delay.  
The division managers were doubtful about their participation in the interviews and 
therefore I decided to ask the CEO for an interview. However, he didn't reply to my emails. 
Through his secretary I managed to arrange a meeting, but he cancelled it one day before 
the meeting. He did not agree with our way of working. All interviews should be accorded by 
him. In the meantime, the head of the SSC didn't agree with company policies and found 
another job. So, my relative and contact person c.q. gatekeeper of the case organisation left, 
something that made me worry about the future of my case study. I tried to bend this 
situation to my advantage by stating that family relations didn't have to be an issue any 
more now. Finally I managed to have an interview with the CEO and he gave his permission 
to continue with the interviews. Most of the informants of my list agreed, so I immediately 
planned the other interviews as quickly as possible. This resulted in six interviews in 
September 2008 and one in November 2008.  
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One of the interviews was with a former employee who left PCM to start his own business. 
An advantage of interviewing a former employee is that the viewpoint you get is that of an 
‘outsider’. An outsider can reflect on the organisation with more distance and without any 
reservations. The same counts for a second interview I had with the SSC director after he left 
the organisation. Those interviews became a valuable part of the data collection.  
The informants also provided me with documents concerning the decentralisation. I asked 
for all possible documents they could give, because at that time I knew I had to take what I 
could get to make the case study a success. I collected annual reports and other financial 
data, service level agreements, emails, minutes of meetings and proceedings of the new 
governance structure and new management regulations (see Appendix B). Many of these 
documents were internal and confidential. They reflected the internal discussions and plans 
of the reorganisation in the making. 
During the last few interviews I noticed that similar information got repeated by the 
participants which gave me confidence that I had collected the relevant information to 
answer my research questions.  
Data collection at Semco 
During 2008, when there was a chance the PCM case study could fail, I continued looking for 
a second case study. At the end of 2008 we made contact with the head of the facility 
management (FM) department of Semco, a semiconductor production and sales 
organisation. He explained that Semco was in a process of outsourcing the management of 
facility management. The management of facility services used to be an internal service, but 
was now outsourced to an FM managing agent called Faspro10. This managing agent had 
taken over most of the FM personnel at Semco, had a location at the Semco plant and 
negotiated a long term contract with Semco. It became a hybrid structure, governed by an 
external outsourcing contract (see Figure 2-1). This made it a very suitable organisation for a 
second case study.  
The contract between the organisations was closed for four years and I wanted to find out 
how the relationship between control and trust developed during the relationship. The main 
sources of data were semi-structured interviews and documents. The interviews were a 
combination of general meetings and individual interviews. Appendix D provides an 
overview of the meetings and interviews. During each interview at least two researchers 
were present. At the university my supervisor and I decided to embed this research in a 
research project together with two other colleagues and for a certain period, an accounting 
10 Faspro comes from Facility Service Provider. The real name of the company is disguised on request. 
                                                        
58 | C H A P T E R  3  
master student. An advantage of this approach was that we could complement each other 
during the interviews and after each interview we could discuss our interpretations of the 
interview results. These ex post discussions were always recorded and became part of the 
case analysis. 
The questions posed during the interviews were based on extant theory. The broad themes 
included contracting, controlling and (mis)trusting. For instance there were questions about 
the purpose, role and actual use of contract and control practices. There were also questions 
related to contracting and controlling processes. For example, how did parties perceive a 
relational signal as either trust building or trust destroying during contracting and controlling 
phases of the inter-firm relationship? The duration of the interviews was between one and 
one and a half hours on average.  
The first two meetings, in June and September 2008, were preliminary ones which were 
made to get access to the company. The conversations during these meetings were not 
recorded, but useful notes about the case company were made. During the other twenty-
one meetings we conducted nineteen semi-structured interviews in two rounds, from 
December 2008 until November 2010. Thirteen interviews were with the Semco managers at 
different hierarchical levels and in different departments such as facilities management, 
purchasing, finance & accounting and manufacturing. Four interviews were with managers 
at Faspro and two interviews were with managers of two different suppliers of the facility 
services.  
We also had two general meetings with the research team at large. The first general meeting 
was a formal introduction to the research objectives, plans and methods. During this 
meeting we received useful information about the outsourcing strategy of Semco. This 
meeting was recorded and the records were part of our analysis. During the second general 
meeting, results of the first round of interviews were presented. The FM director and 
Purchase manager participated in that meeting. It was interesting and useful to listen to the 
feedback of the practitioners and the information from these discussions also became part 
of our further analysis. It helped us revisit the data representativeness and plausibility of 
conclusions (Yin, 2003). 
The first round of interviews was held in 2009. Choosing the right informants was mostly 
done through our contact person the FM director, but also through the Purchase manager. 
They were very cooperative and so were the other managers at Semco. I had learned from 
the PCM case and tried to plan as much interviews as possible in advance. The advantage of 
working in a team was that we could stand in for each other if one of the researchers had 
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other responsibilities. I made a scheme and we divided the interviews, but both Kaleem 
Hassan and myself tried to participate in most interviews ourselves as it was part of our PhD 
research. Many times we went together and other times we were accompanied by a master 
student, and once by our promotor. Also here the first findings and observations after each 
interview were recorded, but the advantage now was that we could share our thoughts.  
After the second general meeting where we had presented our findings, we started writing a 
paper based on our first conclusions. However, after analysing the interviews and writing the 
paper we decided that it would be useful to go back to the organisation to see how the 
process further developed. This was particularly useful since the contract was coming to an 
end. 
When we tried to get in contact with the FM director again we did not get a reply. So we 
contacted the Purchase manager and found out that the FM director was not working there 
anymore. The reason was not very clear to us in the beginning, but it seemed to us that 
different views on cooperation with Faspro was the cause of his leaving. This FM manager 
used to be our gatekeeper and the initiator of the research. His superior, the Country 
manager, did also support our research, but the unbelievable coincidence was that he 
passed away. We now had to convince the new management again to cooperate with a 
second round of interviews. To us it became even more interesting to see how this change of 
management effected the relationship between Semco and Faspro. 
Fortunately, we were allowed to continue, but we had to make an interview scheme and 
after that Semco wanted us to finish the case study as quick as possible. From a 
methodological viewpoint that was not very good, because during the course of the 
interviews new insights may lead to other choices then were made beforehand. But in the 
end the organisation was not so strict and we could make changes to the scheme. We also 
wanted to speak to some suppliers of facility services, but we did not know who were willing 
to participate. Fortunately the two suppliers we approached were very enthusiastic, so we 
could add them to the list. 
We finished the second round of interviews with some new informants and some old 
informants. Some informants also changed position within the FM organisation. The second 
round of interviews gave us insight in the changing relationships between the two 
organisations.  
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Other sources of information included service level agreements (SLAs), roadmap documents 
(monthly meetings) and quarterly reports. These documents became part of our data (see 
Appendix E). 
In 2010 I also had meetings with informants outside the case organisations. The informants 
were SSC and facility management professionals. The aim was to learn about SSCs and 
facility management from professionals and practitioners in the field in order to acquire a 
background of these fields. For more background of SSCs I joint five meetings of financial 
shared service centre (FSSC) groups. The groups existed of ten SSC managers who came 
together to share their experiences and knowledge about their businesses. I shared my 
research findings with this group and made notes about their experiences and comments. 
The meetings are summed up in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Meetings with FSSC-managers groups 
11-03-2010 General meeting in The Hague 
25-03-2010 Workgroup meeting in Deventer at Impress 
20-05-2010 Workgroup meeting in Amsterdam at Detailresult 
26-05-2010 Workgroup meeting in Vianen at KWS Infra 
23-09-2010 Workgroup meeting in Diemen at E-Bridge 
 
For more background of facility management I had two meetings with the CEO of Total 
Facility Management BV. One of these meetings was at the university in Nijmegen together 
with my supervisor, and one in Zwolle with my supervisor and my PhD colleague. We asked 
questions about the concept of Total Facility Management; a philosophy and method of 
taking over all facility services of an organisation, including the contracting with suppliers. 
Another interview with my PhD colleague was in The Hague with a facility and real estate 
manager at KPN. We had an interview about the practice of outsourcing FM services. All 
meetings were recorded and completely transcribed by my colleague and me. An overview 
of the interviews can be found in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: Interviews with practitioners about FM 
18-03-2010 CEO Total Facility Management, Nijmegen (80 minutes) 
28-04-2010 Facility and real estate manager, The Hague (90 minutes) 
10-05-2010 CEO Total Facility Management, Zwolle (90 minutes) 
 
The interviews did not become a part of my data for the two case studies. I did not know at 
that moment if I needed the data or not. In qualitative studies it is not always clear which 
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data will be relevant to the study. I just tried to collect as much data as possible. On the 
other hand I knew it would help me in understanding the topics better and in understanding 
how the organisational changes within the case organisations were embedded in 
developments in the field. The data did eventually become part of my colleague’s PhD thesis. 
We discussed all our data and possible interpretations, but finally we both made our own 
analysis for our PhD theses. The way I did this is the subject of the next section.  
3.4.5 Qualitative data analysis 
In most qualitative research, unless you are analysing more or less from day 1 
you will always have to play 'catch up' (Silverman, 2005, p. 150) 
Qualitative data analysis (QDA) can be defined as “the range of processes and procedures 
whereby we move from the qualitative data that have been collected into some form of 
explanation, understanding or interpretation of the people and situations we are 
investigating. QDA is usually based on an interpretative philosophy. The idea is to examine 
the meaningful and symbolic content of qualitative data” (Lewins & Gibbs, 2010). In this 
section I will describe the processes and procedures I underwent in moving from my data to 
conclusions. It is a description of the process of learning from the idiosyncratic literature on 
qualitative data analysis, and of my personal choices and learning in analysing data.  
The qualitative data analysis process 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe the process of data analysis as consisting of three 
concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/ 
verifications. These three flows are presented as interwoven before, during and after data 
collection in parallel form. Just as the quote of Silverman at the beginning of this section 
suggests, analysis starts from day one. Even before collecting data, choices have to be made 
about a conceptual framework, cases to select, research questions and data collection 
approaches. The different components of data analysis form an interactive, cyclical process 
as depicted by Miles and Huberman (1994) as follows: 
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Figure 3-2: Components of Data Analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) 
Figure 3-2 shows that qualitative data analysis is a continuous iterative process. This is 
something I also experienced during this research project. In the course of the two case 
studies I was simultaneously collecting data, coding, making schemes, drawing conclusions, 
presenting first findings and writing draft papers. As a novice researcher I consulted 
textbooks about qualitative research (e.g. Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005) but it remained a challenge to conduct a good analysis. A 
difference with quantitative research is that it does not have familiar, well-defined methods 
described in canons and it proceeds less in a sequential and linear way. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) explain that qualitative researchers are in a more fluid and a more pioneering 
position. Many books are dealing with data collection but it is hard to find something that is 
helpful about how to analyse qualitative data. This is what Barrett (2009) calls “the last 
frontier in qualitative research” (p. 44). 
Doing qualitative data analysis is learned by experience. Having colleagues to discuss your 
experiences and your conclusions with is very important for the learning process but also for 
the strength of the findings. The remaining of this section is about my process of data 
analysis and is structured around the three components data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing/ verification. 
Data reduction 
The first step after data collection was transcribing the interviews. I used the program 
Express Scribe to load the audio files which made it easier to play back the recordings while 
typing. I typed out verbatim including the pauses, laughing and verbal expressions of the 
Data collection
Data display
Conclusion drawing
and verification
Data reduction
= Analysis
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interviewees. All interviews in the PCM case study were transcribed by myself. Transcribing 
took very long and was tedious at times, but proved very helpful as a first understanding of 
the material. The transcription of the interviews of the Semco case study was allocated to 
different persons within our research team. The transcription of the first round of interviews 
was allocated to my PhD colleague, the master student and myself, and the transcription of 
the interviews in the second round was allocated to my PhD colleague and myself. Due to 
time constraints, the transcriptions of three interviews was outsourced to an external 
transcriptions service. However, the transcriptions were carefully checked for errors 
afterwards. 
The transcribed interviews, field notes and documents entailed an enormous amount of 
material that I organised in my computer during the course of the research. To make sense 
of this data it had to be reduced through selecting, focusing and abstracting. A common way 
or doing this is by coding. Coding is assigning a tag or a label to parts of text to highlight 
ideas, categories or themes that help to answer the research question (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Warden & Wong, 2007). At the start of the research, when researching at PCM, I read 
the transcriptions, listened to the audio files several times and made notes. When I collected 
more material I started coding manually by copying and pasting parts of the text in new 
documents, based on themes. I started with a set of codes derived from theory; empirically 
driven codes were added during the coding process. After finishing data collection and the 
analysis of the material, I wrote a first paper for a Dutch journal (Minnaar & Vosselman, 
2009).  
When I started with the second case study I bought the qualitative analysis software Atlas.ti. 
I noticed that this software was used for other case studies in international accounting 
journals, so that was the ground for buying it. Learning to use the software was also learning 
about qualitative data analysis. The possibilities to work with the data in the software helped 
me with thinking about the data. The software is easy for coding, but it also provides many 
opportunities to arrange the codes in all kinds of ways. I could combine codes in families, I 
could make queries that combined certain characteristics within the data and combine them 
in supercodes. These supercodes emerged while I continued coding new material. I could 
make outputs based on theme, codes, queries, type of interview, code or families. Rereading 
these outputs made it possible to interpret the material and to draw conclusions.  
Some features in Atlas.ti were particularly helpful in doing data analysis. For every object 
(documents, codes, quotes and memo’s) comments could be made. These comments were 
very important in tracing my way of thinking. I made general comments for the interviews at 
large, comments for every new code I created (why I created it, how it would yield a 
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research question or a specific theory) and comments for the quotes (the chunks of text I 
selected). In this way I could always trace back my process of thinking and analysing. I 
learned about the value of this when I consulted codes and quotes that were not 
commented upon; I wondered why I labelled them at that time. 
Another important step in data analysis is memoing. In Atlas.ti it is easy to create, store and 
organise memo’s. A memo can be made at any moment and it can stand alone or it can be 
linked to other objects. It normally contains emerging ideas about the data, about 
relationships, interpretations or first theorisations. These memo’s should be written down 
the moment an idea emerges or strikes the researcher. They are “the most useful and 
powerful sense-making tools at hand” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 72). Indeed, my memo’s 
formed the bases of writing the first draft of a paper later on. 
Atlas.ti also makes the iterative process of data analysis easier. While re-reading outputs of 
certain codes, or combination of codes, I renamed codes, changed codes, assigned new 
codes to text et cetera. I could easily make an output of re-occurring codes and check why 
they re-occurred, and whether I had to combine codes as a result. Without data analysis 
software, this would have been much more difficult. 
Data display 
Miles and Huberman (1994) define a display as “a visual format that presents information 
systematically, so the user can draw valid conclusions and take needed action” (p. 91). In 
qualitative research there are no standard agreed-on displays to use. Displays can have all 
kind of forms. A summary of a case analysis or a report of a meeting are examples of data 
displays. They show reduced focused information instead of extended text. Formats can be 
as various as the imagination of the researcher but are mostly displayed as matrices or 
networks.  
In my research I made several visualisations of the research. For the PCM case I displayed 
the changes within the organisation and the changes in operations between the different 
units (see Figure 4-3, p. 87; Figure 4-4, p. 88; Figure 4-5, p. 89; Figure 4-6, p. 91). To come up 
with different management control structure choices in a matrix I also linked the 
characteristics of the transactions between the units with characteristics found in the 
literature (see Figure 4-7, p. 93). 
For the Semco case I made various representations of the relationships between the two 
organisations and their actors (see Figure 5-2, p. 106; Figure 5-3, p. 107 and Figure 5-5, p. 
110). Furthermore, a timeline was created to display the events within the contracting 
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relationship chronologically (see Figure 5-4, p.108). A table displays the different phases that 
came out of the case study with phase descriptions and implications (see Table 5-2, p. 112). 
Finally, a concluding figure was created combining findings of the case study and different 
codes from the case study with findings from the literature (see Figure 5-6, p.124). These 
and other displays were also used for power point presentations (a display in itself) at 
seminars and conferences and proofed to be a useful tools for conveying my findings of the 
case study to other researchers and to start a discussion about the findings. In the course of 
the research all these displays changed continuously or did even disappear completely, but 
eventually that was just what made them better. 
The drawing of conclusions and verification 
Conclusions were drawn throughout the research, as depicted in Figure 3-2. In this figure an 
arrow from conclusion drawing and verification is going back to data collection, signalling 
that conclusions are drawn during the data collection and that these can be verified by new 
collections of data. According to Miles and Huberman (1994) displays are important in 
drawing conclusions, because the substantial material has to be reduced. Through Atlas.ti. I 
succeeded in reducing the material and in displaying it in usable outputs of codes, 
comments, memo’s and networks of relations between these objects. The outputs were 
adjusted in several iterations. 
Verification of the conclusions took first of all place during discussions with colleagues, 
particularly with colleagues in the research team. We organised meetings, where I presented 
my conclusions and discussed them. We also organised a feedback meeting at the Semco 
case organisation. A master thesis (written under my supervision) was presented and 
discussed at the Semco site. The feedback of this session provided new input for the 
analysis.  
Finally these sessions led to the production of conference papers, so the conclusions could 
also be judged by peers in the field. Presenting my work to unbiased colleagues in the field 
was a good way to test the papers on their plausibility. Plausibility in qualitative research is 
important. The conclusions have to ‘make sense’ and have to be accepted as likely ones 
(Lukka & Modell, 2010). In this respect I did not experience problems. 
A common verification tool in quantitative research is triangulation. However, this tool has a 
different meaning in qualitative research. Triangulation implies that it is possible to get a 
‘true’ fixed view on reality, but this is a positivistic viewpoint not often taken in qualitative 
research (Silverman, 2005). It is, however, possible to use different kinds of data or different 
methods to support or question an interpretation, but it does not give any certainty in the 
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capture of an objective reality (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). In this research, the combination 
of documents and interviews provided additional views on certain interpretations. For 
instance, a roadmap underlined the intention for cooperation, and an SLA supported 
agreements which were mentioned during interviews. 
In the verification of conclusions in qualitative research theory plays an important role. 
Although interpretive research in accounting is largely inductive of nature, similar to 
research based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) where theoretical insights are 
generated from empirical data, this research is abductive in nature (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2011; Lukka & Modell, 2010). 
Whilst abduction differs from the hypothetico-deductive mode in that it starts 
from the empirical findings, not from theory, it does not deny the role of prior 
theoretical knowledge in providing a background to the search for the most 
plausible explanation for empirical observations (Lukka & Modell, 2010, p. 
467). 
Explanations are about finding dependencies within the data and interpretive research can 
provide those explanations. This requires the adoption of an emic perspective, which is the 
perspective of the native insider, but also includes a more inter-subjective etic element, 
which is the perspective of the neutral outsider. This implies an epistemological position that 
puts the researcher in close interaction with the researched individuals (Lukka & Modell, 
2010). For my research within PCM for instance, I used TCE as a general starting point (the 
etic perspective) and then relied on emic accounts, leaving explanations somewhat open-
ended, affirming the chaotic and often paradoxical nature of life in complex organisations. 
Validity was mainly acquired through emic accounts and contrasted with the more 
mainstream TCE perspective, illustrating that in practice choices are more complex and 
drifting in nature. This approach “recognises the theory-relatedness of knowledge claims 
emerging from empirical studies” (Lukka & Modell, 2010, p. 475). 
This view of validating interpretive research in accounting illustrates the midway I used 
between theory and practice, and also, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, 
between ostensive and performative research. How emic and etic perspectives relate to 
performative and ostensive perspectives is a topic for future research.  
The conclusions drawn in this study are not only about the case organisations. By making 
iterations back and forth between theory and data, the case exemplifies and builds on 
broader theory. In this way it is possible to generalise the outcomes through the use of 
theories. 
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3.4.6 Write up 
Writing ethnography is a key part of the entire research process. It is now 
widely recognised that ‘the ethnography’ is produced as much by how we 
write as by the processes of data collection and analysis (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007, p. 191). 
Writing is as much a research and analytical tool as the ones already mentioned in this 
chapter. Nevertheless I make it a separate section as I would like to include the different 
steps I took in writing and struggling when finishing this thesis. Moreover, as Baxter and 
Chua (1998, p. 83) state: “[…] writing-up is not just a final stage in the research process. It 
raises issues that go to the heart of fundamental debates about the scientific authority of 
field research.” 
Writing and reading are two of the main activities in my research project and they are 
intermingled. I read to become knowledgeable in my field and to become familiar with 
textual conventions. Reading the work of other researchers developed my craft skills and 
encouraged the development of ‘sensitising concepts’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). 
Writing is a skill that takes time and practice, and it is often a frustrating business. It forced 
me to be precise and make clear what I was doing and wanted to achieve. The research 
process as described so far, was clearly not a linear process. Writing it down in an orderly, 
understandable and acceptable manner is hard work and took more time than I expected. I 
also had to deal with all kinds of feedback from my supervisors, colleagues, professors 
during PhD courses, fellow PhD researchers, reviewers from journals et cetera. Their 
comments had to be addressed of course, which led to many drafts of the same paper or 
chapter. The difference between my first drafts and last ones are a difference between night 
and day. I am, however, convinced that they significantly improved.  
The literature does not provide much advice on how to write qualitative research reports, 
but Baxter and Chua (1998) distinguish five standard formats. The field report (1) is a 
depersonalised account with little use of quotes. Short stories and short histories (2 and 3) 
“study events over time and investigate the relationship between accounting and social 
elements” (Ibid, p. 82). This is typically a format that fits my research well. The stories 
contain extensive descriptions and interpretations with a ‘liberal’ use of quotes from the 
field. The stories are arranged both thematically and chronologically, which is common in 
qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Stories are a narrative mode, which is the 
primary way through which people organise their experiences into meaningful episodes 
(Richardson, 1990). Narratives are particularly appropriate for qualitative research, as they 
provide meaning and reason to reported events through contextual and processual 
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presentations. For both case studies I wrote a narrative in which I expressed the temporal 
position and role of each event in the comprehensible whole. The extensive use of quotes 
was a way to express the events and to give credibility to the story. 
The last two formats distinguished by Baxter and Chua (1998) are plays and autobiographies 
(4 and 5). I did not use these formats for my research but I used an autobiographical style to 
reflect on my experiences in the field in this chapter. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the methodological background of the two field studies of this 
research into internal and external outsourcing. First, it is explained why the choice is made 
for qualitative interpretive field studies. Second, the connection between ostensive and 
performative research is discussed as this is a recurring theme and position that is taken in 
this research. Third, the last and most detailed section is devoted to a detailed natural 
history of my research. This construction is deliberately chosen to connect to a qualitative 
research tradition of narrative writing. The section is structured around the major themes in 
qualitative research, which are: data collection, data analysis and write up. The personal 
descriptions are intermingled with lessons from qualitative research literature. 
With this approach it is hoped that the trustworthiness and authenticity of the two case 
studies on outsourcing have been demonstrated. 
 
  
 
 
 CHAPTER 4: SHARED SERVICE CENTRES AND MANAGEMENT 
CONTROL STRUCTURE CHANGE: EXPLORING THE SCOPE AND 
LIMITATIONS OF A TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
APPROACH 11 
I don’t want to be framed! But I am ready to study very carefully the framing 
itself, to turn it from such an automatic resource into a fascinating new topic 
(Latour, 2005, p. 187). 
4.1 Introduction 
An organisational construct that became popular during the mid-nineties is that of a shared 
service centre (SSC) in which non-core activities of business units are concentrated. These 
activities thus become services that are delivered to the business units by a service unit. In 
this chapter the impact of the development of an SSC on the management control structure 
in an organisation is examined. The focus is on why and how the management control 
structure within a specific organisation changes as a consequence of a further development 
of an SSC.  
As the development of an SSC is accompanied by the creation of horizontal intra-firm client-
supplier relationships it connects the concept of a management control structure to that of a 
governance structure. The latter is a broader concept than the former, because it starts from 
the position of rather autonomous human actors instead of an organisation, and because it 
explicitly takes divergence of economic interests between human actors into account (e.g., 
Nooteboom, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). A theory used to study 
governance structures is transaction cost economics (TCE). It views a governance structure 
as an “institutional framework within which transactions are negotiated and executed” 
(Williamson, 1979, p. 239); ‘transactions’ are the basis of the analysis. Such transactions 
concern goods or services that can be transferred across a technologically separable 
interface and that may be governed by a market, a hierarchy or a hybrid form between a 
market and a hierarchy. Markets, hierarchies and hybrids are thus conceived of as 
alternative generic governance structures, each having its own transaction costs. In a specific 
situation, a governance structure is considered to be the result of a purposeful choice by 
11  This chapter is published as Minnaar, R., & Vosselman, E. (2013). Shared service centres and management control 
structure change: exploring the scope and limitations of a transaction cost economics approach. Journal of Accounting & 
Organizational Change, 9(1), 74-98. 
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rational human actors who are efficiency-seeking (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2006b). 
Our analysis starts from the position of an existing organisation, where in TCE-terms 
transactions are governed by a hierarchy. One of the key features of a hierarchy is that it 
includes a management control structure aiming at influencing members of the organisation 
to implement the organisation’s strategy (Anthony, 1988; Vosselman, 1995). Similar to a 
governance structure, we conceptualise a management control structure as an institutional 
framework. However, rather than governing transactions, a management control structure 
aims to constrain, monitor and incentivise managerial decision making and behaviour. It is 
subordinate to a generic governance structure, particularly (but not exclusively) to the 
governance structure of a hierarchy and includes the evaluation and rewarding of 
performance (e.g. Zimmerman, 2011), 
In this chapter we demonstrate how the development of an SSC opens up possibilities to 
influence the behaviour of managers by introducing market-like controls. By doing this the 
hierarchy is implicitly pulled into the direction of a hybrid governance structure, thereby 
realigning the notion of management control with that of governance. Because the 
introduction of an SSC opens up possibilities for the blurring of organisational boundaries, it 
calls for a broader concept of management control that includes both hierarchical and 
market mechanisms. Based on TCE-reasoning we theorise that the blurring of boundaries 
and the introduction of market-like controls depends on certain dimensions of the 
transactions at hand. We investigate whether our theorising is consistent with the 
developments that emerge in a newspaper publisher (PCM). This enables us to gain a deeper 
insight in the scope of TCE in explaining management control change and governance 
change related to the development of an SSC. In order to further increase our insights in the 
scope of TCE for understanding management control change, we also investigate whether 
the development in management control is indeed the result of purposive choice and 
(re)design. We relate the presence or absence of purposive choice behaviour to the 
presence or absence of ‘drifting’ (Andon et al., 2007; Quattrone & Hopper, 2001) in the 
development of management control.  
This chapter’s main contribution is twofold. First, in order to fully accommodate for 
management control of an SSC the chapter aims to make a case for a broader concept of 
management control. Such concept allows for the incorporation of a market mechanism in 
influencing SSC managers, thus extending extant management control frameworks as for 
instance developed by Anthony (1965, 1988), Zimmerman (2011) and Simons (1995) and 
further contributing to a line of research that was set out by Speklé (2001) and Vosselman 
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(2002). Second, it explores the scope of TCE in explaining changes in management control 
that are related to the development of an SSC, both in terms of contents (i.e. the nature of 
management control related to the dimensions of transactions) and process (i.e. the way 
change is effectuated). With regard to contents, this chapter particularly builds on the 
horizontalisation of management control as explained in the context of facilities services in a 
university (Vosselman, 2002). With regard to process, it explores the extent to which change 
in the management control structure is a simple result of a top management decision 
followed by guided change. In particular, it questions whether the change process is 
unproblematic and linear, thereby linking up with extant literature on change as a drift 
(Andon et al., 2007; Quattrone & Hopper, 2001).  
Thus, the chapter’s overall research question is how management control structure change 
relates to the development of an SSC. This question has theoretical as well as empirical 
aspects. The theoretical aspects addressed in this chapter are connected with the TCE-
perspective on alternative management control structures and the factors that influence an 
optimal choice between the alternatives, as well as theoretical perspectives on the 
processes of change. The empirical aspects concern the degree to which the calculative 
choice perspective that TCE suggests is recognisable in practice and the real-life processes 
through which a change in management control is effectuated. In order to obtain empirical 
insights into the research issues a case study is performed. We deliberately opted for a case 
(PCM) where top management adopted the construct of an SSC, but where the precise 
nature and degree of concentration of services and corresponding management control 
structures were still in the making. The chapter demonstrates how the development of the 
SSC is linked with the creation of internal client-supplier relationships and, consequently, 
with the horizontalisation of management control. It demonstrates how vertical control 
relationships between top management and management of the SSC is complemented with 
horizontal control relationships between the SSC and its internal clients, and how 
bureaucratic controls may be complemented with market controls. The case study proves to 
challenge the instrumental efficiency perspective inherent in the TCE approach and it 
suggests how an efficiency perspective may be bridged with a relational perspective that 
reveals the drifting character of the change process.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Subsequently, section 2 and 3 address 
the nature of SSCs (section 2), and both the distinctiveness and interconnectedness of 
governance and management control (section 3). In section 4, a TCE-based model on 
management control change related to the development of an SSC is presented. Section 5 
challenges a TCE-approach to management control change and discusses the rather 
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unproblematic nature of change as it is conceptualised in TCE. It presents alternative 
approaches that for instance take into account the potential drifting character of change in 
management control. In section 6 we account for our research methods and start with a 
description of the case company in section 7; a Dutch newspaper publisher called PCM, that 
faces significant changes in its management control structure and the governance of 
services. Section 8 confronts the management control change with our TCE analysis. Section 
9 contains overall conclusions and interprets and discusses the findings of the study against 
the background of our theorising.  
4.2 The nature of Shared Service Centres 
One of the key concepts of this chapter is the SSC. In this section we explain what an SSC is 
and how it is related to governance and management control.  
An SSC is a rather independent organisational unit that provides services to various other 
organisational units. This concept solves the problem that each business unit is engaged in 
tasks that do not belong to its core business, such as HRM, IT and Accounting and Finance. 
Because of improved ICT, it is now possible to concentrate these kinds of tasks in a separate 
service unit and to realise economies of scale. By introducing an SSC, the benefits of a 
divisional business organisation are kept, but without the cost disadvantages (Strikwerda, 
2005). Non-commercial organisations, such as ministries, municipalities, hospitals and 
universities, have also started to embrace the concept and set up SSCs for supporting tasks 
(Janssen & Joha, 2006). 
The main motives to establish an SSC are cost reductions and service improvement 
(Bergeron, 2003; Fahy, Curry & Cacciaguidi-Fahy, 2002; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Strikwerda, 
2005). Other reasons can be: focus on core business, more control and transparency of 
costs, better performance of staff, elimination of redundant functions (Janssen & Joha, 
2006). Also, IT developments can make market transactions more efficient and can develop 
SSCs into an essential part of the infrastructure of businesses (Strikwerda, 2005). 
Case studies conducted by Strikwerda (2005) show that there are many ways organisations 
can adapt their organisational structures to the construct of an SSC and that there are 
different types of SSCs. For instance, as Fahy et al. (2002) describe for financial shared 
services, dislocated service staff may be concentrated in a single low-cost tax location 
somewhere in the world. But also smaller organisations can just bring services together in a 
single service department providing supporting services to several other internal 
departments. Strikwerda distinguishes six different types of SSC’s that range from SSC’s in 
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the form of a central staff department to Business Process Outsourcing (Strikwerda, 2005, p. 
75). 
Janssen and Joha (2006) use a more narrow definition and make a strict distinction between 
a central staff department, an SSC and outsourcing. A central staff department (centralised 
model) provides top management with relatively much influence and does not entail the 
creation of internal client-supplier relationships, whereas outsourcing implies a client-
supplier relationship between business units and external market parties based on formal 
contracts (e.g., Bergeron, 2003). In practice, the choice for a complete outsourcing of a 
service may very well be a final stage in a process. The process may start with the 
introduction of an SSC with internal client-supplier relationships, after which an external 
buy-out may take place. Eventually, business units may get the freedom to structurally opt 
for alternative suppliers. The latter resembles the free market situation (Koene & Van der 
Pijl, 2005). An SSC, however, is standing close to the internal customers (the business units); 
the internal customers have a degree of ownership over the service. Based on Janssen and 
Joha (2006, p. 103) this distinction can be depicted as in Figure 4-1. The dotted line defines 
the boundary of the organisation at large. 
 
Figure 4-1: Positioning an SSC 
Board of Directors
Business Unit 1
Central departement
Business Unit 2 Business Unit 3
Shared Service Centre
Outsourcing
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By creating lateral internal client-supplier relationships top management horizontalises 
management control, because the relationship between the SSC and its clients are of a non-
hierarchical or non-vertical nature. There is no subordination involved. As a consequence of 
such horizontalising, the task of influencing SSC-management so that the SSC performs 
effectively and efficiently is, at least partly, delegated to business unit managers. This has 
the potential to economise on the transaction costs connected to the governance structure 
of the hierarchy. It even opens up possibilities to introduce a market mechanism in the 
management control of the organisation, thus moving into the direction of a governance 
structure that is a hybrid between hierarchy and market. 
4.3 Shared Service Centres, governance and management control  
4.3.1 Governance and management control 
As we stated in the introductory section, the concepts of governance and management 
control should be treated distinctively. The starting point of the analysis is the transaction. 
Governance is related to transactions and is a generic solution meant for coping with 
coordination requirements and appropriation concerns (Dekker, 2004; Gulati & Singh, 1998), 
while management control is related to one of the available generic solutions: a hierarchy. 
Within the hierarchy (the organisation) management control copes with more specific 
coordination problems and motivational problems.  
Governance structures are directly related to the notion that parties enter into transactions 
in pursuit of self-interest. As interests diverge, in the course of the relationship opportunistic 
behaviour may occur; a party seeks self-interest, sometimes even at the expense of other 
parties. Parties can make promises, knowing that they will break them when the benefits 
exceed the costs. Out of the pursuit of self-interest they may even be willing to lie and cheat 
and harm the other. Against this background formal governance structures act as vehicles 
for safeguarding and as a deterrence, therefore (partly) compensating for potential 
opportunistic behaviour. A governance structure includes controls that limit the range of 
parties’ actions and entail monitoring, sanctioning and incentivising. They can take different 
forms, such as responsibility accounting, performance management systems, financial 
incentive systems and open book accounting (Dekker, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). 
One of the possible governance structures as generic solutions for coping with coordination 
requirements and appropriation concerns is the hierarchy (or unified governance). 
Management control structures have traditionally been located within such hierarchy (or 
‘unified governance’). Within the hierarchy there is decentralisation of decision rights and 
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responsibilities, a performance management system and a (financial) incentive system. To 
organisational economists, this ‘stool with three legs’ (Zimmerman, 2011) reflects the 
management control structure. This structure aims to influence managers at various levels of 
the organisation to reach the organisation’s objectives in an effective and efficient way. The 
‘stool’ is a management control structure that accommodates the process of management 
control as defined by the Godfather of management control, Robert Anthony (1965; 1988). 
He defines management control as “a process by which managers influence other members 
of the organisation to implement the organisation’s strategies” (Anthony & Govindarajan, 
2004, p. 7) and views responsibility accounting to be at its core. Simons (1995), however, has 
convincingly demonstrated that influencing the behaviour of managers and other members 
of the organisation may also take place through interactive face to face meetings that 
discuss potential strategic risks and opportunities, and through boundary systems and belief 
systems that respectively restrict and inspire certain behaviour.  
Management control as described above is subordinate to governance in the sense that it 
only comes in place after a choice for a hierarchy as a generic governance structure is made. 
The choice for an organisation in the sense of a hierarchy, is a generic response to 
coordination requirements and appropriation concerns regarding transactions. The 
organisation as a hierarchy (at large) itself is a governance structure. As such, it is an 
alternative to a market, or to a hybrid form between a market and a hierarchy. Conversely, 
management control structures design traditionally takes place within the contours of a 
hierarchy; the choice for a hierarchy precedes the design or choice of management control 
structures. Conversely, the ‘stool with three legs’ is a subsequent economic design within a 
hierarchy.  
4.3.2 Management control and governance 
Management control in a hierarchy is (re)aligned with governance of transactions whenever 
top management decides to create internal client-supplier relationships. This is for instance 
the case when an SSC is instituted in the organisation as an internal service unit that may 
consider the business units to be its clients. The potential transactions between the SSC and 
the business units are in need of governance structures between the SSC and each of the 
clients. These governance structures are designed or negotiated against the background of 
the hierarchy to which both the SSC and the business units belong. Assuming that the proper 
incentives are in place, business unit managers may effectively and efficiently exercise the 
management control of the service unit (the SSC) that formerly was a unit controlled only by 
top management (as a staff department) or that formerly was non-existent as a separate 
unit because the business units performed the services themselves. As long as the 
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transactions remain strictly within the boundaries of the hierarchy (the organisation at 
large), to exercise management control over the service unit, business unit management has 
to be incentivised by vertical management controls that are in place between top 
management and business unit management. In addition, the management control they 
exercise over the SSC may be instituted in governance structures that governs the internal 
transactions. Such governance structures may take the form of internal contracts or service 
level agreements and are therefore subordinate to an overall management control structure 
in the organisation at large, that, in turn, is subordinate to the hierarchy as a governance 
structure.  
The hierarchy as a generic governance structure may move further into the direction of a 
hybrid between a hierarchy and a market whenever top management decides that business 
unit management is also allowed to buy services from external parties and/or that SSC-
management is allowed to sell to external clients. The development towards a hybrid generic 
governance structure would thus be a consequence of a design choice in the management 
control structure by top management. At core, top management then decides to introduce a 
market mechanism in the management control of the SSC, therefore creating more distance 
for itself towards the SSC and putting itself even more in a position of exercising ‘arm’s 
length control’ (a control archetype distinguished by Speklé, 2001). This implies the 
introduction of an exit threat in the management control of the service unit, provided that 
the right incentives for business unit managers are in place. Whenever the price-quality ratio 
of the services is below the expectations of the internal clients, the SSC- management runs 
the risk that the business unit managers decide to buy from an outside company. Business 
units thus put market pressure on SSC-management. As soon as business unit managers 
decide to opt for external transactions, they are in need of negotiating a contract (a 
governance structure) with the external supplier. This form of market control is, however, 
still subordinate to the management control system of the organisation the business unit 
manager belongs to.  
4.3.3 Subsequent theoretical and empirical questions 
We may conclude that the development of an SSC within an organisation opens up further 
possibilities for top management to economise on management control by delegating 
control activities to business units. Business unit managers then feel the need to draw up 
governance structures for the transactions with the SSC, structures that are subordinate to 
the management control system of the organisation at large. In addition to the incentives 
towards business unit managers as incorporated in the management control structures 
between top management and business unit managers, for management control purposes 
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towards SSC-management top management may decide to draw upon a market mechanism 
(particularly the exit threat). Governance structures and exit threats are then subordinate to 
the management control system of the organisation at large. 
As a consequence, interesting questions emerge. In the first place there is a subsequent 
theoretical question: in what circumstances may we expect top management to make a 
decision to introduce such exit threats? This is a question that, drawing on TCE-reasoning, is 
answered in the next section, But there also are interesting empirical questions. In practice, 
is top management really purposefully considering the alternatives in the management 
control structure we have outlined above? Is an SSC with captive buying and selling (implying 
internal transactions without exit threats) really an explicit alternative to a staff department, 
or to a deconcentration of services in business units? And is an SSC with free buying and 
selling (implying internal transactions with exit threats) really an explicit alternative to an 
SSC with captive buying and selling? If yes, are top management’s considerations compatible 
with TCE-reasoning? If no, how does management control structure change relate to the 
development of an SSC then?  
In order to get some first insights into these questions, the results of a case study will be 
presented in section 5. 
4.4 Changes in the management control structure for SSCs: a TCE 
approach 
As was explained above, a management control structure for an SSC includes the governance 
of transactions, particularly internal transactions between business units and the SSC. This 
opens up possibilities to further draw upon TCE in explaining management control structure 
change related to the development of an SSC. In extant control research, TCE as to a large 
extent developed by Williamson (1979, 1993a, 1996, 2000, 2002) has particularly been 
informative in the area of interfirm transactions, that is transactions between separate 
firms. It offers an appropriate base for research into governance structure choice in such 
interfirm relations (e.g., Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Cäker, 2008; Cuganesan, 2007; Dekker, 2004; 
Hakansson & Lind, 2004; Jacobsen, 2010; Lamminmaki, 2005; 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 
2003; Meira et al., 2010; Nicholson, Jones & Espenlaub, 2006; Ryan & Delgado-Sanchez, 
2010; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000, 2006). However, it was also drawn upon 
for studies regarding governance structure choices within organisations (Speklé, 2001; 
Speklé, Van Elten & Kruis, 2007; Vosselman, 2002). In both intrafirm and interfirm 
transactional relationships there are coordination requirements, and moreover, depending 
80 | C H A P T E R  4  
on the degree of autonomy and profit responsibility of the units, appropriation concerns 
may rise. TCE offers an ex ante ‘calculative choice’ perspective on the structuring of 
governance in such transactional relationships. It suggests that the relationships are 
governed by contracts incorporating control structures (e.g. performance management, 
incentives, open book accounting) that provide solutions for coordination problems and 
anticipated opportunism. 
An essential management control choice regarding the governance of intrafirm transactional 
relationships regards the possible introduction of a market mechanism in the form of an exit 
threat. Such a threat has the power to discipline the internal supplier. The credibility of an 
exit threat increases as there are more potential other market parties available where 
business managers could switch to. Exit threats are therefore enacted as a consequence of 
competitive pressures in the market in which the transactional relations are embedded. The 
stronger the competition, the more switching possibilities a party has. Also in case of a 
decision that goes beyond the creation of internal transactions, namely a top management 
decision to structurally outsource the services to external parties, the effectiveness of 
market-based controls (exit threats) increases as there are more potential alternative 
suppliers business unit managers could switch to. Hence, a choice by top management for 
free buying and selling or for structural external outsourcing gets more effective (and 
efficient) as the chances of a so-called small number situation decrease. If there is a situation 
of a small number of competitors, parties become vulnerable for opportunistic behaviour, 
because they get dependent on each other. They will try and compensate for such 
vulnerability by writing contracts incorporating safeguards and/or by staying within the 
hierarchy.  
Consistent with Vosselman’s (2002; see table 2, p. 144) TCE-reasoning we assume that 
choices in management control structures depend on dimensions of transactions. Following 
Williamson (1979) three of such dimensions can be distinguished: the nature of the services, 
the frequency and volume of the transactions, and the uncertainty and complexity of the 
transactions. More concrete, on the basis of TCE we claim that top management’s choices 
for both the creation of lateral transactions between the SSC and business units and the 
introduction of a market mechanism (exit threats) depend on the nature of the transactions, 
the frequency and volume of the transactions and the uncertainty and complexity regarding 
the transactions. Our model is depicted in Figure 4-2. 
First, the degree of standardisation is a measure of the nature of the transactions (the first 
dimension). The degree of standardisation of transactions is important because it heavily 
influences both the efficiency of the distance between the providers and the users of 
S S C S  A N D  M A N A G E M E N T  C O N T R O L  S T R U C T U R E  C H A N G E  | 81 
services, and the degree to which a market mechanism in transactions might be efficient. A 
shorter distance becomes more efficient as the services get more specialised (i.e. more 
idiosyncratic) because the knowledge required for their provision is more strongly located in 
the business unit in need of such services, thus making the alternative of deconcentration of 
service providing in the business unit more efficient. So, for specialised and idiosyncratic 
services the efficient choice will be deconcentration of services. This is particularly a valid 
and efficient option if the business unit has a recurring and high volume need for the 
services. Where the need for highly specialised services is occasional, we claim that the 
choice for either deconcentration or a distanced service provision without a market 
mechanism (an SSC with captive buying and selling) depends on the level of uncertainty and 
complexity, the third dimension of the transactions. As complexity and uncertainty rise, the 
choice for deconcentration will become more efficient because of lower information 
asymmetry.  
Characteristics of 
the services 
 Frequency 
and 
volume 
 Degree of 
uncertainty/ 
complexity 
 Management control 
structure choices  
       
Standard services      SSC free b/s12 
       
  Occasional    
Customised       
services    Low to intermediate   
  Recurring     
    High   
       
    Low to intermediate   
   Occasional     
Highly specialised     High   
services       
  Recurring    Decentralisation 
  
Figure 4-2: Management control structure choices for service transactions 
Conversely, a longer distance between service providers and users becomes efficient as 
services get more standardised. Concentration of services in an SSC with accompanying 
12  b/s = buying and selling. Free b/s implies also the possibility to outsource the service. 
SSC free b/s6 
SSC captive b/s 
Deconcentration 
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transactions with business units then, is not only efficient from the perspective of economies 
of scale, but also from a governance (and transaction costs) point of view. The more 
standardised the services are, the more an introduction of an exit threat (with probably 
future external transactions) gets efficient because there will be less problems with ‘small 
numbers’ and so, there will be switching possibilities. It is proposed, then, that standardised 
services (that will automatically be relatively certain and simple), regardless of their 
volume/frequency, will be concentrated in an SSC and that the internal transactions will also 
be governed by market-like controls (exit threats). In other words: an SSC with free buying 
and selling is the efficient option then. We propose that this is also true for more customised 
services that are only needed at an occasional basis, because the vulnerability to potential 
opportunistic behaviour is relatively small, and does not outweigh the potential economies 
of scale connected to a concentration of service provision. As the frequency and volume of 
customised services rise, the vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour of potential external 
suppliers may rise, thus making the option for an SSC with captive buying and selling more 
efficient. In case of a recurring customised need for services that are highly complex and/or 
uncertain, top management may even opt for deconcentration in the business units.  
4.5 The limitations of a TCE-approach to management control 
structure change 
A TCE approach perceives change in itself as relatively unproblematic (e.g., Vosselman & Van 
der Meer-Kooistra, 2006b). Essentially, change is viewed as the result of a decision taken by 
a farsighted individual. The idea lying behind a TCE-approach to management control 
structure change is that a rational top manager takes a decision on an efficient change in the 
structure and that the decision is then implemented almost automatically. At best, change is 
conceived of as guided action based on farsighted decision making. The notion of 
‘farsightedness’ enables access to “one of the most important ‘tricks’ in the economist’s bag, 
namely the assumption that economic actors have the ability to look ahead, to discern 
problems and prospects, and factor these back into organisational/ contractual design” 
(Williamson, 1993b, p. 129).  
Critiques have challenged the notion of farsightedness in two ways. First, it is argued how 
both cognitive and institutional constraints impact on farsighted decision making. For 
instance, Roberts and Greenwood (1997) integrate a transaction cost economics approach 
and institutional approaches into a unified constrained-efficiency framework for the 
adoption of certain management control structures. They state that, indeed, decision 
makers are driven by efficiency-seeking behaviour, forced by competition or institutional 
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pressure of powerful actors. However, the cognitive and institutional constraints often result 
in design choices that are not efficient. In some cases not all design choices regarding 
management control structures are taken in consideration, while in yet other cases a 
management control structure is simply copied for legitimacy reasons. Second, the very idea 
of farsighted decision making and the subsequent change as a more or less automatically 
guided consequence of such decision making (the instrumental efficiency perspective) is 
challenged.  
According to Quattrone and Hopper change has the characteristics of a ‘drift’, it is ‘an 
incomplete attempt of organising’ (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001, p. 482). The notion of a drift 
reflects that in the process of reaching desired ends the decision maker is not able to control 
all contextual factors. They contend that entities (such as for instance management control 
structures) attain their form ‘performatively’ in, by and through ties of varying strength and 
durability in networks of human and non-human elements” (Law, 1999, p. 278).  Andon et al. 
(2007) extend the notion of ‘drifting’ to ‘relational drifting’. By focusing on 
‘interconnectedness’ of (human and non-human) entities the relational quality of a drift is 
stressed. Also Burns and Scapens (2000) state that conventional economics-based 
approaches such as TCE-approaches do not study the real processes of change, but focus on 
equilibrium and optimal solutions. They argue that although such approaches might be 
useful in analysing why a certain management control structure is rational, they will not 
explain the real-life processes that bring about this structure. However, we contend that by 
analysing why a certain management control is rational, a TCE-approach has the potential to 
guide management in rational behaviour.  
Another critique of TCE is the absence of the dimension of trust. According to Williamson 
(1993a, 1996) the choice for a governance structure is based on calculated risks and trust 
does not add anything to that analysis. However, other authors argue that trust should play 
an important role in theorising about governance and management control (De Man & 
Roijakkers, 2009; Nooteboom, 1996, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006b).  
4.6 Research methods 
In order to get a deeper insight in the change of management control structures related to 
the development of an SSC we conducted a case study. We aimed at getting answers to the 
empirical questions we formulated in section 3. Is top management really purposefully 
considering the alternatives in the management control structure we have outlined above? 
Is the possible introduction of a market mechanism (an exit threat) really an option for top 
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management, does it really consider this? If yes, is the reasoning consistent with the 
instrumental efficiency perspective as it stems from TCE? And is the change the result of a 
guided process, or is it a process that may be characterised as (relational) drifting? Or has it 
perhaps characteristics of both a guided process and a drift?  
It was not our intention to shed light on the management control structure and the 
management control processes within the SSC, nor on operational control issues within the 
SSC. Our focus was on changes in the management control structure in the organisation at 
large (PCM). We also did not intend to come up with generalised conclusions, but sought to 
get a first empirical insight in management control structure change related to the 
development of an SSC. We tried to be clear about the research question at the outset, 
while recognising that these questions can only be tentative at this stage of enquiry 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Data were collected using a qualitative research method. This method is appropriate since 
we want to know how and why a certain management control structure comes into place. 
Data consist of descriptions and accounts provided by participants in the research site and is 
collected over a one year period. In this way it is possible to make rich descriptions of the 
change process at our case company (Baarda, De Goede & Teunissen, 2005; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005).  
The case study started in October 2007 and concerned PCM. This organisation was an 
appropriate site for the study since they were in the middle of a reorganisation towards 
decentralisation and a rearrangement of their supporting services. Furthermore, because of 
family ties of a researcher with one of the participants, accessibility was good.  
PCM is a publisher of daily newspapers and of books. The financial data and headcount over 
2006, 2007 and 2008 are depicted in Table 4-113. 
Table 4-1: Financial data PCM 
 Sales  
(x €1.000) 
Net Profit  
(x €1.000) 
Employees 
(fte) 
2006 670.989 6.369 2.907 
2007 644.287 23.991 2.645 
2008 629.499 (180.041) 2.423 
 
13  PCM-Uitgevers, Jaarverslag 2007 en Jaarverslag 2008. 
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In the case study we focussed on the main newspaper divisions of PCM, i.e. de Volkskrant, 
NRC Media (with the papers NRC-Handelsblad and nrc.next) and Trouw, and on the SSC 
division called PCM-Media14. The SSC is responsible for the advertisements revenues. Each 
newspaper is processed in a separate business unit. The core activities of the business units 
are the gathering and reporting of news, and the selling of the newspaper. The most 
important sources of income are the revenues from selling the paper, and the revenues from 
selling advertisement space. 
From October 2007 till November 2008, data was collected. The researchers started with a 
meeting with the CEO of PCM and the director of PCM-Media (the SSC). After that ten semi-
structured interviews were conducted with several people, among others the CEO, the 
financial director, two successive directors of PCM Media, publishers of the newspapers and 
other persons who were closely involved with the change in the management control 
structure (see Appendix A). In addition, many documents were collected, such as annual 
reports and other financial data, service level agreements, emails, minutes of meetings and 
proceedings of the new governance structure and new management regulations. We were 
fortunate to have access to some highly confidential documents. 
The interviews were centred around issues concerning changes in the governance regarding 
advertisements within PCM. The open questions particularly (but not exclusively) focused on 
‘in house’-activities (i.e. within the business units) and (internal) transactions and on the way 
these activities and transactions were controlled. We investigated challenges and problems 
and solutions regarding the governance of advertisements and focused on the role of the 
interviewees. We deliberate did not use TCE terminology, to avoid triggering them to ex post 
rationalise their choices in this economic frame. The aim was to explore if in the reasoning of 
the interviewees TCE reasoning was used. 
The interviews lasted approximately between forty and ninety minutes and have been 
recorded and completely transcribed15. We used ATLAS.ti for coding and analysing the 
interviews and documents. The reading of relevant theoretical work, discussions with 
colleagues, several presentations of earlier drafts of this chapter and feedback of reviewers 
have produced the chapter in its present form. 
14  After we finished our case study, many things changed at PCM. In the spring of 2009 PCM was sold to a Belgian publisher 
called De Persgroep. PCM continued as ‘De Persgroep Nederland’ and is the largest newspaper publisher in the 
Netherlands. NRC Media is sold and PCM-Media merged with the advertisements sales department of the Persgroep 
called Persgroep Advertising (www.persgroep.nl). 
15  The quotes are translated from Dutch 
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4.7 Case narrative: changing the management control structure at 
PCM 
The desire to share services is the main reason why PCM was founded. In 1968, two 
newspapers in Amsterdam thought it was efficient to share their presses. In this way, they 
thought that they could make a more adequate use of the presses’ capacity. The ‘Press 
Combination’ was born. After purchasing the publisher ‘Meulenhoff’ in 1994, the 
organisation continued under the name PCM. Since its foundation, more and more services 
got shared, e.g. distribution, graphics and finally advertisements sales. The advertisements 
sales organisation is now a separate service unit, called PCM-Media. PCM-Media is the focal 
unit of our analysis. 
In the year 2007, a committee consisting of selected executives prepared a plan for a further 
decentralisation within PCM. An important reason for this was that due to increasing 
competition by other media such as television and internet, revenues from advertisements 
decreased. Business unit management was thus faced with a decrease in profits and felt 
dissatisfied with this. Business unit management was of the opinion that PCM-Media was 
underperforming. Moreover, they felt that the board of PCM was failing in their 
responsibilities:  
When I go back in the past, I see that cooperation between the newspaper business 
units and PCM-Media was far from optimal. I think that this was partly due to PCM-
Media’s assignment. It was able to operate independent from the business units. 
There wasn’t much accountability. During three years there was no accountability at 
all. You could see many frictions between the business units and PCM-Media, 
because when sales dropped they immediately blamed PCM-Media. But the real 
source was the lack of well-prepared plans. How much effort can we expect and at 
which clients? How are we going to do that and also how are we being held 
accountable; what was the performance in comparison with the original plans? (CEO) 
The old structure can be depicted as in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3: Old structure PCM 
In this structure the newspapers operated as departments that were only responsible for 
making the newspaper and for consumer marketing. Other business processes such as sales, 
HRM and strategic planning were centrally controlled. The sale of advertisements was 
organised in a separate department (PCM-Media), that, from the point of view of the 
newspaper business units, was seen as a centrally controlled unit rather than as a business 
partner that delivered services (as an SSC would do). Apparently, based on the definition of 
Janssen and Joha (2006) business unit management perceived PCM-Media to be a central 
department (see Figure 4-1). 
The main reason to change this structure into the direction of an SSC was that the executives 
of the newspapers were held responsible for their profits, but couldn’t control the 
advertisements revenues and costs. PCM-Media operated very independently and 
cooperation with the newspapers was rather poor: 
It was captive buying and we did not had anything to say. When you came with a 
question, the SSC simply refused to answer that. They kept the ranks closed and you 
had to break through those ranks. (Publisher) 
 
The key players within the newspaper divisions were strong enough to stand on their 
own feed. They didn’t need an extra hierarchical layer between them and the board. 
This change was a natural move in the direction the organisation already operated. 
(Head of change committee) 
The newspaper executives wanted their profits of course to be as high as possible and, 
therefore, aimed at an increase of their parts of the revenues gathered by PCM-Media:  
PCM Publishers
PCM Media
Volkskrant
NRC
Trouw
Other DivisionsNewspaper Division
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I don’t want to share with the other papers. I want more than them! (Publisher) 
For that reason, PCM-Media and the newspapers tried to make budget agreements 
regarding the revenues at the beginning of the year. However, such agreements were in fact 
only to a limited extent brought forward. And even when management succeeded in making 
an agreement, there was no instrument for the business units to enforce the agreements. 
Moreover, the costs PCM-Media charged to the business units were not negotiated, but 
were simply calculated and allocated by the financial department of PCM. This increased the 
perception that PCM-Media was just a central department; there was definitely no clear 
client-supplier relationship between the newspaper business units and PCM-Media. Service 
Level Agreements (SLA’s) were made, but were of no significance to the players in the field: 
In the past we also made SLA’s, but we didn’t do much with them. They remained in 
the drawer. We have the intention to change that in 2008 and onwards, and make 
better business agreements. (Director SSC) 
Under the old management control structure, PCM-Media was responsible to top 
management for everything that was connected to advertisements sales; from making 
contacts with clients to back office activities. Advertisements space was sold via media 
agencies, or directly to organisations. The back office was responsible for invoicing and other 
administrative services.  
The relation between the various constituencies can be depicted as in Figure 4-4. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Old structure advertisements sales 
The publishers were not happy with this arrangement. They agreed that PCM-Media could 
sell advertisements to big clients, but the overall feeling with the newspaper managers was 
that a direct and personal approach of the smaller clients could generate more sales for their 
divisions. Another problem was the feeling that they didn’t receive complete information 
from PCM-Media. They felt a need for more transparency:  
We as publishers didn’t have direct contacts with the market. PCM-media was in 
between as an intermediary. And that’s okay as long as the information coming from 
the marked is correct and accurate, but that was definitely not the case. (Publisher) 
Clients:
Media agencies
Companies
PCM Media 
(Sales and
Backoffice
Papers:
VK
NRC
Trouw
Budget 
agreements
Sales
contracts
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Why can’t I see the books of PCM-Media? That is not possible. Don’t they trust me? 
The answer is no. (Publisher) 
Even the director of PCM-Media understood that this structure was probably not ideal and 
he acknowledged that one couldn’t ignore the opinions of the publishers. However, he still 
believed that is was best for the clients and for the profitability of his unit to keep all 
advertisement sales centralised:  
A disadvantage of this model, at least that is the perception, is that you only approach 
the big clients and that you forget about the small clients who are specifically 
interested in one of the newspapers. […] But if I had to decide, I would choose for a 
centralised model. (Director SSC) 
On the basis of the committee’s advice a change process towards a new structure in which 
functional tasks and services were de-concentrated in the newspaper business units was 
initiated. This change process was not always easy. The project leader (the change agent) 
communicated about this: 
It is changing, but some time ago we hired a consulting agency and they spoke with 
all the big chiefs and wrote: ‘PCM bashing is a sport, even now’. (Head of change 
committee) 
This quote indicates that PCM had a culture of resistance to everything that came from 
PCM’s board. Also the phrase “the ministry of newspapers” was often heard during the 
interviews. 
Although the change process is still unfolding, at the end of 2008 the contours of a more 
permanent structure became visible. The organisational layer ‘Newspapers’ was removed 
and the newspaper units were transformed from mere departments to autonomous units 
with profit and loss responsibilities. The new structure is reflected in Figure 4-5.  
 
Figure 4-5: New structure PCM 
In this new structure PCM is functioning as a financial holding, further distancing itself from 
the activities of the newspaper divisions (business units). The business units are controlled 
PCM Publishers
PCM MediaVolkskrant NRC Trouw OtherDivisions
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by a two-headed management, a publisher and an editor. The publisher is responsible for 
the business decisions of the business unit. The relationship between the business units and 
PCM Media also changed. The business units are now unmistakably responsible for profits 
and gained more freedom to realise their ambitions. This opened up the possibility to carry 
out advertisement sales themselves and to develop a better and more equal business 
relation with PCM-Media: 
This eventually led to a new structure of advertisement sales, enabling business unit 
management to indeed accomplish a part of the sales activities themselves. In the PCM-
strategic plan for 2008 it is described as follows: 
Advertisements sales will become a commercial core activity for the business units, 
instead of a supportive activity, and the organisation has to be structured accordingly. 
The director/publisher is responsible for advertisements sales in a model that is based 
on autonomy for the separate business units. (Strategic plan 2008) 
The newspaper business units and PCM-Media made a classification in their advertising 
clients’ data base. In 2008’s SLA it was agreed that PCM-Media would stay responsible for 
the largest part of sales, namely the sales to the 1.500 biggest clients of PCM. It was agreed 
that the remaining smaller clients could also be approached by the business units. The future 
aim and wish of the business units is to reduce the exclusive sales rights of PCM-Media to 
the two hundred biggest clients. However, PCM-Media will continue to perform the back 
office activities for all business units. These activities inter alia include accounting, billing and 
page layout. The business units will establish ‘unit-sales’ teams who will approach the other 
small customers themselves. This will, according to business unit management, create an 
improved alignment between the themes in their newspapers and the interests of the 
clients: 
We have our own story and are better equipped to sell that. Also towards the 
business market, so they understand what unique market share they purchase, 
because that is what counts. You reach a unique audience. (Publisher) 
The new structure can be depicted as follows (Figure 4-6). 
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Figure 4-6: New structure advertisements sales 
The SLA-terms include a clause that the business units are not allowed to outsource the 
advertisements sales to outside parties. So, at least for the short term, there is captive 
buying and selling. From PCM’s strategic plan it is not clear whether this will continue to be 
the case in the future. Quotes, such as “it is not specifically forbidden” (Publisher), “maybe in 
the future” or “we did not look into that yet” (CEO), indicate that it is not an option at the 
moment. For the moment it proves that the business units have no other choice than to rely 
on PCM-Media for the ‘big clients’ advertisements sales and back office activities. In turn, 
the director of PCM-Media is not free to work for other external parties. But this was not a 
problem as ‘going outside’ was not really an issue for the publishers. They mainly wanted to 
have a completely free choice in deciding which client they would approach themselves. As a 
consequence, difficult discussions started about the identities of the ‘big’ clients (who were 
they?): 
At some point the publishers said: ‘We don’t want a restriction in accounts, all 
accounts are free, except maybe the biggest 50 or 100 accounts we all agree on. 
Those are for PCM-Media. The rest is for us. (Head of change committee) 
The director of PCM-Media thought this was a very bad idea: 
The big risk is that five different account managers are chasing the same client. You 
will get a lot of internal competition and you need a lot more coordination. (Director 
SSC) 
Finally, all parties agreed on a list of 200 big clients, who were exclusively for PCM-Media. 
These clients represents approximately 80% of sales. The other, approximately 13.000 
clients can be approached by all parties. The new director of PCM-Media foresees a lot of 
problems: 
No one is coordinating this, so this could become a battlefield. Our biggest challenge 
to manage this as PCM-Media. A lot of new sales people are hired as a result of this 
change, but it is not really generating more revenues. (New director SSC) 
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In sum we may conclude that PCM’s management control structure changed from 
concentrating the sales of advertisements in a central department with relatively little 
influence by internal customers towards a structure that implies a (partial) freedom of 
business units to sell advertisements ‘in house’ (i.e. in the business unit) or they can choose 
to make agreements with the SSC (PCM-Media) about the sales of advertisements. Up till 
now, publishers are not allowed to approach external agencies for the sales of 
advertisements. So, for advertisement sales, the management control structure is based on 
captive buying and selling. The next section confronts this change with our theoretical model 
developed in the previous sections. 
4.8 Confronting management control change with the dimensions of 
the transactions 
This section confronts the management control change within PCM with the dimensions of 
the service transactions as described in the theoretical TCE model.  
The first question is whether the services each business unit needs are standardised, 
customised or highly specialised. The services that PCM-Media provides include sales of 
advertisement space (front office) and administration (back office). A large part of the 
advertisements sales is corporation wide, which means that the ads can be sold for all 
business units, i.e. for all newspapers. Therefore, this service is relatively standard. Although 
they acknowledge that PCM-Media has the best competences to sell the bigger accounts, 
publishers also think they can find other outside agencies who have these competencies as 
well. However, some asset specificity, in terms of knowledge or experience is characterising 
the advertisements sales.  
A smaller part is customised; for instance when advertisers have to be found for a specific 
theme in one of the newspapers. This is for instance the case for special weekly newspaper 
sections of de Volkskrant, for instance about health or travelling. For customised ads, more 
knowledge about the contents of the theme is required, and, therefore, more specific 
agreements have to be made. It is however not a highly specialised task. The back office 
activities do not need any customisation towards specific business units and can therefore 
be characterised as standardised services.  
Secondly the frequency and volume have to be considered. All advertisement services 
needed by the business units are of a recurring nature and of high volumes as it represents a 
major part of revenues. The corporation wide advertisements sales and back office activities 
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are daily transactions. The specific ads sales for campaigns or weekend newspapers do occur 
less frequently, but many of them are nevertheless recurring.  
The third characteristic is the degree of uncertainty/ complexity. Uncertainty is not a 
consideration of the interviewees, but the degree of complexity depends on the advertisers’ 
demands. The more specific the advertisement has to be, the more complex it will become. 
As complexity increases, more internal coordination is needed regarding the advertisement 
strategy in specific media or campaigns. The interviews, however, reveal that the sale of 
specific ads is in themselves not seen as very complex. It just calls for a specific professional 
focus at PCM-Media. 
By confronting the dimensions of the service transactions with the expected management 
control structure (Figure 4-2), expectations about choices in management control structure 
can be formulated. These expectations are depicted in Figure 4-7.  
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Figure 4-7: Services of PCM-Media, nature of transactions and management control 
structure 
In the new structure the relatively standardised ads are sold by an SSC (PCM-Media). Our 
model indicates that concentration of these services in an SSC rather than deconcentration 
of the sales activities in the three business units is an efficient choice. This enables a more 
efficient use of resources, and, thus, minimises production costs and incurs economies of 
scale. It does so without incurring relatively high coordination costs and/or (opportunity) 
costs related to potential opportunistic behaviour. So, the decision to opt for an SSC is 
consistent with our modelling. However, the decision to introduce the concept of an SSC is 
accompanied by captiveness between the business units and PCM-Media. In other words, 
there will be no free buying and selling. Yet, our model indicates that an SSC without captive 
SSC free b/s 
SSC captive 
 
SSC free or 
captive b/s 
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buying or selling, and therefore, a further shift into the direction of market-based control, 
would also be an option. Abolishing captive buying and selling is efficient whenever services 
are standardised, because the risk of a lock-in effect is minimal and there is no ‘small 
number bargaining’. This would enable the business units to switch to other suppliers in case 
of relatively bad performance and therefore would introduce an exit threat in the 
management control of services. As a consequence, business unit management would be 
further empowered to control the price-quality ratio of the services and would get more 
controllability on its economic results. On the other hand, as a consequence of increased 
market control PCM-Media would be incentivised to be more competitive: 
The question is always if you have to buy services from an SSC or if you have to go to 
the free market […] make it a profit centre because then you can start a commercial 
relationship. Otherwise you can just as well do it yourself. What is the added value of 
the fact that you [internally] outsource? Yes, economies of scale, but I wonder if that 
is really the case. (Publisher) 
Apparently, this publisher (the business unit manager) clearly asks for the freedom to make 
his own choices regarding the sales of advertisements and he doesn’t want to be confined to 
the SSC only, as is in line with our model.  
The sales activities of specific advertisements are located within the business units and are 
the responsibility of so called unit-teams. The interviewees state that PCM-Media eventually 
will only serve a few hundred of their largest clients, and that the other thousands of 
‘smaller’ clients will be approached by the business units themselves. In the terms of our 
modelling this would be labelled deconcentration. Is this an efficient choice? If ads sales is 
customised, it is still a relatively simple job. In terms of the theoretical model, customised 
and relatively simple services would imply a management control structure based on an SSC 
with captive buying and selling, In case the services are hardly customised, the sales will be 
efficiently governed by a market based structure. Particularly since PCM already has an SSC 
running for the corporation wide ads sales, it makes a concentration of the sales of 
advertisements to smaller customers in the SSC even more efficient. Deconcentration and 
the freedom this entails for the business units have led to a structure incorporating both an 
SSC and unit-teams within the business units. A potential disadvantage is that diseconomies 
of scale might result, as different sales persons start approaching the same customers.  
The back office activities could be labelled a standardised service. In terms of our theoretical 
model the efficient management control structure would be an SSC with free buying and 
selling. This would lead to the lowest production and transaction costs. However, until now 
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PCM chooses to concentrate these activities in an SSC with captive buying and selling. The 
option of free buying and selling is not explicitly considered. 
In the final section a reflection on these findings will be given and some discussion is raised. 
4.9 Discussion and conclusion  
A TCE-perspective on management control structure change related to the development of 
an SSC broadens existing frameworks of management control by particularly pointing to the 
possibility of including governance structures for internal transactions and exit threats 
(connected to a market mechanism) in the management control structure of an 
organisation. From a theoretical TCE-stance, the management control structure of an 
organisation at large may be the result of purposive choice behaviour by top management. 
In TCE-terms, such an organisation is in itself a hierarchical governance structure for 
transactions that was negotiated and chosen by autonomous human actors.  
Thus, management control structure choice comes after the choice for a hierarchy as a 
governance structure; the management control structure is subordinate to the governance 
structure. Given the hierarchy as a governance structure, management control structure 
choice as it relates to the development of an SSC may include the creation of horizontal 
client-supplier relationships between internal buyers and the SSC. Provided the right 
incentives (for instance in the context of responsibility accounting through which lower 
management levels are held accountable by top management) are in place, these internal 
buyers and seller will negotiate proper governance structures for the internal transactions.  
Such governance structures are consequently subordinate to the management control 
structure of the organisation at large and may take the form of internal contracts or service 
level agreements. Depending on the nature of transactions, the volume and frequency of the 
transactions, and the levels of uncertainty and complexity, top management may moreover 
decide to introduce a market mechanism in the governance of the internal transactions. In 
such cases, exit threats put additional pressure on the management of the SSC to further 
improve the price-quality ratio of the services.  
Alternatively, depending on the above mentioned dimensions of transactions, top 
management may decide to place certain services outside the SSC and to de-concentrate 
them in the various business units. The services are then produced ‘in-house’, bringing the 
distance between these services and the primary processes of the business units to a 
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minimum. In this case, the management control structure of the organisation at large does 
not include governance structures of internal transactions. 
The empirical part of our research gives evidence that related to the development of an SSC 
there is no straightforward rational choice behaviour in management control structure 
change by top management of PCM. Although a team was appointed to come up with a 
proposal regarding a new structure, not all the alternatives stemming from a TCE-approach 
were explicitly taken into account. Particularly, the possibility of the introduction of an exit 
threat was not explicitly in the mind of the team and the CEO. Moreover, there was no 
explicit connection with TCE reasoning. To the extent that there is economic reasoning 
behind the concentration of services in an SSC (for instance back-office activities and selling 
of advertisements to larger customers), it is reasoning regarding economies of scale and not 
reasoning regarding transaction costs connected to specific management control structures.  
However, from a contents point of view, this does not make a TCE-approach to management 
control structure change invalid. Researchers may demonstrate this approach to 
practitioners and, in doing so, may enhance rational economic reasoning concerning 
management control structure change in practice. In a sense this implies that they 
contribute to the ‘performativity’ (e.g., Callon, 2007) of transaction cost economics, that is 
that they help bringing the theory into life. For, as researchers have convincingly argued, a 
strict distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ theories is untenable (e.g., Ferraro, 
Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). 
Furthermore, the change process at PCM was not straightforwardly of a guided nature. 
Although a committee was appointed with an assignment to make a new design of the 
management control structure, the decision to appoint such a committee initiated a change 
process that was not characterised by complete order. It was not guided action based on 
clear decisions, not an identifiable movement between origins and an outcome (Quattrone 
& Hopper, 2001). There was no strict guided change based on rational (efficiency) 
arguments. Although our case study gives evidence that there was some purposeful action 
aimed at the construction of a new management control structure, it proved to be an 
‘incomplete attempt of organising’ (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001, p. 482). The change proves 
to have some characteristics of a drift. In our case, it is the interconnected actions of top 
management, newspaper business units management and SSC management that result in a 
changing management control structure that is relatively fluid.  
Moreover, the search for overall efficiency apparently is not the dominant force for 
developing a relatively stable structure. Although it may very well be that future 
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interactions, through which divergent interests are levelled out, pull the management 
control structure further into the direction as predicted by our TCE-based model, it would be 
through relational drifting that such a stable situation is reached. Divergent interests, the 
search for autonomy and power positions seems to be very influential in such drifting. In 
order to further explore these change processes we would suggest longitudinal case studies 
that enable to study the changes of management control structures in the long run.  
A TCE-approach is an instrumental approach that may be contrasted with a relational 
approach. It presupposes that a farsighted individual (i.e. a top manager) has a priori 
intentions: intentions that are not formed by his or her ‘interconnectedness’ with other 
entities in the network. He or she is outside the network that he or she seeks to far-sightedly 
instrumentalise as an ‘economic man’: ‘man’ that is rationally acting out of economic 
interest. In concrete terms, top management perceives the management control structure 
as an instrument to cope with coordination requirements and motivational problems.  
In a relational approach, parties are considered to be sense making individuals who form a 
posteriori intentions. The intentions stem from the inside of the network, from the 
interconnectedness with other entities. They are not only the intentions of the economic 
man, but may also stem from power positions, from commitment to the network, or from 
intrinsic motivation for the tasks at hand. In a network, management control structures 
gradually emerge as a consequence of day-to-day interaction in the network. They are not 
the results of purposeful decision making by an actor outside the network, but of purposeful 
interaction within the network. Management control structures, then, are not primarily 
instruments in the hands of top management, but are non-human actors that are in a 
constant state of flux.  
We claim that a relational approach to changes in management control might also open up 
possibilities to incorporate the notion of trust in the analysis. In the process of studying the 
PCM-case we observed that there was a certain absence of trust and even distrust toward 
the board of PCM and the SSC. The publishers did not always believe that PCM-Media was 
working in their best interest, and they thought that higher profits could be achieved by 
keeping the services ‘in house’, i.e. within the business unit. 
We suggest that a relational approach could provide additional insights into the change of 
management control related to the development of SSC’s. 
 
 CHAPTER 5: CONTRACTING AND CONTROL PRACTICES: A 
FIELD STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FACILITY 
MANAGEMENT OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIP 16 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the role of contracting and control activities in establishing 
trust and commitment in collaborative relationships. It contributes to a debate that is 
grounded in the literature on the governance and control of relationships between 
organisations (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Cäker, 2008; Chua & Mahama, 2007; Cuganesan, 2007; 
Dekker, 2004; Hakansson & Lind, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000, 2006). More specifically, the chapter adds to research on 
the governance of dyadic relationships (Dekker, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2000) and on the governance of similar relationships that exists within a network (Chua & 
Mahama, 2007; Hakansson & Lind, 2004; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). In the context of such 
governance, control is considered to be an important safeguard against potential 
opportunistic behaviour, but trust is often neglected (Dekker, 2004; Tomkins, 2001). Dekker 
(2004) and Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009), however, do show the importance 
of both control and trust in the governance of interfirm relationships and in obtaining 
beneficial results. Also Lui and Ngo (2004, 474) note that "contractual safeguards and trust 
are important control mechanisms that reduce risk and facilitate cooperation in a 
partnership. These two mechanisms may interact with each other in determining the 
outcomes of cooperation". Free (2008) states that trust is increasingly being viewed as a 
precondition for improved performance and competitive success in complex business 
environments and that future research dealing with the role accounting can play in 
generating trust and trustworthiness is needed.  
There are, however, competing perspectives with regard to the trust-control relationship. 
First, from a substitution perspective it is argued that more trust leads to less control and 
vice versa. Second, from a complements perspective it is claimed that trust leads to more 
control and vice versa. The third perspective is that control and trust interact with each 
other. This perspective focuses on the dynamics between control and trust. 
16  This chapter is a working paper, co-authored with Ed Vosselman, Paula van Veen-Dirks and Kaleem Hassan. It is 
presented at the 36th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association 6-8 May 2013 in Paris, France. 
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This chapter takes an interaction perspective on the relationship between control and trust. 
In particular, it aims to make a contribution to the scientific debate by an empirical 
investigation of the interactive relationship between control and trust in an interfirm 
relationship and it builds on the framework presented by Vosselman and Van der Meer-
Kooistra (2009). More specifically, in order to enable the study of the dynamics in this 
relationship in a comprehensive manner, it draws on a distinction between the ostensive 
and the performative (Latour, 2005) in order to extend the framework so that it not only 
includes ostensive aspects, but also performative aspects of contracts, control and trust (see 
for instance Boedker, 2010). It uses ‘verbs’ rather than ‘nouns’ (see Chua, 2007). That is, this 
chapter explores the building of trust as it interacts with the structuring and practicing of 
control. Control structures are the control solutions as written down in contracts and lay the 
basis for the practicing of control (see also Ahrens & Chapman, 2007) and may take the form 
of scorecards, open book accounting, incentive schemes, constraints etc. As control 
structures are an effect of contracting (verb), this chapter aims to contribute by further 
exploring the complex interactions between contracting, the practicing of control and the 
building of trust. It shows that the boundaries between control and trust may not be as clear 
and sharply defined as envisioned in previous work. 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) adopt the distinction between thin trust and 
thick trust (see also Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Nooteboom, 1996, 2002) and translate it to 
the ‘accounting-control-trust’ nexus in the governance of interfirm relationships. Thin trust is 
produced by formal control structures incorporated in a governance structure, whereas thick 
trust is produced by relational signals through voluntary local decisions. So, Vosselman and 
Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) suggest that control structures relate to thin trust, whereas 
voluntary relational signals relate to thick trust. They model the building of trust as a linear 
process where thin trust is established first as a basis for a transactional relationship, thus 
providing input for the building of thick trust.  
This chapter aims to further explore the building of trust by conducting an in-depth case 
study. In doing so it responds to calls for case studies by Free (2008), Caglio and Ditillo 
(2008), De Jong and Klein Woolthuis (2008) and Meira et al. (2010). The in-depth case study 
examines a relationship between an international industrial organisation (Semco) and a 
managing agent for facility services (Faspro). By focusing on the act of contracting, the 
practicing of control and the building of trust (all verbs), and, thus, by taking a performative 
perspective, this chapter shows that the boundaries between thick trust and thin trust may 
not be as clear and sharply defined as envisioned in previous work on thin and thick trust. 
Relational signalling may not only be connected to (informal and unexpected) voluntary 
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decisions of parties involved, but may also be produced by contracting and the practicing of 
control. Contracting and the practicing of control therefore not only serve safeguarding and 
the building of thin trust, but may also serve relational signalling and, the building of thick 
trust.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the second section, we provide the 
conceptual background of the chapter. In the third section, the research methodology is 
outlined, followed by a description of the case situation. In the fourth section, an 
interpretive case study follows with a description of the development of the relationship. 
The chapter finishes with a section containing theoretical implications and limitations. 
5.2 Conceptual background: an interactive relationship between 
control and trust 
5.2.1 Complementing an ostensive approach with a performative approach 
This chapter aims to add to the literature that takes an interactive perspective on the 
relationship between control and trust. Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) 
theorised on the interaction of trust and control by taking an ostensive perspective. The 
ostensive approach assumes that stability, orderliness and predictability characterise social 
life and takes a subordinate and instrumental role for accounting and control for granted, as 
opposed to, for example, a role that drives transformation (Boedker, 2010). From an 
ostensive perspective, control and trust are both instrumental in absorbing uncertainty and 
behavioural risks (Dekker, 2004; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; 
Tomkins, 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). Control and trust are 
predominantly seen as two distinct concepts, either substitutive of or complementary to 
each other (Dekker, 2004). This is different from a performative perspective. From a 
performative perspective, control and trust are viewed as active forces in a relationship or a 
network that are made to act by many other subjects and objects and that help to mediate, 
shape and construct that very relationship or network. From a performative perspective 
Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) claim that trust differs from control technologies in the sense 
that it is not an object, but a quasi-object. In their view, trust is an aspiration circulating in 
the interfirm relationship or network. It is a problematising device that becomes important 
when it is absent. It then mobilises control that facilitates ongoing business in the network. 
In this way, trust is shown to emerge through control technologies including accounting.  
Viewing ostensive aspects and performative aspects as a duality (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Hansen, 2011; Pentland & Feldman, 2005, 2007, 2008), this chapter complements the 
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ostensive approach taken by Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) with a 
performative approach. More specifically, it aims to extend the framework developed by 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) (see Figure 5-1 on page 104 below) by 
focusing on processes of becoming and enactment. In an ostensive approach interaction 
between control and trust is a result of rational decision making by individual human actors; 
in a performative approach the interaction of control and trust is viewed to take place in a 
social-material network. A performative approach is characterised by a focus on processes of 
becoming and enacting in a relational network; a network consisting of humans and other-
than-humans such as contracts and control technologies. The next subsection outlines the 
ostensive basis for our analysis. 
5.2.2 Control and thin trust 
In an early stage, when parties enter into an interfirm relationship, they are in need of some 
basic trust. In this sense, trust must exist prior to contracting (Neu, 1991). It may be drawn 
from the social and legal institutional environment of the relationship, or from past 
experiences with parties in the relationship. In turn, contracting may strengthen the trust 
base in relationships. Contracting enables parties to cope with legitimate mistrust 
(Lindenberg, 2000; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) amongst each other. To a 
certain extent, explicit mistrust will be acceptable to the parties, because there always are 
foreseeable conflicts of interests between the parties. These foreseeable conflicts of interest 
can be compensated for by negotiating credible commitments (Williamson, 1979): 
contractual agreements or control structures that aim to safeguard against potential 
opportunistic behaviour (the seeking of self-interest with guile), thus coping with 
appropriation concerns. An important function of a contract therefore, is, by balancing 
interests, to create a legitimate power-base with the intention of creating a sustainable 
relationship. Such explicit balancing of interests adds to the trust that the parties draw from 
the institutional, social and legal environment. In a contract, controls may take the form of 
performance management systems, incentive schemes, etc. These controls, together with 
social values and norms that are internalised in the participants in the relationship may 
produce the thin trust that is necessary (but not sufficient) to create and maintain a 
relatively stable and sustainable relationship. They produce sufficient positive expectations 
about future behaviour of parties to enable a (behavioural) risk taking attitude.  
5.2.3 Control and thick trust 
Although thin trust from both the institutional environment and the governance and control 
structures (contractual arrangements) has the power to solve the problem of legitimate 
mistrust in relationships, it is not sufficient in preventing all potential forms of opportunism. 
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Because there are always unforeseeable possibilities for behaving opportunistically, there 
always are control structure deficits. These deficits are connected to myopic forms of 
opportunism (Lindenberg, 2000), for instance induced by unexpected opportunities for one 
of the parties outside the relationship. For the continuance of the long-term relationship, 
parties need positive expectations about the future behaviour of other parties. They may 
create such positive expectations by giving relational signals to each other. Such relational 
signalling is not embedded in a governance structure, but is based on a self-organising 
mechanism (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) that somehow regulates voluntary 
decisions by the parties to act appropriately and cooperatively in the relationship. At the 
core, this mechanism entails the voluntary disclosure of commitment to the relationship. 
These relational signals reflect a willingness to forgo opportunistic behaviour. They reveal 
commitment to the relationship. By voluntary relational signals parties aim to express that 
they can be trusted because they value the relationship. The signals create positive 
expectations about the other parties’ behaviour (thick trust), thus supporting the 
continuance of the relationship.  
Relational signalling produces thick trust (Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009) as a 
result of voluntary rational decisions; decisions that are not governed by a central power-
base as for instance a contract. Thick trust is thus associated with relational control, a form 
of control that emerges from voluntary actions. Relational control is not embedded in a 
structure, but is the result of agency of parties that act out of enlightened self-interest (see 
Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). Parties are then willing to take a long-term 
perspective, rather than trying to maximise their short-term gains. Although relational 
control is the result of intentional decisions, it does not take the form of a practice. It is not 
organised, it emerges and it is contingent upon (unexpected) circumstances. 
Decisions to provide relational signals may be particularly expected in so-called 'solidarity 
situations' (Lindenberg, 2000). There are different categories of such situations. In 'common 
good'-situations, for instance when suppliers and assemblers desire to work together in a 
'family'-context, parties might signal to each other that they are willing to relax their self-
interests for the benefit of the relationship. In 'sharing'-situations a party might decide to 
share unexpected benefits with other parties, without having a contractual obligation to do 
so. In 'need'-situations other parties might decide to help the party that is in need, without a 
contractual obligation. In 'breach'-situations parties might express their willingness to 
sustain the relationship. And in 'mishap-situations' a party might decide to inform the other 
parties about a mishappening and to express its willingness to compensate for the damage. 
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The main argument made by Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) can be 
summarised as in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: The building of thin and thick trust 
Essentially, Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) categorise the building of thick 
trust through relational signalling as a voluntary action which is not based on a formal 
power-base that contains formal control structures. However, to a large degree they leave 
the question whether relational signalling may also be a part of the writing of control 
structures (contracting as a process) and the control practices unanswered. Our case study 
explores how relational signals (and thus trust building) may be connected to both 
contracting as a process and the practicing of controls. The study addresses two main 
questions. First, it addresses how contracting and the resulting contract are vehicles for (thin 
and thick) trust building. Second, it addresses the question as to how control practices as 
they are embedded in control structures not only act as safeguards, but also produce 
relational signals, and, thus, how they produce thick trust. 
5.3 Case setting and research methodology 
5.3.1 Case setting  
This case study examines the interfirm transactional relationship between Semco and Faspro 
(pseudonyms). Semco is a leading semiconductor company founded by Lectro (pseudonym) 
more than 50 years ago. Headquartered in Europe, the company has about 29,000 
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employees working in more than 30 countries and sales of USD 5.4 billion in 2008. Semco 
produces semiconductors, system solutions and software that deliver better sensory 
experiences in TVs, set-top boxes, identification applications, mobile phones, cars and a wide 
range of other electronic devices. Semco is a multinational company having its operations 
and customers in different countries in Europe, Asia and North America. In the Netherlands, 
the company is located at two sites, i.e. Nijmegen and Eindhoven. 
Faspro is an Anglo-Dutch organisation, located in the Netherlands. The organisation 
possesses specialist knowledge of and has experience in the provision of management 
solutions for facilities services, for both public and private sector clients. The company 
strives to become the market leader in the European Total Facilities Management (TFM) 
market. Faspro is a joint venture between a UK-based company and a Netherlands-based 
company. It was founded in 2002 and currently it has various multi-million euro on-going 
contracts with international companies located in the Netherlands. Their first substantial 
contract was with Semco. 
The facility management relationship 
The facility management relationship between Semco and Faspro comprises several players 
which can be depicted as in Figure 5-2.  
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Figure 5-2: The organisation of facility management at Semco 
Within Semco, a facility management department is responsible for so called ‘building 
services’. Operational management of these building services is outsourced to Faspro. 
Semco concludes SLAs (service level agreements) with the internal customers and Faspro 
coordinates the delivery of facility services to its internal customers by the various suppliers. 
However, not everything is outsourced. Some complex and very specific maintenance 
services for the semiconductor fabrication plants (commonly called ‘fabs’) are managed by a 
separate in-house Semco facility department. This department also buys services from 
outside suppliers, but manages the delivery of services itself. The managers of the facility 
management departments have a direct line of responsibility to Semco’s corporate level.  
Figure 5-2 reveals that Faspro does only have a managing relation with suppliers and not a 
contracting relations. The contracts are concluded between Semco and the suppliers and 
between Semco and Faspro. This is depicted in Figure 5-3. The focus of this chapter is on the 
contracting relation between Semco and Faspro. 
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Figure 5-3: Interfirm relationship between Semco, Faspro and suppliers 
Changes in facility management at Semco 
The origins of the relationship between Semco and Faspro lie in a contract that was 
established between Lectro and Faspro in 2006. The contracting period ended in 2010. At 
the time the original contract was signed Semco did not exist yet. At that time it was a part 
of the Lectro organisation known as Lectro Semiconductors. However, Lectro 
Semiconductors was not one of the negotiating and contracting parties; the contract was 
concluded at Lectro’s corporate level. As a consequence, at the beginning Semco did not 
experience ownership of the relationship. Semco came into existence in September 2006. It 
soon employed new local management that successfully improved the relationship with 
Faspro by starting a contract review. This proved to be the beginning of further relationship 
developments. In the beginning of 2010 the facility service departments of the buildings 
(soft services) and ‘fabs’ (hard services, for example machine maintenance) merged into one 
facility management department. At the same time, some key personnel changed. 
Moreover, in 2010 new contract negotiations for the soft facilities services (buildings) 
progressed.  
This development is depicted in Figure 5-4. 
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Figure 5-4: Timeline of relationship between Semco and Faspro 
This chapter particularly focuses on the period 2006 until 2009. 
5.3.2 Research methodology 
The processual nature of the research questions made field research the appropriate 
approach (Silverman, 2005). Our study responded to the latest calls for in-depth process 
studies of interfirm relationships (e.g. Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). Extant theoretical knowledge 
on contracts, control and trust in conjunction with field data were used to draw plausible 
conclusions (Lukka & Modell, 2010). Building on an ostensive understanding of contracts and 
control structures in interfirm relationships the study provides theoretical interpretations of 
how contracts and control structures may be vehicles for relational signals and relational 
control in a specific time-space.  
The main sources of data were semi-structured interviews. The broad themes included 
contracting, control practices and (mis)trusting. For example, there were questions about 
the nature, purpose and role of contracts and control practices. Many questions were 
related to contracting and control practices. Yet, during the interviews some new and 
relevant issues and insights emerged which proved very useful in the process of theorising. 
The interaction between the researchers and the interviewees was weakly structured in 
order to facilitate communication of insights from the field. Most of the interviews took 
place at Semco’s plant. The duration of the interviews was between 1 and 1 ½ hours on 
average. We had 23 interviews/ meetings (see Table 5-1).  
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Table 5-1: Overview of interviews 
# Date 
(yymmdd) 
Organisation Position Duration 
(minutes) 
1 08061017 Semco FM director18-119 60 
2 08092920 Semco FM director-1 70 
Semco Purchase Manager  
3 08120821 Semco FM director-1 75 
4 090319 Semco FM director-1 134 
5 090324 Semco Director FM-Fabs22 67 
6 090330 Semco Purchase Manager  98 
7 090330 Semco FM manager-a 59 
8 090406 Faspro Account director-1 97 
9 090409 Semco Country manager-1 63 
10 090414 Semco Controller-a 16 
11 090414 Semco Controller-a 90 
Semco Controller-b 
12 090423 Semco Manager FM-Fabs 74 
13 090429 Semco Site Purchasing 
Manager 
92 
14 090429 Semco FM manager-b 111 
15 09091623 Semco FM director-1 117 
Semco Purchase Manager 
16 100618 Semco Purchase Manager  
17 100721 Faspro Account director-2 63 
18 100726 Faspro Senior facility manager 26 
19 100726 Faspro Contract manager 58 
20 100908 Semco FM director-224 52 
21 101014 Supplier Manager maintenance 97 
22 101026 Semco Country Manager-2 67 
Semco FM director-2 
23 101110 Supplier District manager-a 96 
Supplier District manager-b 
 
The interviewees were selected because, from different hierarchical positions, they were 
involved in managing facilities services. Figure 5-5 depicts the hierarchical positions of the 
17  First contact and discussion about research project (not recorded) 
18  This is the head of the facility management organisation 
19  The addition 1 and 2 is used when during the case study the person for this position is replaced by another person. The 
addition a or b means that the interviewees are different persons with the same positions 
20  Informative meeting (not recorded) 
21  Complete research team present (5 researchers) 
22  A Fab is a Semiconductor Fabrication Plant 
23  Feedback meeting with complete research team 
24  This was the old manager FM-Fabs (#12) 
                                                        
110 | C H A P T E R  5  
interviewees and their connections. The dotted lines represent the contacts at the different 
levels between the two organisations. 
 
Figure 5-5: Hierarchical positions of interviewees within Semco and Faspro and their 
connections 
The first two preliminary meetings, in June and September 2008, were aimed at gaining 
access to the company. The conversations during these meetings were not recorded, but 
useful notes about the case company were made. The additional 21 meetings were 
organised in two rounds in which 19 semi-structured interviews were conducted (in the 
period December 2008-November 2010). Thirteen interviews were conducted with Semco 
managers at different hierarchical levels and in different departments such as Facilities 
Management, Purchasing, Finance & Accounting and Manufacturing. Moreover, four 
managers at Faspro and two managers of two different suppliers of the facility services were 
interviewed. In addition two general ‘feedback meetings’ between the research team and 
key players in Semco were arranged. During the first recorded general ‘feedback meeting’ all 
the authors of this chapter participated in a formal introduction to the research objectives, 
plans and methods and received useful information about Semco’s outsourcing strategy. In 
the second general meeting the results of the first round of interviews were presented and 
discussed. The Facility Management (FM) director and Purchase Manager participated in 
that meeting along with a group of five researchers. 
 
All the interviews were transcribed and analysed in relation with the other material using 
the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti. By coding all the material (see Appendix F), 
Country Manager
FM Director
Site Purchase
Manager
Purchase Manager
Manager FM-a and b
Account Director
Facility & 
Contract Manager
Senior Facility
Manager
Semco Faspro
Controllers
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the software provided a means to manage and organise the data. That helped in 
understanding and analysing the data.  
Other sources of information included service level agreements (SLAs), roadmap documents 
(monthly meetings) and quarterly reports (see Appendix E). The documents and interview 
transcripts were used to triangulate and cross check what was said during the interviews and 
what appeared in the documents. Different sources of information were drawn upon to 
observe patterns and to make a chain of interpretations. For example, the review of 
quarterly reports offered insights into the performance and the status of the interfirm 
relationship. This insight was compared with the views expressed by different managers. 
Since this research aims to understand the interactive development of control and trust, the 
model of Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) provides a basis for the interpretive 
case study. Although the model is on intentional and rational decision making and focuses 
on trust as both an input and an outcome, it can be complemented or transformed by a 
performative case study. Given already designated phenomena or constructs as contracts, 
control structures and control practices the field study presented in the next section aims to 
demonstrate how these constructs act as vehicles in the development of trust and the in the 
development of the relationship at large. Thus, it demonstrates how these constructs help 
mobilising the relationship. 
5.4 Field study: Development of a facility management relationship 
This case study is about Semco’s quest to manage the rendering of facility services. For 
several years there had been a relationship between Semco and different suppliers of facility 
services. In 2006, the former owner of Semco, named Lectro, decided to outsource the 
management of the facility services. To this end, they signed a contract with Faspro, a new 
organisation that originated out of a joint venture between a Dutch and a British facility 
management organisation. The contract spanned a period of four years and ended in 2010. 
The research started in 2008, when a first contact with Semco’s Real Estate and Facility 
manager at that time (in this case study labelled FM director-1) was made. There were three 
initial talks with him in 2008; the subsequent interviews started in 2009. The research 
encompasses the contract period from the beginning of 2006 until the end of the contract in 
2010. The events of interest were examined both after they had taken place (ex post facto) 
and as they took place (real-time).  
The longitudinal study concerns three phases in the development of the relationship: (1) the 
writing of the contract between Faspro and Lectro in May 2006, the sale of Lectro semi-
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conductors to Semco at the end of 2006 and problems with the original contract; (2) a 
review of the contract during 2007 and the writing of a new contract in September 2007; (3) 
the development of the relationship and the development of the control structure during 
2008 and 2009.  
The following sections are structured around these three phases. Each phase provides 
insights into the relationship between control and trust (see Table 2). The study of the first 
phase offers a demonstration of the difficulty of achieving commitment because not all 
parties were involved in the contracting process. The study of the second phase offers a 
description of the contract review and of the process towards this review, and shows that 
contracting provided opportunities for relational signalling and, thus, for building thick trust. 
The study of the third phase reveals that control acted as a vehicle for relational signals. 
Table 5-2: Case development and theoretical implications 
Phase Description Implication 
1 Contract closed between Lectro and 
Faspro. 
Sale of semi-conductor division to 
Semco 
Dissatisfaction with the new situation 
Change in management 
Commitment is difficult to achieve as 
not all parties are involved in the 
contracting process 
2 Contract review Contracting plays a socialising role and 
provides opportunities for relational 
signalling and thick trust building, and 
does not just serve the building of thin 
trust 
3 Development of the relationship under 
a new contract with ups and downs 
Control practices act as vehicles for 
relational signals  
5.4.1 Phase 1: Lack of commitment 
The first phase in the relationship is characterised by the signing of the contract between 
Faspro and Lectro in May 2006, the sale of Lectro semi-conductors to Semco at the end of 
2006, and problems with the first contract.  
It was Lectro’s strategy to outsource everything that was not considered core business. This 
strategy entailed the decision to outsource facility management, resulting in a contract with 
Faspro. When the first contract was established between Faspro and Lectro, the managers of 
Lector’s semiconductor division were not happy with this contract. They knew Lectro was 
planning to sell the semiconductor division to Semco, and they thought this would bring too 
much change at one time. 
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In 2006 just before we went from Lectro semiconductors to Semco, Lectro said it was 
a good idea that we should outsource the operational part of facility management. I 
say it specifically like that because none of us were very enthusiastic about that. We 
all knew that something was going to happen with Lectro Semiconductors, that they 
were going to sell it25 (#6, Purchase manager, Semco26). 
The general feeling was that Lectro should have led the decision to the new owner, Semco. 
One of the reasons was a bad experience the Semco director FM-Fabs (#5) had with the 
outsourcing of the facility management of a Lectro plant in the Czech Republic. After the 
original contract between Lectro and Faspro was signed there was much resistance against 
the outsourcing project. For example, Faspro’s account director did not receive any support 
from Semco’s facility manager. This lack of support was related to the transformation of 
Lectro Semiconductor’s facility manager’s role that changed into the role of a demand 
manager. The new role required a cooperative attitude to Faspro. Since the Facility Manager 
did not want this change he was not willing to cooperate. 
Semco’s facility manager had to relate to Faspro and the first thing he did was saying: 
Okay Faspro you are now in control, you are managing this. I want this, this and this. 
And these were all kinds of elements that he himself had never been able to do (#4, 
FM director-1, Semco). 
Another important issue was the control structure included in the contract, such as the set 
of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and incentives for savings. Local Semco management 
did not negotiate this with Faspro. Apparently, interests were not properly aligned, which 
resulted in difficult discussions about the measurement of the savings. 
There were certain aspects in the contract, which were in contradiction with a good 
relationship and a good execution of the agreements in the contract. […] For instance 
when we achieved savings, as an incentive in the contract, we split the revenues up 
and 80% of those savings were for us and only 20% for them. That's how the first 
contract was written. It did not work, it did not work (#6, Purchase manager, Semco). 
It was not clear to everybody what should be achieved and who was responsible for which 
actions. 
25 All quotes are from Dutch native speakers who have been interviewed in English. We left the quotes as original as 
possible which may result in typical grammatical structures 
26 Please refer to the interview details in Table 1: #6 is the interview number from Table 1 followed by the interviewee’s job 
title (Purchase manager) and the interviewee’s company (NEC). 
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And if you look at savings, savings are always a nice issue; who initiated it? Who is 
responsible for the results? Who gets paid for it? And if you don't make that very 
clear you will always have discussions and cooperation becomes very difficult. So that 
was one big problem with the previous contract (#7, Manager FM-a, Semco). 
Operational management showed a lack of commitment to the relationship. It was not their 
decision to outsource, but that of Lector’s senior management. Operational management 
had not participated in the contracting process. 
We weren't there when this contract was signed. We did not have a lot of influence 
on how the contract was concluded (#6, Purchase manager, Semco). 
 
In 9 out of 10 cases it is a management decision on the highest level. Most of the time 
above my level and in the case of Faspro back then everybody in our division was 
against it, including the managing director. I was against it, but this was the 
philosophy of Lectro at large, so this happened (#5, Director FM-Fabs, Semco) 
Not only did the Semco-FM managers feel that their interests were not properly aligned, 
they also did not experience 'ownership' of the contract and, therefore, they did not feel 
commitment to the day-to-day activities. So, although there was an explicit contract 
embedded in repeated transactions between Lectro and Faspro, the required trust base for 
good cooperation was not present. In other words, the contract was not sufficient to 
mobilise the parties involved. Both the facility management department of Semco and 
Faspro had not experienced a process of socialisation during the first contract period. Faspro 
acknowledged a lack of motivation on the part of their outsourcing partner. 
It was not supported by the Facility Manager then. […] They did not believe it was the 
right time to also outsource immediately the support of buildings and labs. But 
management decided to outsource anyway (#8, Account director-1, Faspro). 
Apparently both parties experienced a lack of commitment at the operational start of the 
relationship. Operational management experienced the start of the relationship as a 
struggle. The contract appeared to be an insufficient base for the further building of trust. 
However, Semco’s top management decided to continue with Faspro. This was partly 
because the contract period was four years and breaking the contract might have legal 
consequences, but also because they were fully aware of the basic reasons for outsourcing, 
which were to improve flexibility and, above all, cost reduction. Competition in the 
semiconductor industry was severe and a yearly decrease in cost was essential for survival.  
Not all Semco managers were convinced that the savings would be reached through the 
cooperation with Faspro, but the general feeling was that it would be possible through 
better cooperation and through new contract negotiations. It was recognised that the 
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relationship was still very immature and that facility managers had to get used to the new 
way of working. 
In sum: Phase 1 
The control structures incorporated in the contract were not capable of providing thin trust 
as a sufficient base for the development of a stable and durable relationship. The main 
reasons why the relationship did not develop well were a lack of commitment and an 
absence of a feeling of ownership of the contract. Semco managers were not involved in the 
contracting process. As one of the managers said: 
You are building a house on a fundament, the contract. If the fundament is wrong 
don't start building a house, that's what we have learned: don't do that" (#6, 
Purchase manager, Semco).  
However, Semco knew it was not in its interest to jeopardise future cooperation and it was 
acknowledged that contract renegotiations were needed. 
5.4.2 Phase 2: Contract review 
After a problematic start of the relationship, Semco and Faspro started a review of the 
contract. This review took place in 2007, and a new contract was signed in September 2007. 
Faspro initiated a press release about their new contract with Semco with the following text:  
Faspro has been selected to perform facility management services for Semco 
Semiconductors. The contract with a term of at least three years comprises all 
activities and all sites of Semco Semiconductors. The estimated value of the contract 
is EUR 10 million per year. […] The facility managers of Semco already joined Faspro in 
2006. The new contract is a continuation of the activities which Faspro performed for 
Lectro (Doc #4, 070927). 
This release suggests that the contract with Lectro came to an end and that Semco chose to 
continue its relationship with Faspro. As was mentioned in the former section, the original 
contract period was four years, but in the eyes of the parties the contract needed a review 
because the parties felt a need for a more cooperative and committed relationship. During 
2007, Semco and Faspro started renegotiating the contract and came closer to each other.  
A misinterpretation that might come forward from the press release is that Semco did chose 
for Faspro after a tender. However, an FM manager commented as follows:  
27 Please refer to document details in Appendix A: #4 refer to the document number from Appendix A followed by the 
document's date as yymm. 
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the contract was signed for four years. When I started here, we started to rewrite the 
contract. The period stood, but we changed some details of it […] we brought some 
nuances in it to help us to cooperate, to work together to one, uh… one goal (#7, 
Manager FM-a, Semco). 
Contracting was seen as a vehicle for appropriate cooperation. One Semco-manager 
explained: 
We needed to revise the contract, because the contract is material in how 
organisations interact and behave" (#6, Purchase manager, Semco).  
When we asked whether the relationship could have improved without a new contract, 
another manager answered: 
Could be… but finally under the line, if you add everything up, the contract 
determines the interaction and the business way of working between two companies. 
That's the formalised way of how you should work. In practice of course most of the 
time the contract remains in the cupboard. And you go in your everyday working (#5, 
Director FM-Fabs, Semco). 
In a formal sense, contracting aims at establishing formal control structures and related 
formal control practices that seek to safeguard interests and to compensate for 
appropriation concerns, for potential opportunistic behaviour. However, the main goal of 
the contract review was not the institution of a new control structure, but above all, a better 
cooperation through sharing values and beliefs. The managers apparently were in need of a 
new start: a period where a new arrangement, where new control and communication 
structures could be discussed and where they could work on a better relationship. 
So what we did in 2007, we had a review, a contract review with the management 
over here where we said we need to share things; we need to share our thoughts 
about the contract and the results of the contract. We were very much in agreement, 
and what we did is based on that review. We established a new contract. Despite the 
fact that the [old] contract was still valid, both parties agreed to enter a re-
contracting process (#6, Purchase manager, Semco). 
The parties wanted to create a sharing situation and they wanted to express this through re-
contracting. A hurdle in the new relationship was the FM director who had difficulties in 
changing his role from facility manager to demand manager. A demand manager is less 
leading in the provision of services and more coordinating in his role (Doc #10, 0903; 
Gijsbers, Van der Kluit & Van 't Spijker, 2010; Kearney, 2003). He mediates between the 
demands of internal departments of Semco and the managing agent, Faspro, who has an 
important managing role in the provision of the services. In order to improve the situation, 
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Semco’s top management decided to appoint a new FM director. At the same time a new 
country manager was appointed and they both contributed to a revitalisation of the 
relationship. This change was important for the development of the relationship; it was a 
clear sign (a relational signal to Faspro) that Semco was committed to the relationship 
And then FM director-128 came, he is someone who is able to manage this in a proper 
way. And the relationship with Faspro started to develop (#5, Director FM-Fabs, 
Semco). 
 
Then FM director-1 came, a different person and he was, let's say, more a team 
player. Also he was better than his predecessor and that helped a lot, because then 
he started investing into the community first and he tried to understand how people 
looked at things and, if there were any sensitivities and if people were not happy, that 
kind of things, he invested in that, you could say. In the mean time we also had 
another country manager, who was also a more practical, pretty hands-on manager 
and the purchasing guy is also quite a practical guy. He logged in to that as well and 
they started in principal restoring the relationship with Faspro (#13, Site Purchasing 
Manager, Semco). 
The new FM director was thought to be the right person for the job. It was someone who 
believed in the idea of outsourcing the management of facility services and who was clearly 
committed to the demand management function. He wanted to build a partnership based 
on mutual respect and trust and expected cost savings. The following quote expresses his 
cooperative attitude and demonstrates how he relationally signals such attitude:  
We have a mutual agreement, from both sides we agree on this. It is not that we say, 
okay we want to have 500.000 euro savings, just go! No. You need to do this in a 
partnership. Because they come up with ideas and it is easy to say that it is a bad 
idea. No, we both have the responsibility for getting the right saving, define the right 
saving opportunities (#4, FM director-1, Semco). 
 The contract review was done by local management, and as a consequence of the formation 
of shared values and ambitions, ownership of the relationship was reached. This is not to say 
that the alignment of interests (and the compensation for legitimate mistrust) did not play a 
role anymore. It did: 
In 2007 we renegotiated our contract and in the contract we have both incentives 
and penalties because Faspro has to bring the costs down over a period of two years. 
If they can't realise us cost savings, they have to pay a penalty. If they do more, then 
they will share in additional cost savings. That is a kind of incentive penalty system 
(#9, Country manager-1, Semco). 
 
28 Names are replaced with function titles 
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We changed it into a partnership. We wanted this from both sides, but we needed to 
come up with the right incentives to achieve the savings (#4, FM director-1, Semco). 
The new contract included several control structures: formal rules, procedures and policies 
to safeguard, monitor and reward desirable performance. 
In sum: phase 2 
This subsection explored the way the contract review influenced both commitment and 
control in the relationship. It was demonstrated how re-contracting restored the cooperative 
attitude of the parties; how it was a vehicle to provide relational signals in the form of a 
change in personnel, expressing the desire for partnership and a the desire for a sharing 
situation. Particularly the lack of ‘ownership’ of the original contractual relationship 
interfered with the formation of positive expectations and, thus, with proper cooperation. 
After the successful re-contracting process, the contract represents a basis for further 
cooperation. This is consistent with De Jong and Klein Woolthuis (2008, p. 287) who state 
that "negotiating the contract can be seen as a process of getting to know and understand 
each other. Signing the contract can be seen as an act of commitment." Both the renewed 
alignment of interests (the compensation for legitimate mistrust) and the expression of 
commitment in an open atmosphere of communication create a base for trust building, as 
will also be shown in the next subsection.  
This study suggests that it is hard to separate thin trust from thick trust. We interpret the 
situation as one in which the alignment of interest (production of thin trust) and the 
expression of commitment (and, thus, the building of thick trust) are intermingled. From a 
performative perspective, the distinction between thin trust and thick trust may not be so 
straightforward after all. 
5.4.3 Phase 3: Development of the relationship 
After the re-contracting period, a third phase started in which the renegotiated contract is 
practiced through day-to-day interaction. Both Semco and Faspro aimed to build a stable 
relationship on the basis of the renegotiated contract. There was commitment, but the 
relationship was still young and fragile. To a large extent, the re-contracting was done by 
Semco’s FM director-1 and Faspro’s account director-1. For Faspro’s account director it was 
important to show an understanding of the client needs and to demonstrate the capability 
to translate these needs into concrete plans. For example, to show how savings could be 
reached Faspro made a business case for Semco. 
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You have to prove that you are willing to do what they expect […] So what we have 
done: for example for this year we made a year plan, a business plan, and we 
challenged it with the business plan from Semco and that was for 80-85% the same. 
So that means that we understand what they want so we have the capabilities to do 
what they want (#8, Account director-1, Faspro). 
Apparently, the business case was a vehicle for signalling an understanding and for signalling 
competencies. Faspro was also willing to help Semco when the economic recession in 2008 
severely hit Semco. Reorganisations took place and employees were fired. Semco tried to 
transfer one of the project managers to Faspro. Faspro agreed and, in addition, helped 
Semco by taking over the activities that they could not handle because of a quantitative 
decline of capacity in the demand management organisation. 
Their demand management organisation is getting smaller and smaller and they said 
we can't do it because we don't have any capacity. Can you take over? Yeah we can 
take over but we will make a list. So we make a list of activities what we take over and 
sometimes we said there is no problem and sometimes we said ok, but you have to 
pay for it. So we are prepared to help, but we also negotiate, working together on the 
relationship and take over then new activities (#8, Account director-1, Faspro). 
They also changed the structure of their work meetings, a change which both parties 
experienced as positive. At first they had a one hour meeting once a week. These meetings 
were often too short for adequate problem solving. The new meeting structure had a lower 
frequency (once a month), but took a full afternoon.  
They also changed the structure of their work meetings, a change which is experienced as 
positive by both parties. At first they had one hour meetings once a week. These meetings 
were often too short for adequate problem solving. The new meeting structure had a lower 
frequency (once a month), but took a full afternoon, so that there was time to discuss 
important problems and issues. 
We have done this now for two months, actually I am quite happy with it. Because 
then you find the time, to go, a full afternoon, very deeply into the service, into the 
operation and have time to discuss real issues. In the old structure, often the whole 
hour was spent on operational issues and you never came to the real problems 
behind these issues (#4, FM director-1, Semco). 
As mentioned earlier, this FM director-1 was the new manager. After the contractual re-
negotiations the discussions with Faspro about the control system continued, but always in a 
cooperative atmosphere. 
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You will receive a supplier which you deserve and if you don't manage this, if you 
don't work on a partnership, it will never work (#4, FM director-1, Semco). 
On the basis of the contract he continued working on achieving savings, developing new KPIs 
and developing a road map for the future. These control practices furthered the 
development of the relationship and helped building (thick) trust. Problem solving attitudes 
and creating a ‘sharing’-situation were demonstrated: 
We all know what is in the contract and act on it. And in a conflict we could say okay 
we take the contract out, which I did a few months ago, because we had a discussion 
about what is a saving […] but that was the only time I took it out. 
[…] 
We are working on new KPIs, because we started with KPIs which were effective but, 
they are not effective anymore. […] On a quarterly basis they report us directly what 
their performance is. […] We call this [laughter] our 'feet-on-the-table-session'. 
What's your feeling? What is your problem? You have a problem with me? What is 
the problem? Let's discuss this. Just working on the relation (#4, FM director-1, 
Semco). 
One FM manager describes the situation as ‘acting as one department’. Apparently, 
boundaries were blurred: 
You have a contract with an external company, but you should take care of one goal 
and then you have to say, we are one department […] Of course at the end of the 
month you have to talk about financials, but until that time you have to take care of 
one organisation and you have to cooperate (#7, Manager FM-a. Semco) 
Also the country manager and the FM director experienced the partnership as a mutual 
investment. Every month the parties discussed how to achieve the agreed cost savings. This 
is also an example of a control practice. 
There is a very open discussion. Every month FM director-1 is doing that with Faspro. 
How much help do you need with the projects? So the discussion is, how can we 
achieve all these cost savings together (#9, Country manager-1, Semco). 
This cooperative approach was received positively by Faspro’s account director-1. It 
encouraged him to improve his work on a daily basis. 
What we are doing here, what I will do here is everyday better than the day before. 
For example when we started at the first day at the campus almost two years ago, 
Semco said that we might score a four. Now they give us an eight. (Researcher: They 
are satisfied?) They are more than satisfied (#8, Account director-1, Faspro). 
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Faspro’s performance was measured drawing upon a performance measurement system 
and Semco managers could look into this system. The KPIs in the measurement system were 
perceived to be the right ones, but according to Account director-1 the Semco managers did 
not use the system. This was very frustrating and he wanted to address this issue. 
Every client from Semco, every demand manager can look in Semco’s performance 
measurement system. It's a KPI system; they can see everything. So they can click on 
a high level KPI and then they can click through to the bottom. […] But that is the way 
we want to work. It should be transparent for them.  
[…] 
So why is there no trust? I want to have it on the agenda to make it clear to each 
other. We have to work together, but how can we help you if we are feeling from our 
team there is no trust, we are not doing the right thing we are not working at the 
right… on the best way for you. And within two weeks the problem was solved (#8, 
Account director-1, Faspro). 
Discussing performance measures worked out well in this situation. However, since Faspro 
was measuring and reporting its own figures some distrust might have been expected at 
Semco. Still, Semco’s FM manager-a was convinced that this was absolutely safe and that 
Faspro would handle this with integrity. 
Despite problems and possible improvements you have to see this as a kind of a 
partnership. It's a long term relationship; you step in and if you don't want to do that, 
don't start with it at all. Faspro should not aim for the quick win and neither should 
Semco. You should have a goal for the long term and if you start with this 
manipulations or fraud, then you can never trust each other again (#7, Manager FM-
a, Semco). 
At the other Semco site in the Netherlands the FM-manager expressed a similar 
interpretation of the cooperation with Faspro. At this site there were only offices and no 
fabs, and Faspro manages all the facility services. The FM-manager there had to get used to 
the new way of working but did not experience any problems. 
I think we changed… uh… I changed into a demand manager and they do the 
operation and they do it very good. We now have a one-to-one organisation (#14, FM 
manager-b, Semco). 
In sum: phase 3 
During this phase (that lasted for about two years) the renegotiated control structure is 
brought into practice and the relationship developed. Control practices with intra-acting KPIs 
and performance measures did send relational signals. So, control practices as they were 
embedded in the contractual control structures not only served to align interests and 
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mitigate risks, not only offered instruments for safeguarding interests, but also facilitated 
the signalling of the willingness to the other party to achieve mutual long term goals and to 
improve the relationship. 
5.5 Theoretical implications and limitations 
This study adds an understanding of performative aspects of the ‘accounting-control-trust’ 
nexus to ostensive aspects as these are highlighted by the framework produced by 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). Particularly the study illustrates how 
contracts and control structures are vehicles for the building of trust. However, the study 
also reveals how there are both ostensive aspects and performative aspects of contracts and 
control structures in an outsourcing relationship that changed from a relationship between 
Lectro and Faspro into one between Semco and Faspro. Ostensive aspects were particularly 
visible in the relationship between Lectro and Faspro. The study shows how, to Lectro, the 
outsourcing contract with Faspro and the incorporated control structures were a solution 
that matched the strategic decision to concentrate on the core business. Through the 
contract and the control structures incorporated in it interests were aligned. Legitimate 
mistrust was compensated for, inter alia by an incentive scheme and by the negotiation of 
KPI’s. The decision was taken by Lectro’s top management that acted as a kind of a ‘macro 
actor’. Out of long-term economic interest this actor acted as a rational decision maker. The 
decision was taken at a distance of the facility management activities and the facility services 
at such; even the business unit Lectro Semiconductors whose facility management was 
outsourced did not take part in the decision. Lectro’s top management imported trust from 
earlier experiences it had with Faspro, and apparently the imported trust and the contract it 
signed provided the thin trust that things would work out well.  
Performative aspects particularly became visible when the relationship changed from one 
between Lectro and Faspro into one between Semco and Faspro. The original decision taken 
by Lectro’s top management and the formal contract between Lectro and Faspro was now 
translated in a relational network consisting of many human actors at different positions and 
hierarchical levels and other-than-humans: contracts, scorecards, incentive schemes and 
business plans. Rather than a governance structure that was outside the network the 
contract was now translated in the network. The contract was not a solution for divergence 
of interests and for potential opportunistic behaviour, but a problematising device. The 
process of translation even entailed a re-contracting because the parties involved felt 
insufficient commitment to the relationship. The re-contracting mediated the shaping of a 
trusting relationship between Semco and Faspro. Although there was a certain re-alignment 
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of interests, the re-contracting process helped producing commitment to the relationship 
with many of the human actors involved: managers at different levels at Faspro and Semco. 
Apparently trust was produced, but the distinction between thick trust and thin trust 
became blurred.  
Moreover, in the relational network the control practices were not simple implementations 
of control structures that were laid down in the contract; they were not straightforwardly 
instrumental to an alignment of interests. They developed out of intentions to further build 
the relationship; intentions that, to a large extent, were formed inside rather than outside 
the network. The human actors involved were convinced that they had to make the best out 
of the relationship and as the case narrative suggests, they aimed to build trust. They 
signalled trust to each other, but such signals were not primarily those of economic men that 
aimed to control the relationship at a distance of the network, but of committed men that 
were part of the network. In the network the production of thin trust is intermingled with 
the production of thick trust.  
Our narrative challenges a view expressed by De Jong and Klein Woolthuis (2008), who 
perceive contracts to have a similar role as trust, thus suggesting that ‘contract’ and ‘trust’ 
are two separate entities. Our story, however, suggests that dichotomies such as ‘contract’ 
versus ‘trust’, or ‘control’ versus ‘trust’ are an oversimplification. Trust building cannot be 
separated from contracting or from control practices, but, instead, is highly intermingled 
with both of these practices. To the humans involved trust revealed itself as an ambition 
connected to contracting and control practices. In a network, control and trust are not only 
resources resulting from negotiations, or from self-regulating mechanisms connected to 
long-term economic interests. They are neither only instrumental solutions to control 
problems or the results of purposeful individual rational decision making. They are above all 
the results of intentional (inter)action in a relational network; in our study intentions 
oriented towards strengthening the trust base and the cooperation. Contracts and control 
then provide vehicles for the building of trust and, thus, for the development of the 
relationship.  
As the start of the relationship between Lectro and Faspro shows, however, this does not 
imply that there is no purposeful rational decision making outside the network. This study 
illustrates that there are both ostensive and performative aspects of the ‘accounting-control-
trust’ nexus. Control and trust are resources as well as a vehicles that shape the relationship. 
There is both distance as well as close interaction.  
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This more complete account for the messy context in this interfirm relationship leads to a 
change of the ostensive model presented by Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). 
The new model (Figure 5-6) takes into account both the ostensive and the performative 
aspects of the accounting-control-trust nexus. 
 
Figure 5-6: Interaction between control and trust 
The fundamental problem that the parties face at the start of an interfirm relationship may 
be potential opportunistic behaviour by the partner. To mitigate this risk a governance 
structure is negotiated that copes with appropriation concerns. A contract is negotiated and 
signed. The control structures incorporated in this contract produce thin trust. The control 
structures are practiced in control practices. But also contracting (a verb) itself may be 
viewed as a control practice, because periodically, new contract negotiations are needed 
when problems occur (lack of commitment and contract review in our case study), or 
because the contract expires. The control practices are vehicles for relational signalling and 
trust building and can result in thick trust, while this gained thick trust will influence the 
control practices back. The (re)-contracting process also results in changes in the contract 
which again influence the control practices. This process is depicted as the circular arrows in 
Problem: Potential 
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the figure and can lead to surprises when performed in a relational network. Actual changes 
and developments in the relationship occur through the control practices. The control 
practices give rise to relational signals and trust building. They will eventually impact the 
contract and control practices again.  
It is hard to capture a clear linear relation between thin and thick trust, because the building 
of thin as well as thick trust occurs in interaction. The difference with the ostensive model 
presented by Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) is first of all that the model 
presented here is not a model that gives a rationalised view of a trust building process. It 
acknowledges the presence of the ostensive aspects of control and trust, but connects this 
with the performative aspects that emerge during control practices. The outcome of this 
process is uncertain, but will influence again control and trust in the relationship. Secondly, 
only the contract can be seen as a concrete object: a materialisation of the agreements of 
two partners. The contract is an artifact, a legal document with a solution for potential 
opportunistic behaviour, but it also lays the foundation for the control practices. These 
ostensive structures also provide the ostensive aspects of the control as practised in the 
relationship. However, control practices are more than a mere implementation of control 
structures. The structures perform every day, thus producing (un)expected outcomes that 
are situated, dynamic and emergent. These performances may also have ostensive 
consequences when they entail a reshaping of control structures (Feldman & Orlikowski, 
2011).  
Our analysis is limited as it is a single case study into one specific interfirm relationship. The 
results, therefore, may not hold in other relationships. However, our aim for this study was 
to infer theoretical implications from a context specific reflection on contracting, control 
practices and relational signals. These theoretical implications may well be further examined 
in other contexts. Thus they provide opportunities for future empirical studies to broaden 
our understanding into both the ostensive and performative aspects of the ‘accounting-
control-trust’- nexus and of the way these aspects are interrelated. This research could also 
be extended to intra-firm relationships to understand these aspects in those contexts. For 
instance the widespread design of shared service centres in organisations and the trust and 
control issues involved makes this very relevant. 
From a managerial stance this study does have implications for parties involved in 
outsourcing. The study shows that it is important to be aware of the role that both contracts 
and controls can play in trust building processes. In addition, the study underscores to 
managers how control practices in a relational network determine the development of 
outsourcing relationships.  
  
 
 CHAPTER 6: CONTROL PRACTICES, RE-CONTRACTING AND 
TRUST 
If organisations are ‘a-centred’ then a re-conceptualisation of accounting and 
control as a discipline and an organisational practice is required (Quattrone & 
Hopper, 2001, p. 430). 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5 the focus of the external outsourcing case study was on three phases in the 
relationship between Semco and Faspro: the start-up phase, the contract review phase and 
the subsequent period with the developing relationship. It was demonstrated how 
renegotiating new control structures (as embedded in new contracts) provided 
opportunities for relational signals and for building trust in the relationship. In the course of 
the relationship these new control structures were brought into practice and gave rise to 
new interactions, discussions and negotiations. This is visualised in Figure 5-6. The main part 
of this figure is at the centre and shows the interaction between thin and thick trust. This is 
where it adds to the model of Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). The figure also 
shows that the core of trust building is in (re)-contracting and the practising of control.  
This chapter specifically focuses on events after the contract review. These events were 
signalled to us in the second round of interviews we conducted from June 2010 till 
November 2010. These interviews provided insights in control practices and trust building 
when negotiations for an extension of the contract took place. In retrospective, the 
interviewees gave their opinions on the negotiations with Faspro about the extension of the 
services towards the 'hard' facilities and about the negotiations towards Total Facility 
Management (TFM). During this round of interviews we were, however, confronted with a 
change in staff. This had significant influence on the course of the relationship between 
Semco and Faspro and illustrated the importance of personal relations for the development 
of trust and control in a relationship. The relationship was particularly tested when Semco 
started a tendering process during the contract-extension negotiations. 
For this chapter the same theoretical basis is used as for chapter 5. The aim is to acquire a 
deeper knowledge on contracts and control structures as vehicles for trust building and how 
control practices produce trust or vice versa, specifically during the last contractual phase 
between Semco and Faspro. One element however is added. Chapters 5 concludes with the 
observation that only the contract can be seen as a concrete object: a materialisation of the 
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agreements of two partners. The contract is an artifact, a legal document with a solution for 
potential opportunistic behaviour. The contract also lays the foundation for the control 
practices and these control practices in return entail a reshaping of the contract. Trust (thin 
and thick) emerge from this circular process with contracts and control structures as its 
driving vehicles. However, this thesis adopts the notion of duality between control and trust, 
which, among others, means that trust and control create each other. It is not only control 
that creates trust. Embracing the duality perspective paves the way for further investigation 
on the influence of trust/ control on lateral relationships. According to (Möllering, 2005, p. 
300): 
Finally, the duality perceptive of trust/ control as such is only a starting point. 
It gives an opportunity for studying that which actually matters most and that 
is the question of how trust/ control is enacted. 
The idea of trust/ control as a duality is abstract and in need of richer accounts that describe 
how actors form positive expectations, particularly during negotiations were parties have 
different interests, use surreptitious methods and have asymmetrical power positions. In 
this chapter this is examined using the facility management case study towards the last 
phase of the relationship, where trust becomes a problem. First section 6.2 analyses the 
performativity of trust by expanding on the idea of Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) about trust 
as a quasi-object. The sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 describe the events after the contract review 
that influenced trust and control in the relationship. The events are examples of incidents 
that occur in commercial outsourcing relationships and produces dynamics between control 
and trust. Section 6.6 analyses the case events and discusses the implications. Finally section 
6.7 rounds up with a short conclusion. 
6.2 The performativity of trust 
The main conclusion of chapter 5 is that trust building is directly linked to (re)-contracting 
and the practising of control. This results in both thin and thick trust, although they are hard 
to distinguish and cannot be described in a linear fashion. The conclusion, does presume a 
one-way relation from control to trust. However, taking the duality perspective seriously 
means that trust should also shape control structures and practices. This reasoning assigns 
some kind of agency to trust, which is difficult since trust is not an object such as a contract 
or a formal control procedure. How trust can be performative in the relationship is not 
discussed in depth in the former chapters and will be the subject of this section. 
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A starting point for the analysis of the performativity of trust on control practices might be 
to elaborate further on the performativity of artifacts on control practices. Pentland and 
Feldman (2008) state that managers design artifacts (such as contracts) and these artifacts 
shape the ostensive aspects of a routine (in this study control practices), but are also 
designed to afford and constrain the performances of the practices. However, in the actual 
practices the outcomes may differ from managers’ expectations. This idea is also brought 
forward in chapter 5 that shows how an artifact such as a governance structure interacts 
with control practices. The main point is the distinction between the artifact and the 
practices. Artifacts can represent and shape the ostensive aspects of a practice. For instance 
the contract in our case study reflects what actors formally agreed on in the relationship but 
also shapes actual practices. This idea has similarities with actor-network theory and 
particularly addresses the role non-human actors or artifacts have in structuring the social 
world. Artifacts are placed outside the routine itself “to indicate that artifacts are different 
from either the specific performance or the abstract patterns and that the artifact can be 
incorporated into the routine in a variety of ways” Pentland and Feldman (2008, p. 244). 
Trust might shape practices in a similar way, however, an artifact is always a concrete object, 
a material thing that can be seen and touched. As a consequence, trust cannot be examined 
as a separate object, or as a non-human actor that influences and shapes control practices. 
So to understand how trust can influence control practices we need another perspective, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
6.2.1 Trust as a quasi-object 
Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) who studied the role of accounting as an actor in an inter-
organisational network suggest that trust is a quasi-object “because there is a normative 
tone around the arrangements” (p. 243). They refer to Brown (2002) who states that a quasi-
object is derived from an object from which the particular qualities are unimportant, but it 
are the properties assigned to the object by people that makes it important. It is “the 
projection of sentiment onto the object, the ‘desire’ for it or the ‘passionate’ relation with it, 
which characterises a quasi-object” (Schiermer, 2011, p. 85). A crucifix for instance, is just an 
object, but it becomes a fetish (a quasi-object) once put into circulation as a religious object. 
Such objects leave behind their objective status (Serres, 1995).  
In a similar way, control can provide the basis for trust that becomes a quasi-object once put 
into circulation. If control instruments contain uncertainty about their intended outcomes, 
trusting becomes part of controlling and trusting is typically something that has an 
emotional value to people. So control might need trust, but trust also might need control to 
signal this trust. Theorised as such, trust can be a non-human actor, incorporated in control 
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as a quasi-object. This coincides with the idea that trust and control form a duality 
(Möllering, 2005): trust and control each assume the existence of the other.  
It can be concluded that trust respectively perceived as a quasi-object of control (Mouritsen 
& Thrane, 2006), or trust and control as a duality (Möllering, 2005) or as an interaction 
(Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), as described in chapter 5, share in essence the 
same philosophy about the interrelatedness of control and trust. This means that if control, 
as an artifact, is a non-human actor in the relationship, at the same time trust is a non-
human actor in the relationship.  
So, as an answer to the question whether trust can be examined as a separate object, the 
answer is no. Trust should be examined in relation to an object and in accounting those 
objects are control artifacts such as contracts, but also proposals or minutes that that reflect 
both the ostensive and performative aspects that shape the control practices and the 
relationship. The above analysis strengthens again the insight that trust and control 
interacts. It is however important that this insight is researched empirically, particularly with 
qualitative case studies that illustrate this interactive relationship. The remainder of this 
paper contributes to this aim by analysing how trust and control interact during the events 
after the contract-review in the facility management outsourcing relationship. 
6.3 Control and trust after the contract-review 
This section continues the analysis of the field study into the development of a facility 
management relationship between Semco and Faspro after the contract-review. The analysis 
in Chapter 5 revealed that the renegotiated control structure that was brought into practice 
not only served to align interests and mitigate risks, not only offered instruments for 
safeguarding interests, but also facilitated the signalling of the willingness to the other party 
to achieve mutual long term goals and to improve the relationship. After the contract review 
the partners established a basis for cooperation. FM director-1 stated in a presentation that 
the cooperation had to be based on mutual respect and trust. He made a roadmap with a 
prospect for Faspro to be fully in the lead. Thus, FM director-1 was a main initiator of this 
cooperation. He used a set of KPI's to measure the output and had monthly meetings to 
discuss long term goals rather than daily operational problems. During a period of two years 
this form of control at a distance remained relatively stable. 
The control practices and developing discussions related to these practices enabled both 
parties to send relational signals; they were vehicles to show the other party the willingness 
to achieve mutual long term goals and to improve the relationship. Particularly after the 
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contract review, both parties were committed to cooperate. The aim of the cooperation was 
to extend the 'soft' real estate services of Faspro with the 'hard' industrial services. 
Furthermore the parties wanted to develop towards total facility management (TFM). With 
TFM the management of facility services is completely outsourced, including the contracting 
with all the suppliers (that become subcontractors). The Roadmap, made by FM director-1, 
signalled a positive development towards TFM. TFM entails less control for Semco and 
additional measurement systems based on output. The Roadmap stated: 
Why (T)FM, what added value can/ do we expect? 
1 More responsibility and autonomy. 
2 No operational attention needed from Semco 
3 More output based SLA 
4 Market conformity with respect to cost, delivery of services etc.  
5 Semco headcount reduction 
6 Optimise Savings Process 
[…] 
Faspro fully in the lead (Doc #9, 0902) 
The parties wanted to change the triangle relationship, between Semco, Faspro and the 
subcontractors, into a horizontal relationship with Faspro in between Semco and the 
subcontractors. This is common in TMF constructions and is in line with the policy to further 
outsource facility management. There would be one all-inclusive contract between Semco 
and Faspro, and Faspro would be the contacting partner of the subcontractors. To Semco, 
this would imply less control over the choice of service providers, but it should also reduce 
cost, since Faspro is supposed to have expertise in acquiring suppliers and managing supplier 
contracts. It would also imply a level of trust in the outsourcing partners’ managerial and 
technological competencies.  
Country manager-1 of Semco had emphasised the importance of trust in this outsourcing 
project. According to him the interdependencies and uncertainties would have to be 
mitigated by building trust at a personal level. This personal trust would be a basis for the 
decision to enter into a situation of TFM with Faspro. 
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So as soon as you start doing the outsourcing of large activities, you get 
interdependence between two companies and you have to manage that 
interdependence. That's why I know the boss of Faspro. We see each other regularly; 
two times per year we have a review about how it goes and so on. And: have we built 
enough trust to outsource even more? So with Faspro we have discussions about who 
is responsible for the contracts with the service providers. So we have a cleaning 
company that is being managed by Faspro, but we are doing the negotiations with the 
cleaning company. As soon as we have done that we say to Faspro this is the contract, 
you manage the whole thing. Why not let Faspro do the contract negotiations with 
that company? Well, therefore, you need to go with trust (#9, Country manager-1, 
Semco). 
The country manager trusted Faspro and was willing to hand over to Faspro the contracts 
that Semco had with subcontractors, as long as they reached the targeted cost savings. But it 
was not only about trust between top managers. Country manager-1 was also aware of the 
fact that the commitment of the purchase department was necessary; that department 
should have trust in Faspro as well. The purchasing department proved to have a critical 
attitude towards a more ‘integral’ outsourcing. They were afraid to lose control over the 
service providers. 
At this moment we have been working with Faspro for two years. I fully trust them 
[…] There is also the question if our purchasing people trust Faspro enough so that 
they say okay we won't do it anymore, you take over all the contracts of the service 
suppliers (#9, Country manager-1, Semco). 
The Country manager knew that middle management should also reach a state of trust 
before an extension towards TFM-outsourcing was possible. This also regarded the 
outsourcing of the facility services of the semiconductor fabrication plants (fabs). Facility 
services for the fabs (for instance the maintenance of the machines) were seen as very 
critical and were in need of a competent outsourcing partner. If something would go wrong 
in the fabs, it would cost Semco millions of euros. Faspro was convinced that they could do it 
and they had the ambition to do it, but the fabs facility managers were reluctant and not 
convinced. Country manager-1 of Semco also had his doubts, but was slightly positive and 
expected Faspro to be ready in a few years. 
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And that is the discussion we have with Faspro, that I said well I am quite happy to 
outsource to you, but how are you going to build the knowledge so that you can 
guarantee that my fabs never stop. That there will never be an incident. There is still 
discussion because Faspro doesn't have the knowledge and the experience in doing 
the facility management for fabs. They first have to prove to me how they are going 
to do it. Which kinds of partners they take on board, whether they do an acquisition 
or whatever to bring in that knowledge before I can trust them to do the total facility 
management. I might give them a part of the outsourcing first, thus still keeping 
control of the crucial parts until I can trust them that they are really building up the 
knowledge, and slowly in two years or so move everything over to Faspro (#9, 
Country manager-1, Semco). 
Helping Faspro to achieve its goals, for instance by gradually outsourcing more complex 
services, signals trust. Of course Country manager-1 couldn’t jeopardise the continuity of his 
organisation by handing over crucial services, but he signalled willingness and commitment 
for cooperation towards the future. Both he and FM-Director 1 had positive expectations 
about Faspro, but as stated before Country manager-1 was not completely sure about the 
other FM managers within Semco. Some middle managers indeed expressed their concerns. 
During the negotiations concerning the facilities for the fabs some problems arose. The 
facility managers in the fabs worked in a technical environment with very sensitive 
processes. This environment was characterised by a different culture than the culture in the 
offices that required the more ‘soft’ services. Faspro couldn’t convince these facility 
managers of its competencies. 
Can they do better? Yes they can do better. What you see is, they are specialised in 
offices. We also have a lab environment and things like that. We as fabs facilities, we 
look at Faspro as mere 'box movers' (#12, Manager FM-Fabs, Semco). 
To achieve the intended cooperation between Semco and Faspro, FM director-1 initiated 
negotiations between middle management of the fab-services and Faspro about extending 
Faspro’s activities towards the fabs. However these negotiations did not have the intended 
effect. One FAB manager became disappointed and expressed his doubts about Faspro. He 
negotiated for about four months, but did not gain enough trust in Faspro’s competencies to 
outsource the fabs facilities to them. He started talking with other suppliers. 
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It [trust] goes up and down. I lost some trust in the past months but that's recovering. 
That had to do with the very tough negotiations. So I think Faspro is a professional 
company, they are good in managing soft-services, they are not good in managing 
this let's say high tech environment with a high risk and were you have to produce 
24/7, and where every minute counts, there we were missing the sense of urgency. 
As a company I trust them. What I see is a growing organisation, they sometimes 
have to learn the hard way (#5, Manager Fab-services, Semco). 
Also after the contract review, negotiations about the services of the fabs continued. For the 
long run, Country manager-1 was positive about this, but the FM managers in the fabs were 
not convinced about the competencies of Faspro. Although, to a certain extent the 
negotiations harmed the relationship, the relationship was resilient enough to withstand 
this. They revealed however the differences between the fabs-FM managers and the office-
related-FM managers. The fabs-FM managers worked in a high tech environment and were 
more focused on Faspro competencies. Since these managers were powerful, Faspro was 
thus only trusted for the ‘soft’ office related facilities.  
6.4 Changes in the facility management organisation 
The ‘relative stability’ after the contract review ended when in a subsequent period things 
changed. The two separate FM departments, one for the ‘soft’-services and one for the 
’hard’-services, merged. Historically this used to be the situation and this situation was now 
restored. The fabs-FM manager did become the new head of the FM department (from now 
on FM director-2) and replaced the FM director-1, who left the organisation. This change 
resulted in a stronger influence of technical staff in the facility management of the office 
environment. FM director-2 never liked the idea of two departments. 
I think that splitting up the two facility organisations had always been a wrong 
decision and I always assumed that ultimately the two organisations would merge to 
one again. That is what happened at the beginning of this year. It's not because of the 
fact that FM director-1 left. We were already discussing the fact that we should 
merge the organisations and perhaps assign the responsibilities in a different way 
(#20, FM director-2, Semco). 
The idea of a separate FM department for offices was never fully accepted by the fabs 
personnel because it was seen as impractical to deal with two FM departments. The fabs had 
their own FM-department for ‘hard’ services, such as maintenance, but they were also a 
client of FM director-1 for the ‘soft’ services, such as cleaning or catering. For problems or 
questions concerning the facilities, fabs personnel had to contact demand managers. Those 
demand managers were working for Semco and were located in either the ‘soft’ FM or ‘hard’ 
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FM department. This was not very practical. The old FM-director 1 foresaw a future for 
Semco with him as the single demand-manager that functioned as an intermediary between 
all Semco’s internal clients (hard and soft facilities) and Faspro with its facility subcontractors 
(see the Roadmap, doc #9, above). However his support within the organisation was 
decreasing. The developments towards a merged FM department increased the influence of 
the fabs FM managers and they felt the distance between Semco and Faspro as a loss of 
control. The monthly reports produced with measurements of KPI's were not seen as a 
reflection of real performance. The fabs managers got around this accounting information 
and trusted more on direct feedback from the end users. In this new strategy there was no 
room for FM director-1 so he was replaced by the FM manager fabs.  
There was another important change. Semco’s country manager became ill and passed 
away. He was replaced by a new country manager (Country Manager-2) who was already 
vice president (VP) Operations Manager Front End at Semco. Moreover, there was an 
important change at Faspro. Faspro’s account director was replaced by a new account 
director (Account director-2). Account director-2 had worked with FM director-1 for a while 
and the relationship was very good, similar to the relationship between Account director-1 
(Faspro) and FM director-1 (Semco).  
The fact that FM director-1 had left Semco affected the relationship. Faspro’s Account 
director-2 clearly stated that he trusted him. It was a good relationship, but suddenly it 
disappeared. 
We had FM director-1 and I think he really wanted to have a relationship with Faspro, 
and it was really one of partnership, and he wanted us to do as much as possible. 
When the fabs came [the merger], he was fired so that was huge because he 
disappeared from one day to another; he wasn't here anymore, nobody talked about 
it and after six weeks they told us that he was fired. So there was trust, also to us, this 
was my demand manager. It was my partner and he disappeared […] but they didn't 
speak to us about it so that was a problem then. Then FM director-2 came and he 
always had a little bit of a difficult relationship with FM director-1, because he 
wanted to work in another way than FM director-1 wanted to. So Semco decided that 
one of them had to go and FM director-2 stayed, but FM director-1 was our partner, 
so that was difficult in the beginning (#17 Account director-2, Faspro). 
The fact that Semco’s old and new FM director had difficulties with each other caused 
problems in the re-contracting process. The bond that had grown between Semco’s FM 
director-1 and Faspro was felt as an obstacle in the new relationship with FM director-2, 
because according to Account director-2: "We (Faspro) and FM director-1 were one and the 
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same organisation." This was also experienced in a similar way by Faspro’s contract 
manager. 
FM director-2 has a completely different point of view as FM director-1. I think if we 
had the contract negotiation now with FM director-1, the contract was already done. 
It was done, it was okay, you did a good job and you restart. There was more trust. 
Now it's not bad, it's okay, but they want to know everything. Everything, you know, 
until the smallest detail (#19, Contract manager, Faspro). 
Faspro’s contract manager was used to dealing with FM director-1, who was positive 
towards the cooperation with Faspro and who wanted to buy more of their services in the 
future. Now this development abruptly stopped and he had to deal with a new and more 
uncertain situation. 
First is was just FM director-1 and one or two others I had to deal with. Now it is five 
or six persons you are talking with and five, six persons have all different perceptions 
of what they want and they have all other interests in what they want to get from a 
contract because procurement has a completely different focus on a contract than 
FM director-2 who wants quality, and procurement only wants to have low costs, a 
good price. You know? So, it's always a kind of a battle and who are you making the 
best conversation with and from who are you getting trust? (#19, Contract manager, 
Faspro). 
FM director-1's strategy of creating mutual trust and respect by giving Faspro more 
autonomy, responsibilities and tasks was not accepted anymore within Semco. Just before 
he left Semco he had reached an isolated position in his own organisation, particularly after 
his partners (Semco’s Country manager-1 and Faspro’s Account director-1) changed. As 
Semco's core business is complex high tech industry the technical personnel did not think 
Faspro was competent enough for the technical environment they were working in. They 
trusted Faspro for the real estate services but not for the fabs. The risks in that area were 
perceived as too high. 
6.5 End of contract period  
The four year’s contract period came to an end. However, a clause in the contract stated 
that the contract with Faspro was automatically extended until a new contract was signed. 
Semco needed more time to decide if they wanted to continue with Faspro or with another 
partner. So to Faspro this was a time of uncertainty. 
Given the new managers and different style of control, the relationship had to be rebuild 
again. Contract-extension negotiations offered a good opportunity to do so, but rebuilding 
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the relationship was not achieved easily. Semco was tendering and they expected much 
information from Faspro before they could decide if Faspro would be their preferred partner 
again.  
6.5.1 Competencies and commitment 
As the contract-extension negotiations reached a more focused state, the two discussions 
about TFM and the inclusion of the facilities services of the fabs intensified, because this had 
to be settled in the new contract. Semco’s Purchase manager was not sure whether Faspro 
was ready for the extension of the tasks. His worries were connected to the necessity of cost 
reduction. He did not believe that Faspro was able to shift from a managing agent to TFM, 
take over all the accompanied responsibilities, decrease cost and increase quality. FM 
director-2 also had doubts about Faspro, but they were more based on Faspro’s lack of 
competencies of doing TFM. 
I don't see it developing into a TFM contract because I can see that they have 
problems delivering the integral service because of lack of skills and experience (#20, 
FM director-2, Semco). 
Although FM director-1 and Country Manager-1 (the former managers) saw potential for 
Faspro in a few years, FM director-2 was not convinced of Faspro's competencies. This also 
holds for Country manager-2. With his technical background, he shared FM director-2’s 
vision, but he was not as negative as FM director-2. Similar to his predecessor he 
acknowledged Faspro’s ambition, but he did not think that Faspro would be able to acquire 
the necessary competencies in the near future. 
Speaking about Faspro, they once have indicated they would take an interest in doing 
facilities for the factory. It's an interesting idea, but I think, you know, based on their 
background, they're not ready for it; it's a different business. But as an idea, it's an 
interesting idea […] They don't have the competencies, you know. They have the 
ambition, so it doesn't mean we cannot have a discussion. On the other hand, you 
know, today, it's not a reality that they will be capable of learning the facilities for one 
of the most important factories, frankly speaking (#22, Country manager-2, Semco). 
Faspro’s senior facility manager, however, thought they could deliver the services to the 
fabs, but that they had to follow a path of growth. His idea was that they should not only 
deliver services to Semco, but also to other organisations. He acknowledged that Faspro still 
had to invest in expertise, knowledge and time. If they would have more clients, they would 
have a better position, so in a way he understood Semco’s doubts. 
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They think they can do a better job by keeping it [facility of fabs] by themselves. But I 
think we can do it, but we cannot do it as we do offices, as we do it to most 
customers at least, at this moment. We need to step up in our own organisation, 
before we will be able to do it in the way Semco wants it to be done. That is part of 
the trust question as well I guess. I think we could do it within Faspro, but for one 
customer to do such a specialised technical part, that would not benefit Faspro as 
well I guess. We should also do it for other customers, but our customer base for very 
technical facility management is small (#18, Senior facility manager, Faspro). 
Not only were competencies under discussion, but also commitment. Faspro’s contract 
manager had a difficult conversation with Semco managers about his commitment. Semco’s 
FM managers made it clear that they were expecting higher degrees of ownership and 
commitment. Again it was Faspro who had to prove itself and had to signal commitment. 
I just came out of a meeting with our demand manager, and it was not a nice 
conversation and it was about trust and it was about perception and they had the 
perception that they didn't see the contract manager as much as they wanted and 
they had the perception that there wasn't enough ownership of the contract 
manager, with me […] They have another perception of what they can expect of the 
contract manager (#19, Contract manager, Faspro). 
FM director-2 stated that he was in need of an open discussion, in which anything could be 
said. After the contract-review, there were indeed open discussions between Faspro and FM 
director-1. The latter spoke about meetings “with your feet on the table” in which problems 
were openly discussed. This situation clearly had to be re-established with FM director-2, but 
to reach such a state they had to take time. 
I always tell them, if we do something wrong you tell me, and say it blunt, but with 
respect, have an open discussion, you can put anything on the table. It should be an 
open discussion. With Faspro we were not in that situation yet (#20, FM director-2, 
Semco). 
6.5.2 New control and measurement systems 
According to FM director-2 did the accounting numbers not reflect the real quality of Faspro, 
so one of his aims was to increase the quality of services. The agreed upon policy used to be 
the realisation of cost savings, but to Semco this was no longer sufficient. Semco was sure 
that Faspro’s performance could increase and they started with a strategy of 'service 
excellence'. Faspro did not have a problem with this, but emphasised that this was not what 
they contractually had agreed upon before. Faspro’s Account director-2 did not like the 
‘blaming atmosphere’ this entailed. 
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Now we're talking about service excellence and how we are doing that. But in the last 
years we only had savings, savings, savings, and now they say why don't they clean 
the table anymore? Because there was a saving two years ago, we don't do that 
anymore. So it's difficult, and it's difficult to have a relationship in this way because 
there's a risk that you're going to blame each other (#17, Account director-2, Faspro). 
FM director-2 explained the new way of working. He expected a pro-active attitude, more 
responsibility and more focus on the quality of the services delivered to Semco. In his eyes 
there was too much talk about savings, penalties and rewards. The discussions should be 
about the effort Faspro would be willing to make to do a good job and about performance. 
I want the energy focused on the service and not on the discussions about penalties 
and discussions on scope of cost reductions. There's a lot of time spent in the past on 
how to reduce cost. I don't recognise that […] the focus should be: we have a 
performance issue, solve it. To give you an example, we have conference rooms, and 
management expects when they go to the conference room and they start using the 
beamer, the beamer should work. The room should be adequately lighted, no light 
bulb broken and stuff like that. What they actually were executing is if a light bulb is 
broken, somebody makes a telephone call, they will fix the light bulb, and what I want 
is, I want them to actively work in having the right environment, so pro-actively check 
the beamers. Do an inspection or things like that. So, it's a quality step and it could… 
in our eyes it could be with the same cost (#20, FM director-2, Semco). 
So, according to Semco, Faspro had to increase the performance but that should not be 
accompanied by more formal control systems. The performance was measured by a KPI 
system, but this system was not seen as reliable by Semco, although it was an open-book 
system they could always access. Faspro expected that this transparency would satisfy 
Semco, but this was not the case. 
They can look in our system and we know that they don't check it. We give them once 
a quarter, we give them a report out of the system and they look at it not enough 
because they think that the KPI’s are not the KPI’s they want to have, but they don't 
look in the system (#17, Account director-2, Faspro).  
In general, Faspro’s performance, based on the KPI’s was good, but this did not satisfy FM 
director-2. The new FM management was more receptive to signals from the end users then 
to a number of figures in reports. They thought that the measurement was not good, or 
even that the measures were the wrong ones. Again, the measurement system was set up 
by FM director-1 and FM director-2 wanted to change things. In a joint interview with 
Country manager-2, they explained what, in their view, was wrong with the measures and 
measurements. 
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Yeah, but, you know, after a certain phase, people don't report negatively anymore, 
they say, you know [blows raspberry], I don't care anymore. I think a very human and 
natural reaction (#22, Country manager-2, Semco). 
 
The scores were always good. So there's something in their questioning that doesn't 
add up to a good evaluation. Now I'm in charge, I can do something about it. What we 
will do is another way of interviewing customers to get direct feedback on things they 
see, just like walking around (#22, FM director-2, Semco). 
The established control structures did no longer reflect the control practices. Control 
practices changed and as a consequence this had to be represented in the new contract.  
6.5.3 Final negotiations and trust developments 
After the changes in staff, changes in control, and discussions about new services, the 
negotiations for a contract extension did not convince Faspro that they would remain the 
preferred partner. The atmosphere had changed from a trusting one into a pragmatic one. 
The Purchase manager still thought that trust was an important basis for business, but also 
acknowledged that it is not possible to trust without any reason. Trust should be based on 
signals that underpin the trust. According to him, that is the essence of building a 
relationship or "a business way of working". 
I think the bottom line here is establishing partnerships or establishing trust. You 
should always work on the basis of trust […] But I think also trust should be 
underpinned with other things, because I have a certain responsibility […] If I only 
trust your blue eyes, than that is not a business way of working (#16, Purchase 
manager, Semco). 
Apparently to the Purchase manager trust was a starting point, a natural basis of the 
partnership, but it had to be ‘underpinned with other things’. He called these ‘safety 
measures’ or ‘references’. He was in need of more concrete examples or documentation to 
build trust on, because of his ‘responsibilities’. Only through such ‘responsibilities’ he could 
be held accountable by his superiors. So, in a way he was looking for the right ‘objects’ 
backing the ‘quasi-object’ of trust. 
Faspro’s account director-2 did not experience the new contract negotiations as a 
strengthening of the relationship. According to him, further relationship building could only 
start after signing the contract. 
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It is not a lack of trust, but I think that they just want more. Delaying a decision about 
a new contract will be a problem for the process, because then we have a time with 
no decisions, and the time with no decisions is long enough now. So it would be 
better that we say, okay, here is the new contract, and now we're going to build the 
relationship. Because we don't build a relationship, the only thing we are doing are 
these negotiations with each other (#17, Account director-2, Faspro). 
Faspro’s account director-2 did not experience a lack of trust, but he perceived the contract 
negotiations as an obstruction to the further building of a good relationship. When his 
contracting partners changed, uncertainty increased. 
To Faspro, being the smaller party, trust seemed to be more important than to Semco. 
You must trust each other because when you don't trust each other we have a bad 
contract at the end, and that's not what we want. We are new to each other, we are 
in a difficult process, so sometimes it's difficult for them to trust us (#17, Account 
director-2, Faspro). 
Semco announced a tender, thus signalling that it might choose for another party, not 
Faspro, to manage the FM. Faspro’s account director-2 did not perceive this as a lack of 
trust. She understood Semco’s motives. She was not sure, however, that the FM people 
lower in her team would understand it. 
When there is a tender I don't think it has something to do with trust. I don't think it's 
a problem for the trust. I think in the team it will be a problem for the trust because 
they are not negotiating and will not understand it (#17, Account director-2, Faspro). 
Indeed, Faspro’s senior facility manager did feel they were treated with disrespect by Semco. 
He wondered why they had to prove themselves after all the good work they had done. In 
his opinion Semco wanted too much and tendering was hurting the trust, particularly after 
all the information they provided to Semco on its request. In his view Faspro sent more than 
enough signals and now it was time for Semco to signal commitment.  
The way in which we are treated by Semco in the sense that they posing questions 
and more questions, I sometimes think they want all our knowledge and they might 
say in the end, thank you for everything and we are going to do it ourselves […] Well, 
it is a matter of trust of course. In the beginning we gave them some information and 
we gave them our offer. Of course when you put your offer on the table they have 
questions, but at a certain moment our management team needs to know if we will 
work together and if we will be the sole party. So we are in this process and I think 
they will choose us for another period, but it is a bit strange (#18, Senior facility 
manager, Faspro). 
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Faspro’s Account director-2 could understand the feeling of the Senior facility manager and 
also felt it was time that Semco chose for them as the preferred partner. Contracting and 
negotiating therefore does not always improve the relationship. It is a potential setting to 
send relational signals, but it may also hurt the relationship. The contract-extension 
negotiations in this case were harsh, but in the end FM director-2 was optimistic and had 
positive expectations for the future. So somehow the contracting process helped Semco in 
gaining positive expectations. 
At the moment we are really in the negotiations and that's somewhat hurting the 
relation because we're now exploring the boundaries of the discussion, and I'm 
convinced we will manage to come up with a solution that is satisfying for both 
parties (#20, FM director-2, Semco). 
According to Faspro’s contract manager this solution was already found. He stated that 
Semco did not choose for a tender after all. According to him the negotiations were going 
well and he detected a restoration of trust. 
Now the negotiations are going really good and we showed them we know what we 
do and we showed them we know what we are talking about and we can do it for a 
good price and we made a good proposition to them. I think we did. And they have 
already said that they really trust us and that they don't want to tender. So, I think 
that it will be okay, yes (#19, Contract manager, Faspro). 
Also at a higher level in Semco, Faspro was still the preferred partner. Country manager-2 
acknowledged that he spoke with other possible FM providers, but he did not feel the same 
'chemistry' with those business partners as he did with Faspro. So this chemistry was 
important for the further development of the relationship. The re-contracting process 
between Semco and Faspro, with all the ups and downs, therefore accomplished a common 
ground for trust and a continuing relationship. 
The chemistry between the people is important, because we also have contract 
discussions with other possible partners and there you can feel that the chemistry is 
different. Sometimes you have negotiations and then the people have different 
wavelengths, different emotions, whatever you want to call it, and then you feel it 
doesn't work. But I think it's very important that during the negotiations you have the 
right match between the people who are negotiating, that they understand each 
other. And you also need commitment from the chief in command to make it work. 
It's an important part of the trust or relationship building (#22, Country manager-2, 
Faspro). 
The new contract was confirmed through a press release in June 2011. The partners did even 
extent it towards a TFM construction. 
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The existing agreement with Semco is extended for three years and changed in a 
Total Facility Management model so that Semco is able to focus even more on its 
primary activities (Doc #15, 1106). 
The positive attitude the process revealed at the end of the contracting period was also 
reflected in Faspro’s external communication. Again they explicitly stated that the 
relationship was based on mutual respect and trust. 
Semco searched for a partnership with a first class supplier in which services could be 
outsourced at the maximum. Faspro was the partner that Semco selected for the 
partnership. The assumptions for the contract show a very strong focus on savings 
and quality, among other things such as integrated real estate and facility 
management for Semco in the Netherlands and operational excellence in a 
partnership based on mutual respect and trust (Doc #16, 1203). 
6.6 Interfirm control and trust 
The case study illustrates how control and trust impact an interfirm outsourcing relationship. 
After the contract-review the organisations continued to cooperate based on trust and on a 
formal performance measurement system with control at a distance. However, certain 
events during the contracting period turned the trusting atmosphere around. Particularly FM 
managers with a technical background did not trust Faspro’s competencies to expand its 
services. They wanted a tighter and more operational control of Faspro’s activities and an 
increased exchange of information. This change was reinforced after the replacement of 
some key personnel. After four years of cooperation and a trusting relationship, against the 
background of an exit threat a new and difficult contract extension negotiation process 
evolved. Ultimately a new contract was signed and a basis for trust was restored.  
Table 6-1 reflects the main characteristics of the relationship between Semco and Faspro. 
The table summarises how distinct situations are related to the interaction of control and 
trust. The contracting period can roughly be split up in two halves. The first half covers 
approximately a period of two to two and a half years. This period is mainly described in 
chapter 5. During this period, problems in the relationship were solved by the appointment 
of a new facility manager, a contract-review and a relatively stable development of the 
relationship afterwards. The second half of the relationship was characterised by new events 
that put pressure on the relationship and ended in contract negotiations about the 
extension of the contract.  
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Table 6-1: Changes in trust and control, and the interaction between control and trust 
during the contracting period 
Period and events Trust Control Interaction of 
Control and trust 
First half of contracting 
period: After a difficult 
start a new facility 
manager starts a 
contract-review which 
builds commitment and 
trust between both 
partners about future 
cooperation. 
Trust results from 
signalling a positive 
expectation of 
partner’s 
competencies. 
Relationship based 
on equality. 
Control is formalised 
and distanced based 
on KPI’s and open 
book accounting. 
Lower frequency of 
meetings and focus 
on long term goals 
stipulated in a 
roadmap. 
Contracting and an 
exchange of 
information 
facilitates 
relational 
signalling, and thus 
trust building 
(control produces 
thick trust).  
    
Second half of 
contracting period: 
Semco changes the 
organisation of facility 
management. Some key 
FM staff is changed and 
the extension of the 
contract is negotiated. 
Lack of competence 
trust (no 
outsourcing of 
‘fabs’-facilities). 
Lack of trust in 
accounting 
measures (dis-
cussion of ‘control 
at a distance’) 
Relationship is 
dictated by Semco. 
More ‘hands on’ 
management and 
informal control (i.e. 
direct feedback of 
end users). Inclusion 
of market pressure 
(tendering). 
Changes in control 
(hands-on, market 
pressure) hindered 
‘thick’ trust 
building, which 
was ‘on a hold’ 
during the contract 
extension process.  
 
During the first half of the contract period, the contract-review was used to lay down control 
structures in the contract for the creation of commitment and the building of trust, not (at 
least not primarily) for appropriation concerns. In our case we observed that periodic 
meetings and discussions on performance (KPIs) enabled Semco and Faspro to jointly solve 
problems and to demonstrate that they were prepared to think in the interest of the 
relationship rather than in the interest of their own organisations. The control practices 
arising from the formal control structures demonstrated to be important for relational 
signalling (Lindenberg, 2000). Particularly the contract-review was a vital process in the 
relationship as it provided the opportunity to send relational signals and to commit the 
parties to the new control structure (see also Faems, Janssens, Madhok & Van Looy, 2008, 
who state that contracting can create commitment).  
A rather formal control structure was designed, based on a performance measurement 
system with KPIs. This performance measurement system afforded control at a distance. It 
was Faspro who measured the KPIs and made the reports. The measurements were 
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completely transparent so Semco could always check the performance. Once every month 
the parties discussed the progress and worked on a roadmap that would led to even more 
autonomy and responsibilities for Faspro. Semco treated Faspro as an equal partner and 
information was exchanged in an open atmosphere. A part of Faspro’s personnel consisted 
of former Semco employees, and since Faspro was integrated at the Semco site, the 
transacting parties shared a sense of belonging to one and the same organisation with 
mutual interests. During this period particularly re-contracting, discussing and negotiating 
new services, enhanced trust and not so much the control structures as incorporated in the 
contract.  
During the second half of the contract period further negotiations with the management of 
the fabs FM-department about TFM and inclusion of the facility services of the fabs were 
necessary to complete the negotiated roadmap. These negotiations, however, failed which 
revealed that the fabs FM-management was an obstacle in the execution of the roadmap, 
thus hindering the further development of the outsourcing relationship. So, although the 
contract-review created a firm base in the relationship, at the operational level 
disagreement emerged. FM director-1 had to deal with internal technical FM management 
that had doubts about Faspro's competencies regarding technical facility services. Moreover 
they had doubts about the representation of the accounting numbers, e.g. the internal 
performance measurement system, even when it was an open book system. Open book 
accounting can be used as a way to regain control in an interfirm relationship (Mouritsen et 
al., 2001), and it might also be a way to signal trust (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 
(2009). However, the new management clearly did not perceive the open book accounting 
numbers as trustworthy and to them it was a reason to change control towards more 
operational ‘hands-on‘ control with more direct feedback from the users of the services. 
Hands-on control is the opposite of management control as a ‘paper-practice’, where 
production is controlled from a distance with accounting numbers as a representation of 
information (Mouritsen, 1999). 
Faspro however believed to provide a true and honest account with their performance 
measurement system. This was disputed now and felt like a decrease in trust from Semco. 
The representational properties of accounting were challenged and when accounting does 
not function as an actor anymore it can neither function as a vehicle for trust building. This 
coincides with the perception of trust as a quasi-object. It were the control structures and 
accounting numbers in the outsourcing relationship, that initially created commitment and 
provided the basis for trust, because they were shared and circulated in the network. At the 
moment that the control structures were not seen as sufficient, trust became a problem. 
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This is why Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) call trust a problematising device as it is a relation 
to people in a network. Trust becomes a problem when other actors or their actions get 
challenged. In this case study, especially during the events in the second half of the 
relationship and during the contract extension negotiations, both parties indeed questioned 
each other’s actions. Semco had doubts about the representation of the accounting 
numbers of Faspro and Faspro had doubts about the real intentions of Semco’s contract 
negotiations. During these events it seemed that trust was temporarily put ‘on a hold’, but it 
never disappeared as an factor.  
The doubts within Semco about the representational qualities of accounting eventually 
pointed to that one manager, who was the initiator of the roadmap and who gave Faspro 
more autonomy with control at a distance. It was FM director-1 whose ideas about 
accounting and the accompanying trust were not shared anymore and who became isolated 
and ‘disbarred’. His leaving might have been accelerated by the passing of Country manager-
1. FM director-1 was appointed under Country manager-1 who supported the ambition to 
expand Faspro’s services. At the same time also Account manager-1 of Faspro was replaced, 
so the foundation of the contract-review disappeared. Nooteboom (1996) argues that when 
too much reliance is based on just a few persons who have a trusting relationship, this trust 
can easily disappear when people leave organisations. However, this case study illustrates 
that trust not just disappears. A trust relationship was built during the years and also the 
new FM managers had been around during those years. Faspro staff built positive 
expectations based on negotiated control instruments as roadmaps and KPI’s. It is 
understandable that Faspro’s positive expectations didn’t disappear, but that they thought 
that they would be transferred into the new situation. However when trust is taken for 
granted, it does not eliminate the agency of the actors in the relationship. A duality 
perspective implies a reflexive relationship between trust and control (Möllering, 2005). The 
former trust relationship did not overpower the new FM managers’ agency to act against 
Faspro’s interest. The situation made clear that trust cannot be reduced to control and 
control cannot be reduced to trust. Trust and control produce a common output, which 
might be positive or negative expectations. The change in staff did indeed change the 
interaction between control and trust, but trust did not just disappear.  
A final observation that can be made regarding the second half of the contracting period is 
that the relationship between Semco and Faspro evolved into one with asymmetrical power. 
Semco was dictating what Faspro had to deliver. During the contract-extension negotiations 
the issue of (thick) trust seemed to be set aside. As Chaserant (2003) claims, the building of 
trust requires that the party with the stronger bargaining power has to signal the credibility 
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of its commitment, because the party with less power has much more to lose. During the 
contract-review this was the case, but at the end of the contract period only negative signals 
were sent, such as the expression of doubts about competencies, hesitation in signing the 
contract, asking much information (more than Faspro thought reasonable), and the 
tendering process. Asking too much and too detailed information can get in the way of 
creating good exchange relationships. “Such planning indicates a lack of trust and blunts the 
demands of friendship" (Macaulay, 1963, p. 64).  
Ultimately the contract was signed and parties succeeded in constructing a new base for the 
development of the relationship. The very act of signing a contact may be seen as an act of 
commitment (De Jong & Klein Woolthuis, 2008). Yet, the new base for the relationship is one 
on which ‘hands on management’ will be active rather than ‘control at a distance’; one in 
which direct feed-back information and professional judgment will be more active than 
accounting measures. In this situation the parties may lose some opportunities to mobilise 
trust via the ‘old’ control practices, but the new way of controlling also assumes trust. The 
new control practices will generate new ostensive and performative control/ trust aspects 
that may help in maintaining a successful long term relationship. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter the relationship between control and trust is discussed for a contractual 
relationship between a semi-conductor factory and a managing agent of facility services. It 
looked at the difficult role of trust in an industry where the facilities in the factories are of 
extreme importance to the organisation. The first half of the contracting period, 
commitment to the negotiated control and measurement system developed trust which 
held the relationship together. When management changed, the acceptance of the control 
and measurement system also changed. New management of Semco thought that the KPI 
measures did not reflect the real performance. The focus of Semco shifted from decreasing 
costs to service excellence. Negotiations to extend the services of Faspro towards total 
facility management and towards the high risk factory facilities failed. After accounting 
practices were changed by the new management, not much was gained from earlier trust 
building. Positive expectations about the outcome of the negotiations were still present but 
had to be redefined during the negotiations about a new contract.  
A contribution of this chapter is the insight that trust is directly linked to the acceptance of 
control as an actor in the relational network. It is argued that trust forms a duality with 
control (Möllering, 2005) and that trust can be characterised as a quasi-object of control that 
acts when it circulates between actors (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). It is not so much the 
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relation between control and trust that determines the relationship but the agreement on 
control as an actor mediating in the building of trust. 
This insight reaffirms the analysis of chapter 5 that trust and control develop through a 
series of events in which signals (during control practices) are sent that influence trust. It 
extends the analysis however by adopting the control/ trust duality in combination with the 
ostensive/ performative perspective on organisational routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Pentland & Feldman, 2008). The case reveals that during the end of the contractual period 
between Semco and Faspro, expectations about each other were changing, influenced by 
perceptions of trust and control. Different events at different times and places reveal the 
building of positive expectations, which sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. Control and 
trust are both part of the process of building these positive expectations, but in a dynamic 
non-linear way. Actors in the relationship refer to control structures (ostensive aspects), but 
do also (re)produce control structures through their practices (performative aspects). This 
generative process may result in a change of the artifact (the contract) and will influence the 
ostensive and performative aspects of the control practices again which can be characterised 
as a continuous process of change. The approach in this chapter may be helpful to future 
management control research to provide new insights in the influence of control structure 
design on control practices.  
 
  
 
 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
After the intensive hours in the field, and the countless lonely hours in front of 
the computer screen, the “qualitative” management accounting scholar 
inevitably faces a painful, almost existential question – does qualitative 
research in management accounting really matter? (Vaivio, 2008, p. 64) 
7.1 Research overview 
This thesis adds to the understanding of governance and control as it is related to internal 
and external outsourcing by answering three questions:  
1. How does change in governance and control structures relate to the development 
of internal outsourcing relationships? 
2. How are contracts and control structures vehicles for trust building?  
3. How do control practices relate to trust? 
Whereas the first question is answered by empirically studying internal outsourcing, the 
other two questions are answered by studying external outsourcing. 
To answer these questions, a qualitative research approach is adopted. Qualitative research 
offers possibilities to reveal how certain governance structures and control practices are 
relationally framed in specific situations, thus challenging the economic notion of individual 
and rational managerial choice behaviour and instrumental consultancy behaviour (Vaivio, 
2008). It also offers possibilities to reveal how governance and control structures are 
performative. This study aims to contribute to theory building in the management 
accounting and control discipline. Two case studies, one for internal and one for external 
outsourcing, are performed. The case studies took place from 2007 till 2010 and included 
extensive documentary analysis and thirty-three semi-structured interviews.  
The first research question theorises and empirically investigates governance and control 
structure change through a case study at PCM (a Dutch newspaper publisher). In doing so, 
the scope of a transaction costs economics (TCE) perspective both in terms of content (i.e. 
the nature of management control related to the dimensions of transactions) and process 
(i.e. the way change is effectuated) is explored and challenged. The calculative choice 
perspective that TCE suggests is only partly recognisable in practice. Changing governance 
and control structures is a process that is only to a limited extent programmable. 
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The second and third research question examine the interactive relationship between 
control and trust building, focusing on the dynamics between control and trust. Through an 
in-depth case study into a dyadic relationship between the facilities management 
department of a multinational company and an outside contractor it is shown how the 
governance of this relationship develops. 
7.2 Theoretical findings and contributions 
This study makes a number of contributions to the current management control literature. 
In a conceptual sense it adds to the understanding of governance and control structures 
within and between organisations. The empirical findings are derived from two field studies 
where respectively TCE is applied and critically evaluated and where developments in trust 
and control are explained. This section summarises and interprets the findings. The study 
also illustrates how there are both ostensive and performative aspects of governance- and 
control structures , and how these aspects are related. 
7.2.1 Conceptual insights 
Governance and management control structures conceptualised 
Both the terms governance structure and management control structure are used in 
management control literature. It is not always clear what the difference is and the meaning 
of the concepts is often context dependent. This thesis concludes that the decision to 
implement an SSC entails a management control structure choice within a hierarchical 
governance structure. Once this choice is made, an additional choice regarding the 
governance structure of transactional relationships between the SSC and the internal clients 
(business units) has to be made. In fact, this concerns the choice of a governance structure 
on a lower level. This ‘lower level’ governance structure is reflected in a contract and/or an 
SLA. When business unit managers are free to buy services from third parties rather than 
from the internal SSC, the lower level governance structure moves into the direction of a 
hybrid. In this way business unit managers can put market pressure on SSC-management; 
the market mechanism then becomes a powerful (horizontal) management control 
instrument. Exit threats are at the heart of such a mechanism. Such a mechanism extends 
extant management control frameworks as for instance developed by Anthony (1965, 1988), 
Zimmerman (2011) and Simons (1995) who do not include exit threats in there management 
control theory but focus on vertical management control arrangements based on a 
bureaucratic mechanism. 
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Ostensive and performative views on management control research 
The conceptualisation of governance and control as the result of a managerial choice of 
horizontal and vertical arrangements is rather instrumental. It is a conceptualisation from an 
ostensive perspective. From an ostensive perspective, research focuses on detecting and 
explaining order and stability (Latour, 1986, 2005). The ostensive conceptualisation of 
governance structures and control structures as stable, orderly and predictable structures 
ascribes subordinate instrumental roles to such structures. There is no acknowledgement of 
a more active transformative role of these structures. The case studies examined 
governance and control in practice from a performative perspective. The distinction 
between ostensive and performative perspectives finds its roots in actor-network theory 
which focuses on processes of becoming and enacting in a relational network; a network 
consisting of humans and other-than-humans. That is, actor-network theory takes a 
performative perspective. Latour (2005) positions such a perspective against an ostensive 
perspective. A TCE-based approach to the governance and control of intra- and interfirm 
relationships is an example of an ostensive perspective. This study exemplifies that it is 
possible to combine both perspectives in one study (see also Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Pentland & Feldman, 2008; Vosselman, 2012), thereby revealing both relatively stable (i.e. 
governance structures, control structures, trust) and drifting (i.e. changes in control and 
trust) aspects of reality.  
The study into the internal outsourcing initially took an ostensive view and drew on TCE to 
explain decisions on governance and control structure change. The research, however, also 
revealed the limitations of such an approach and advocates additional performative 
research. The results are presented in the empirical findings section.  
The distinction between ostensive and performative not only refers to theoretical 
perspectives (epistemology), but also to aspects of reality (ontology). Epistemologically, 
governance and control are examined from either an ostensive perspective (like TCE) or an 
performative perspective (like ANT). Ontologically, the existence of ostensive and 
performative aspects are identified in practice. Particularly, control practices may include 
both ostensive and performative aspects. Drawing on Pentland and Feldman (2008) and 
Feldman and Pentland (2003), the ostensive aspects are the abstract and general elements 
of the control practices as perceived by the organisational participants. The performative 
aspects are generated in practice and based on participants actions when performing control 
practices. Artifacts, such as contracts, presentations or minutes of meetings, may reflect or 
influence either the ostensive or performative aspects of control practices. From a 
performative view, the formal governance and control structure is an actor by itself, 
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produced and reproduced by the network. New hybrid forms and practices might arise 
through such processes. By analysing artifacts and interviewing organisational participants 
this qualitative study is relating abstractions and conceptualisations from ostensive research, 
such as governance structures, control structures and trust to the performative effects of 
these structures in practice. 
Conceptualisations of trust and control 
The relational nature of outsourcing relationships entails the importance of the sharing of 
accounting information and the establishment of trusting relations (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; 
Free, 2008). Extant literature, however focuses on the incomplete aspects of contracts to 
argue the use of trust in relationships (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), while the 
contracting aspects before, or re-contracting after closing the contract is largely neglected. 
This research highlights the importance of trust in relation to control in outsourcing 
alliances. The empirical findings are discussed in the next section. 
This thesis’ literature review of trust and control in accounting research distinguished a 
number of categorisations and types of trust, but did also reveal that they fit within the 
dichotomy of thin and thick trust of Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). Thick 
types of trust include vulnerability and positive expectation of the other party, while thin 
types of trust are mostly based on the fact that certain safeguards are in place or that there 
is no risk at all. The distinction between thick and thin trust may be practical for future 
research on trust.  
However, this thesis goes beyond the abstract, ostensive categorisations of trust and 
contributes by studying trust also as a performative practice and its relations with 
accounting. Ostensive and performative aspects of control practices are related to material 
artifacts such as contracts or performance reports, and trust is not a formal aspect of these 
artifacts. Since trust is not an artifact or an object, it is difficult to study it as a non-human 
actor that influences and shapes control practices. So to understand how trust can influence 
control practices the concept of quasi-objects is adopted (Brown, 2002; Mouritsen & Thrane, 
2006; Schiermer, 2011). Trust is conceptualised as a quasi-object which means that trust is 
related to an object and in this thesis that is control. Control artifacts such as performance 
agreements, contracts, SLAs, roadmaps et cetera, emerge and change over time during day 
to day practising of control. During these practices trust is signalled which is reflected in the 
control artifacts. As long as control is perceived as an objective measurement tool by the 
actors in the relationship, trust can circulate. Trust perceived as a quasi-object of control is 
analogue with the idea of trust and control as a duality (Möllering, 2005). Trust and control 
do not have a certain variable relation to each other, but are irreducible to each other. 
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Control assumes the existence of trust and vice versa. The following section shall discuss the 
empirical findings of this research. 
7.2.2 Empirical findings 
Shared service centres: the internal outsourcing case 
The internal outsourcing case study examined the change in governance and control at PCM, 
a newspaper publisher, in a reorganisation towards decentralisation. Services were 
concentrated in an SSC. To examine the extent to which governance and control changes at 
PCM were the result of managerial decision making and could be explained by TCE 
reasoning, a framework is developed that adds to Vosselman’s (2002) framework of the 
horizontalisation of management control. The framework is geared to the specifics of SSC 
organisations where business unit managers’ choices may result in make, buy internally or 
buy externally. The framework depicts rational choices of certain management control 
structures. The rationality of the choice depends on the nature of transactions, the volume 
and frequency of the transactions, and the levels of uncertainty and complexity. The 
alternative control structures are: an SSC with free buying and selling (b/s), an SSC with 
captive b/s and deconcentration within the business units. The latter structure does not 
entail the development of an SSC. Particularly the SSC with free b/s introduces a market 
mechanism in the governance of the internal transactions. With a marked mechanism, exit 
threats put additional pressure on the management of the SSC to further improve the price-
quality ratio of the services.  
The empirical part of the research gives evidence that related to the development of an SSC 
there is no straightforward rational choice behaviour by PCM’s top management in 
management control structure change. Not all the alternatives stemming from a TCE-
approach were explicitly taken into account. Particularly, the possibility of the introduction 
of an exit threat was not taken into account. To the extent that there was economic 
reasoning behind the concentration of services in an SSC, it was reasoning regarding 
economies of scale and not reasoning regarding transaction costs connected to specific 
management control structures. 
The change within PCM was initiated by top management that appointed a committee with 
an assignment to make a new design of the management control structure. The case study 
revealed that the decision to appoint such a committee initiated a change process with 
unexpected effects. The process was not guided action based on clear decisions of top 
management, not an identifiable movement between origins and outcome. There was no 
strict guided change based on rational (efficiency) arguments. The change proved to have 
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some characteristics of a drift and thus challenged a view of change as a calculative, linear 
and guided process. In the case, it were the interconnected actions of top management, 
newspaper business unit management and SSC management that resulted in a relatively 
fluid management control structure. 
The internal outsourcing case study thus challenged the instrumental efficiency perspective 
inherent in the TCE approach and suggested that an efficiency perspective might be bridged 
with a relational perspective that reveals the drifting character of a change process. 
Divergent interests, the search for autonomy and power positions that influenced such 
drifting makes every attempt of organising incomplete (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001, p. 482). 
Tracing how concerns with the governance of advertisement sales within PCM became 
linked to purposeful actions, aimed at the construction of a new management control 
structure, illustrated how managerial intentions can fail when these intentions are not 
connected with the intentions of other entities in the network. In a relational approach, 
parties are considered to be sense making individuals. In a network, management control 
structures gradually emerge as a consequence of day-to-day interaction. Management 
control structures, then, are not primarily instruments in the hands of top management, but 
are non-human actors that are in a constant state of flux. 
A relational approach to changes in management control might also open up possibilities to 
incorporate the notion of trust in the analysis. In the process of studying the PCM-case we 
observed an absence of trust and even the presence of distrust toward the board of PCM 
and the SSC. These (dis)trust issues had partly historical roots, but did also develop during 
the change process where different groups of actors with different interests tried to 
influence the control structure. This issue was studied in more depth in the external 
outsourcing case study. 
Control, trust and the external outsourcing of facility management 
The case on external outsourcing is about a semiconductor fabrication plant that outsourced 
the management of facility services. During a contract period of four years contracting, re-
contracting and control practices are examined and related to trust. Starting from an 
interaction perspective on the relationship between control and trust the study builds on the 
framework presented by Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). Their framework 
takes a rationalist approach and “aims to further contribute to the theory on the relationship 
between control and trust” (p. 268). In their modelling, the problem of potential 
opportunistic behaviour in interfirm relationships is at the basis of negotiating and designing 
a control structure. This structure should entail thin trust. It should provide a basic safeguard 
against opportunistic behaviour which also serves as a basis for forming positive 
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expectations about the other party’s future behaviour. To form these positive expectations, 
during the development of the relationship parties look for relational signals, particularly if 
unforeseen situations occur. By voluntarily providing these relational signals the parties 
demonstrate their positive intentions with the aim to build trust. This type of trust is called 
thick trust. 
This case study, however, shows that the boundaries between thick trust and thin trust may 
not be as clear and sharply defined as expected. The formal contract negotiations and the 
ultimate contract did not lead to positive expectations of the other party, because the actors 
involved in the negotiations were not involved in the execution of the contract. Although 
accounting and control structures were in place, these structures did not result in the 
intended outcomes of the interfirm relationship. A new re-contracting process with local 
actors proved necessary to regain a positive atmosphere and produce a fruitful relationship. 
So, relational signalling is not restricted to a phase that starts after a phase during which a 
formal management control system is designed, but is also integral to contracting and re-
contracting. Apparently, during the re-contracting process, trust was produced, but the 
distinction between thick trust and thin trust became blurred. 
Furthermore, it is argued that if in control practices relational signalling is used as an 
instrument in the hands of managers to achieve a trusting relationship (Lindenberg, 2000), it 
mainly reveals the ostensive aspects of the control practices. However, this study reveals 
that at the level of the relational network that frames the relationship, there is a duality 
between the ostensive and the performative. From the case study it can be concluded that 
the ostensive aspects of the contract are enacted through points of view that weakly relate 
to the contents of the contract (from the ostensive to the performative), while at the same 
time such enactment produces a new contractual base (from the performative to the 
ostensive). The original contract is signed by top management, that took a rather distanced 
view on the future outsourcing relationship. Performative aspects particularly became visible 
during re-contracting when (new) local management became involved in the negotiations 
and relational signals emerged spontaneous when the situation was in need of such signals. 
Contracts and incorporated control structures become vehicles for the building of 
commitment and trust and are performative through control practices. They are not 
straightforwardly instrumental to an alignment of interests. Rather than a governance 
structure that is outside the network the contract is now translated inside the network. 
The study demonstrates that (re)-contracting (inter alia resulting in formal control 
structures) and control practices are the drivers for trust building. The act of (re)-contracting 
seems to be essential for the (further) development of the interfirm relationship because it 
158 | C H A P T E R  7  
generates trust, it serves the safeguarding of interests and it enhances cooperative 
behaviour. Control practices enable the provision of relational signals that reflect a 
commitment to the relationship, thus broadening the significance of contracting and control 
practices from formal safeguarding to the building of positive expectations and intentions in 
the relationship.  
A theoretical contribution of the case study concerning external outsourcing is a new 
conceptualisation of the model of Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). The 
conceptualisation in this thesis tries to reflect the interaction between trust and control. 
Although the model of Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) is taken as a starting 
point, the new model in this thesis is based on other assumptions. It is not taking a 
rationalist approach of a trust building process. It acknowledges the presence of the 
ostensive control structures and of ostensive aspects of trust. However, it connects these 
presences to performative aspects that emerge during control practices. The new model 
shows that instrumental solutions, reflected in a governance structure, influence control 
practices and that control practices, through (re)-contracting, again re-present the control 
structure. From this circular process, thin and thick trust emerges, but not in a linear fashion. 
If interfirm control practices develop through interaction between ostensive aspects that 
constrain and enable performances and performative aspects that create and recreate the 
ostensive, also thin and thick trust interact. Thin trust is the result of constraining and 
enabling controls, because it is based on formal control structures, while at the same time 
thick trust is generated during negotiating controls and during control practices that create 
and recreate control.  
In sum, it can be concluded that designing governance and control artifacts (contracts, rules, 
SLAs, roadmaps, KPIs, etc.) do not determine the control practices as if they were objects or 
things. Managers design artifacts and they hope that the control practices will be a reflection 
of the design. This case study shows that it is not likely to expect the codified pattern of the 
design, but that management control activities are generated in chains of actions that form 
control practices. The contract only provides a relative stability. This is in line with Feldman 
and Orlikowski (2011) who state that eventually the practices rather than systems produce 
outcomes that are situated, dynamic and emergent. 
Dualities and quasi-objects 
The interconnectedness between control and trust becomes particularly visible during the 
later phase in the external outsourcing relationship. During the phase that started after the 
contract-review certain events bring tensions to the relationship. Faspro wants to extend its 
services and is originally supported by Semco in this aim, but internal organisational and 
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personnel changes interfere with their plans. The negotiated roadmap and the KPI system 
are questioned by newly appointed management. This new management changed 
accounting practices and not much was gained from earlier trust building. 
The case shows that control and trust are not just substitutes or complements, but form a 
duality. Trust, as a quasi-object is linked to control objects and in the case of the external 
outsourcing relationship the negotiated control structures are such objects. From the 
moment Semco’s new management, for instance, questions the accounting measures it is 
the very actorhood of accounting that is challenged. Also, the trust that is connected to 
these measures loses its actorhood. The accounting measures cannot produce trust, and the 
trust disappears. It thus stops mobilising other actors. It is as Latour (1991, p. 107) says: 
The unity of an innovation is not given by something which would remain 
constant over time, but by the moving translation of what we call, with Serres, 
a quasi-object (Serres 1987). 
If the word ‘innovation’ is replaced by ‘control structure’, this quote adds to the conclusion 
in this book that a control structure in an outsourcing relationship is not simply implemented 
as a relatively stable instrument, but that it is the translation of trust in the control 
structures that produces its actorhood in the network. Once all (human) actors in the 
relationship attach a value to the control structures, and trust that it is a reflection of the 
other’s performance, then trust circulates as a quasi-object. Once, as in the external 
outsourcing case, trust is not circulating anymore but resides at the designer of the control 
structure, trust is individualised and disappears, thus stopping the moving translation.  
Since trust and control form a duality, also the accounting measures lose its capabilities to 
re-present performance. In the outsourcing relationship new management has no trust in 
the capability of accounting measures to re-present performance. Thus, new management 
does not have trust in ‘control at a distance’ and shifts its information sources towards direct 
supervision and professional judgement by facility managers. Trust is now not a mobiliser 
anymore. As this new ‘hands-on-’ form of control is not generated within the relationship, 
there emerges a need for a new mobiliser in the relationship. Faspro cannot interpret 
Semco’s intentions and new negotiations are necessary to develop the relationship again. 
However, also the contract-extension negotiations cause tensions, as Semco dictates what 
Faspro has to deliver. The a-symmetrical power relation is perceived as a lack of trust by 
Faspro. During the negotiations, trust is to a certain extent restored. 
In sum, this study sheds some new light on the way trust and control are interconnected in 
outsourcing relationships. Conceptualising trust as a quasi-object of control implies that 
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trust and control form a duality. Similar to Möllering (2005, p. 284), it may be concluded 
that, in practice, controlling and trusting are less distinct than is typically theorised, as “trust 
and control each assume the existence of the other”. Trust has mobilising power as long as 
the object to which it is attached is perceived as valuable by the parties involved. As soon as 
the other actors do not value this object (in this case the accounting performance measure) 
anymore, trust stops circulating in the network. It then loses its mobilising power and other 
mobilisers (for instance direct supervision and/or new contract negotiations) are required.  
Ostensive and performative insights 
Both the internal and external outsourcing case study illustrate that governance structures, 
control structures and trust can be approached in an ostensive and a performative way. In 
the ostensive TCE-approach, control structures are perceived as solutions to a problem. 
Dimensions of service transactions determine the design choice of a management control 
structure. This approach can be helpful in analysing or designing/choosing rather static 
situations. Change, then, is perceived to be a direct and unproblematic result of the control 
solution. However, as the PCM case study reveals, in practice the change towards an SSC has 
more of a drifting character. Or, stated as Latour’s ‘first principle’: “The fate of what we say 
and make is in later users’ hands” (Latour, 1987, p. 29). Thus, a designed control structure 
may result in a different control practice as expected. 
Therefore, it is possible to take a performative approach. In such an approach, the relations 
between the actors (both human and non-human) in the network are under study. This is 
advocated by actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 2005; Law, 1992). There are many 
variations of ANT, but in its core it describes the pattern of associations among a set of 
human and non-human actors. This thesis illustrates how governance, control and trust are 
shaped within the network, but at the same time are non-human actors that shape the 
relationship. The original contract in the external outsourcing case study acted as a non-
human actor because it is shaped by and shapes the relationship between the partners in 
the relationship. Re-contracting resulted in new control structures that again mobilises a 
new working relation. These very same control structures eventually led to negative feelings 
about Faspro’s intentions.  
Instead of patterns of associations, a performative approach can also focus on patterns of 
actions (Pentland & Feldman, 2008). Control practices then are perceived as a bundle of 
activities that generate patterns of action. Contracting, for instance, is such an activity within 
the control practices which generates new patterns of action. The contract itself, however, is 
perceived as an artifact that is outside the practice. Practices both generate and draw on the 
artifacts through quasi-objects such as trust. These practices have ostensive and 
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performative aspects. In the external outsourcing case new actions or events (performative 
aspects) alter the ostensive aspects (action patterns) in the control practices. This 
eventuality is represented in the contract again. 
7.3 Research limitations and future research 
This final section describes the limitations of this research and will make some suggestions 
for future research. 
This thesis approaches internal and external outsourcing from different perspectives. The 
internal outsourcing case study primarily takes an ostensive approach and the external 
outsourcing case study primarily takes a performative approach. However, the performative 
approach does acknowledge that there are both ostensive and performative aspects of 
control practices. It does account for ostensive aspects as well. Although this approach is 
deliberately chosen and proves to reveal new insights, it is in need of further development. 
Connecting specific paradigms from sociology and organisational theory, such as ANT-kind of 
research (performative), with instrumental economic approaches such as TCE (ostensive), is 
rather unusual in management accounting research. Further debate on the benefits of 
‘triangulation of paradigms’ (see also Hassard & Wolfram Cox, 2013) in the management 
accounting discipline and future micro studies that draw on multiple research paradigms 
would be most welcome. 
Data collection was influenced by the management changes, because it concerned the 
contact persons for the case studies. Without these changes there might have been more 
possibilities for data collection and interactions about the results, which might have 
strengthened the research results. However, although this is an obvious limitation, acquiring 
more access does not automatically lead to better results. In this research it even led to 
some unexpected insights, as the change in management also changed the control and trust 
interaction. It is also difficult to know when enough data is collected and if more data would 
have led to more insights. Mouritsen (1999, p. 35) points out that we cannot be certain that 
important events have not happened in a place where the researcher was not present.  
It is therefore perhaps less the individual piece of evidence that counts but the 
interrelations between various bits of data put into a stream of a story-line 
which is held together not only by the sheer amount of data but also by the 
logic that ties various items of evidence together. 
Hopefully the logic of the conclusions in this study are convincing to the reader. 
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More longitudinal research might well be conducted on the control practices in the 
relationships between SSCs and their internal clients. The case study revealed that divergent 
interests, the search for autonomy and power positions are very influential in the changes of 
management control structures in the long run. Particularly the design and change of SLAs 
between SSCs and clients provide opportunities to examine intrafirm trust dynamics. This 
should not be restricted to private organisations. Also public organisations have embraced 
the idea of SSCs and struggle with the governance and control issues (Janssen & Joha, 2006; 
Knol, Sol & van Wamelen, 2012). 
The external outsourcing case study gives rise to several research topics. More research 
might be conducted on the duality of trust and control. This perspective helped in 
understanding the external outsourcing case study but it might also be interesting to study 
the duality of trust and control in intrafirm lateral relations. Also, more research on control 
practices as patterns of actions, which is related to practice theory, can give rise to new 
insights in both intrafirm and interfirm relationships. From the external outsourcing case it 
can be concluded that the same control structures and practices can result in different trust 
dynamics. This also adds to research on coercive and enabling control (Adler & Borys, 1996), 
especially because enabling controls aim to improve collaboration by information sharing 
and joint efforts for mutual benefits. They have relational consequences, and they are 
related to a trusting atmosphere (Jordan & Messner, 2012). In addition to Free (2007) who 
examined coercive and enabling controls as they distinctly present themselves in two 
distinct organisations in a supply chain, future research could address the concepts of 
coercive and enabling control as they are successively found in one and the same 
outsourcing relationship (Hassan, Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013). 
This study draws on the model of Pentland and Feldman (2008) concerning organisational 
routines. Future research might investigate other interfirm and intrafirm settings and focus 
on the specific ostensive and performative aspects of control practices, and on how the 
practices are connected to specific artifacts. To enhance research results it may be helpful to 
connect the conceptualisation of emic and etic research (Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka & 
Kuorikoski, 2008; Lukka & Modell, 2010) with the model of Pentland and Feldman (2008), 
because both research perspectives seem to pursue the same goal in their own specific way. 
The ‘outside’ etic perspective may be connected to research from an ostensive perspective, 
whereas the ‘inside’ emic perspective may focus on the ostensive and performative aspects 
of control practices. This theoretical exercise may result in new ways of analysing qualitative 
management accounting research . 
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After answering the research questions of this thesis, the question of Vaivio (2008) at the 
beginning of this chapter will hopefully be answered positively by the reader. Qualitative 
research in management accounting does matter. Analysing real life processes in 
organisations and making sense of the influence of human and non-human actors creates 
knowledge that can take us beyond the narrow and functionalist textbook view and is a 
counterweight to the idealised economics view and consultancy view. It may help students 
and practitioners in management accounting in reflecting on control structures that are 
presented as stable solutions to a problem, but are in fact continuously in the making. This 
may be achieved when accounting scholars study control practices in a variety of situations 
and organisations by taking a performative research approach, thus extending our insights in 
the shaping and enactment of accounting. 
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Appendix A LIST OF INTERVIEWS INTRAFIRM CASE STUDY 
Date  Participants Duration 
01-10-2007 
Initial meeting researchers with CEO 
and Director PCM-Media29 
60 minutes 
26-11-2007 Director PCM-Media 64 minutes 
26-11-2007 Financial director PCM 70 minutes 
26-03-2008 Chair of change committee 95 minutes 
04-09-2008 CEO 42 minutes 
04-09-2008 New director PCM-Media 37 minutes 
11-09-2008 
Former marketing director PCM-
Media 
73 minutes 
16-09-2008 Director PCM-Media 30 45 minutes 
25-09-2008 Publisher paper division 43 minutes 
25-09-2008 Vice-publisher paper division 40 minutes 
04-11-2008 Publisher paper division 59 minutes 
 
29  This meeting was not recorded. Notes were taken during the meeting 
30  This interview was carried out by telephone. Notes were taken 
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Appendix B OVERVIEW OF DOCUMENT SOURCES INTRAFIRM CASE STUDY 
# Date (yymm) Original Description Translation/ explanation 
1 0705 Nieuwe structuur PCM Uitgevers, Definitieve versie mei 2007 
New structure PCM 
(decentralisation) 
2 0710 Memo: Adviesaanvraag herstructurering PCM uitgevers 
Email to employees council 
about restructuring PCM 
3 0712 Bevoegdheden, kortingen en prijsafspraken 2008 
Responsibilities of managers 
concerning prices and 
discounts 
4 0801 Bonusregeling PCM Media 2008 Pay for performance plan at PCM Media.  
5 0804 Email over concept directiereglementen 
Email about draft 
management rules 
6 0808 Directiereglement Management rules 
7 0808 Omzetdoelen divisies Sales targets divisions 
8 0808 Overeenkomst van opdracht tussen PCM-Media en de Volkskrant 
SLA PCM-Media and de 
Volkskrant 
9 0808 Bijlage bij SLA over planning en control cyclus 
Appendix of SLA about 
planning and control cycle 
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Appendix C INTERVIEW ANALYSIS CODES INTRAFIRM CASE STUDY 
Name of code  Name of code 
Actors  Interests 
Advantages SSC  Internal competition 
Asset-specificity  Management Control 
Autonomy  Managing agent 
Captive buying and selling  Open book accounting 
Client-supplier relationship  Outsourcing 
Competence  Paper sales teams 
Coordination  Paper wide sales 
Corporate governance  Reasons for decentralisation 
Customised  Relationship SSC and divisions 
Customised service  Relationship top and divisions 
Decentralisation  SLA 
Deconcentration  Specialised services 
Disadvantages SSC  Specific sales 
Division of accounts  SSC 
Formalisation  Standard service 
Free captive buying and selling  Steering group 
Frequency  TCE 
Governance structure  Transparency 
Governance structure change  Trust 
Headquarters’ directives   
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Appendix D LIST OF INTERVIEWS INTERFIRM CASE STUDY 
# Date (yymmdd) Organisation Position Duration (minutes) 
1 08061031 Semco FM director32-133 60 
2 08092934 Semco FM director-1 70 
  Semco Purchase Manager   
3 08120835 Semco FM director-1 75 
4 090319 Semco FM director-1 134 
5 090324 Semco Manager Fab-services36 67 
6 090330 Semco Purchase Manager  98 
7 090330 Semco FM manager-a 59 
8 090406 Faspro Account director-1 97 
9 090409 Semco Country manager-1 63 
10 090414 Semco Controller-a 16 
11 090414 Semco Controller-a 90 
  Semco Controller-b  
12 090423 Semco Manager FM-Fabs 74 
13 090429 Semco Site Purchasing Manager 92 
14 090429 Semco FM manager-b 111 
15 09091637 Semco FM director-1 117 
  Semco Purchase Manager  
16 100618 Semco Purchase Manager  
17 100721 Faspro Account director-2 63 
18 100726 Faspro Senior facility manager 26 
19 100726 Faspro Contract manager 58 
31  First contact and discussion about research project (not recorded) 
32  This is the head of the facility management organisation 
33  The addition 1 and 2 is used when during the case study the person for this position is replaced by another person. The 
addition a or b means that the interviewees are different persons with the same positions 
34  Informative meeting (not recorded) 
35  Complete research team present (5 researchers) 
36  A Fab is a Semiconductor Fabrication Plant 
37  Feedback meeting with complete research team 
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# Date (yymmdd) Organisation Position Duration (minutes) 
20 100908 Semco FM director-238 52 
21 101014 Supplier Manager maintenance 97 
22 101026 Semco Country Manager-2 67 
  Semco FM director-2  
23 101110 Supplier District manager-a 96 
  Supplier District manager-b  
38  This was the old manager FM-Fabs (#12) 
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Appendix E OVERVIEW OF DOCUMENT SOURCES INTERFIRM CASE STUDY 
# Date (yymm) Name Description 
1 0501 SLA 2005 SLA between Lectro and internal facility management department of Lectro 
2 0609 Dutch norms (NEN) 
Dutch standards document for suppliers: 
Condition assessment of building and installations 
components – Part 1: Methodology. 
3 0705 SLA 2007 SLA between Semco Real Estate & Facility Services and internal customers. 
4 0709 Press release Press release about new contract with Faspro (PR Newswire) 
5 0804 Presentation: Outsourcing FM 
A powerpoint presentation of the FM director of 
Semco he did during a seminar for colleagues. 
6 0806 Dutch norms (NEN) 
Dutch standards document for suppliers: 
Condition assessment of building and installations 
components – Part 2: Lists of faults. 
7 0812 SLA 2009 SLA between Semco Real Estate & Facility Management and Faspro. 
8 0901 Fabs Management Team 
Organisational chart of the management team of 
the Fabs division of Semco. 
9 0902 (T)FM Roadmap 2009 
Complete strategic plan of relationship between 
Semco and Faspro 
10 0903 Job description demand manager Job description of a demand manager at Semco 
11 0904 Primary process FM Powerpoint presentation of Faspro about FM primary process improvements 
12 0904 Quarterly report Quarterly report, prepared by Faspro to evaluate performance 
13 0905 Fabs services Organisational chart of the service departments of the Fabs division. 
14 1010 Management report  Evaluation report of the month September by one of Semco’s biggest suppliers 
15 1106 Press release contract 
Press release new contract (www.facility-
info.com) 
16 1203 Case study Semco semiconductors 
Description of Faspro on their website of their 
contract with Semco 
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Appendix F INTERVIEW ANALYSIS CODES INTERFIRM CASE STUDY 
Category Name of codes 
Background Faspro and Fabs 
Background Semco organisation 
Background Faspro 
Background interviewee  
background Semco-Faspro  
Description Fabs organisation  
Description Semco-FM organisation  
Establishment relationship  
Main characteristics  
Services Fabs-FM delivers 
Contracting Contact Phase  
Contract content  
Contract-review  
Contracting  
New contract  
Relationship development  
TFM 
Control Accounting 
Allocating costs 
Demand management 
Formal control 
Roadmap 
Control practice 
Control 
Safeguards 
Trust and control 
Experiences about Faspro 
 
Faspro - 
Faspro+ 
Experience of Faspro after 1st contract 
Experience of Faspro after 2nd contract 
Experience with Faspro 
Other topics 
 
FM practice 
Learning curve 
Organisational learning 
Role consultants 
Role demand manager 
Outsourcing FM 
 
Outsourcing - 
Outsourcing + 
Reasons for outsourcing FM 
 
Management fashion 
Stability for your employees 
Influence (top) management 
Costs 
Reasons for outsourcing 
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Category Name of codes 
Role consultants 
Relational signalling/ Solidarity situations 
 
Breach temptation  
Common good situation  
Mishap situation  
Need situation  
Normative Frame  
Problem situations  
Relational Signals  
Sharing situation 
Trust Competence trust  
Embedded governance structure  
Interactive trust-control  
Personal trust  
Thick Trust  
Thin Trust  
Trust and control  
Trust development 
 

 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
Organisaties, of divisies binnen organisaties, kunnen er voor kiezen bepaalde producten of 
diensten zelf te produceren of om ze uit te besteden aan een andere organisatie. 
Uitbesteden aan een andere organisatie is de traditionele externe manier van uitbesteden. 
Organisaties kunnen er ook voor kiezen een gespecialiseerde divisie op te richten waaraan 
interne divisies hun product of dienst uit kunnen besteden. Dit laatste is in feite intern 
uitbesteden, waarbij de gespecialiseerde divisie een shared service centre (SSC) kan worden 
genoemd. 
Het doel van dit onderzoek is inzicht krijgen in de besturing en beheersing van interne en 
externe uitbestedingsrelaties, met de nadruk op het ontstaan en de werking van 
besturingsstructuren, management control structuren, control praktijken en vertrouwen.  
In hoofdstuk 1 worden de aanleiding en achtergrond van dit doel toegelicht en worden de 
volgende drie onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:  
1. Hoe verhouden veranderingen in besturings- en controlsystemen zich tot 
ontwikkelingen naar en in interne uitbestedingsrelaties? 
2. Hoe kunnen contracten en controlstructuren in uitbestedingsrelaties dienen als 
instrumenten voor het creëren van vertrouwen? 
3. Hoe verhouden controlpraktijken zich tot vertrouwen? 
Deze vragen worden beantwoord aan de hand van een theoretische analyse en twee 
gevalstudies, waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van de transactiekosten theorie (TCE) en 
theorieën over management control en vertrouwen binnen- en tussen organisaties. De 
gevalstudies vonden plaats tussen 2007 en 2010 en omvatten een intensieve analyse van 
documenten en drieëndertig semigestructureerde interviews. De eerste gevalstudie staat in 
het verband van de eerste onderzoeksvraag en betreft de krantenuitgever PCM die een 
veranderingsproces van de besturingsstructuur doormaakt in de richting van verdergaande 
decentralisatie. De tweede en derde deelvraag zijn gerelateerd aan een gevalstudie in een 
chipfabriek waarin het management van alle facilitaire diensten zijn uitbesteed. 
De uitkomsten van het promotieonderzoek worden beschreven in zeven hoofdstukken. In 
hoofdstuk 2 wordt het onderwerp theoretisch uitgewerkt, wat leidt tot een aantal 
conceptuele bijdragen. Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethode en geeft 
een gedetailleerde persoonlijke beschrijving van het onderzoeksproces. De hoofdstukken 4, 
5 en 6 beschrijven de empirische bijdragen van dit proefschrift en hoofdstuk 7 sluit af met 
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een conclusie. De conceptuele en theoretische bijdragen van dit proefschrift worden 
hieronder samengevat. 
Conceptualisering van management control- en besturingsstructuren (hoofdstuk 2) 
Bestudering van op economische organisatietheorie geïnspireerd onderzoek in accounting 
en control literatuur geeft aanleiding tot een verduidelijking van de begrippen 
besturingsstructuur en controlstructuur, omdat deze begrippen niet eenduidig worden 
gehanteerd. Een besturingsstructuur wordt door Williamson (1979) gedefinieerd als een 
raamwerk waarbinnen transacties plaatsvinden. Besturingsstructuren kunnen worden 
gecategoriseerd als hiërarchische-, hybride- en marktstructuren. Transacties binnen 
organisaties vallen per definitie onder een hiërarchische structuur, maar de leiding van een 
organisatie kan de management control keuze maken dat divisies mogen kiezen diensten af 
te nemen van het interne SSC of van externe organisaties. Op deze manier wordt er 
marktwerking in de organisatie gebracht door de interne afnemers de expliciete 
mogelijkheid te geven om te ‘switchen’ naar een andere aanbieder (dat leidt tot een 
zogenaamde ‘exit threat’ bij de interne aanbieder). In feite is dit een tweede-orde keuze 
voor een besturingsstructuur van transacties binnen een management control structuur in 
een hiërarchie. Die keuze omvat de inrichting van horizontale relaties met specifieke intra- 
of interorganisatorische management control vraagstukken. Vervolgens moeten er tussen de 
partijen in de laterale relatie weer afspraken worden gemaakt over de management control 
structuur, waarin wordt vastgelegd op welke manier prestaties worden gemeten, 
geëvalueerd en afgerekend. Die afspraken worden vastgelegd in een contract of een SLA. 
Met name de ‘exit threat’ is een uitbreiding op bestaande management control raamwerken 
zoals ontwikkeld door Anthony (1965, 1988), Zimmerman (2011) en Simons (1995), die zich 
beperken tot verticale management control structuren gebaseerd op een bureaucratisch 
mechanisme.  
Ostensieve en performatieve benadering van management control onderzoek (hoofdstuk 2) 
De benadering dat een management control of een besturingsstructuur het resultaat is van 
een managementkeuze is een ostensieve benadering. In een ostensieve 
onderzoeksbenadering wordt gezocht naar orde en stabiliteit (Latour 1986, 2005). Een TCE 
benadering is een voorbeeld van een ostensief perspectief. Daartegenover staat een 
performatieve benadering die er van uitgaat dat de management control- en 
besturingsstructuur het resultaat is van interactie tussen zowel menselijke- als anders-dan-
menselijke actoren in een netwerk. Deze laatste benadering vindt haar oorsprong in actor-
network theorie (Latour, 2005). In dit promotieonderzoek wordt aangesloten bij en 
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voortgebouwd op Feldman en Pentland (2003), Pentland en Feldman (2008), Hansen (2011) 
en Vosselman (2012) en wordt ervan uitgegaan dat het mogelijk is om beide perspectieven 
in één onderzoek te combineren. Het combineren van beide perspectieven refereert zowel 
aan theoretische perspectieven (epistemologie) als aan aspecten van de realiteit (ontologie). 
Conceptualisering van vertrouwen en control (hoofdstuk 2) 
Het relationele aspect van uitbestedingsrelaties benadrukt het belang van het delen van 
informatie en van het bouwen aan vertrouwensrelaties. De literatuur richt zich echter tot nu 
toe vooral op de beperkingen van contracten die het belang van vertrouwen benadrukken. 
Er wordt evenwel weinig aandacht besteed aan contracteringsprocessen voor- of na het 
afsluiten van het contract. In dit verband is in dit proefschrift het begrip vertrouwen en de 
relatie tot control nader onderzocht in de cases.  
Buiten het accountingveld zijn vele indelingen en soorten vertrouwen beschreven. In de 
accounting literatuur hebben Vosselman en Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009) een link gelegd 
tussen vertrouwen en control. Zij maken een indeling in dik en dun vertrouwen. Mijn 
onderzoek laat zien dat deze indeling zeer goed kan dienen als basis voor een rangschikking 
van verschillende typen vertrouwen.  Soorten vertrouwen die zijn te categoriseren als dik 
gaan uit van een zekere mate van kwetsbaarheid van de betrokken partijen en van positieve 
verwachtingen ten opzichte van de andere partij. Vormen van dun vertrouwen zijn 
gebaseerd op onderliggende instrumenten die de relatie waarborgen, zoals contracten of 
control instrumenten, of op vertrouwen waarbij het gaat om situaties zonder risico. 
In dit onderzoek wordt ook de actieve rol van vertrouwen in een relatie onderzocht. Het gaat 
hierbij vooral om de performatieve rol van vertrouwen en niet om de ostensieve 
stabiliserende rol. In controlpraktijken spelen diverse actoren een rol. Tot die actoren 
behoren ook concrete objecten als contracten en daarin vastgelegde prestatieafspraken. 
Vertrouwen is echter geen concrete actor of concreet object en dus niet concreet te 
herkennen in controlpraktijken. Daarom is vertrouwen in dit onderzoek geconceptualiseerd 
als een quasi-object (Brown, 2002; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Schiermer, 2011). Dit 
betekent dat vertrouwen op zichzelf geen object is, maar wel gerelateerd kan worden aan 
een object. In dit onderzoek zijn het de contracten, prestatieafspraken, SLA’s, ‘roadmaps’ et 
cetera die o.a. hun vorm krijgen door het vertrouwen dat partijen met elkaar opbouwen 
tijdens bijvoorbeeld contractonderhandelingen en in de dagelijkse controlpraktijk (het 
meten, sturen en evalueren op basis van de vastgestelde management control structuur). 
Omgekeerd kunnen contracten een bron van vertrouwen vormen (evenals andere 
menselijke en andere-dan-menselijke actoren). Deze benadering sluit aan op de benadering 
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van Möllering (2005) dat vertrouwen en control een dualiteit vormen. Vertrouwen en 
control, zijn onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden. Control impliceert de aanwezigheid van 
vertrouwen en andersom. In hoeverre deze bevindingen zichtbaar zijn in de casus wordt 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 en 6. 
Shared service centres en veranderingen in besturing en beheersing (hoofdstuk 4) 
De gevalstudie betreffende het intern uitbesteden van diensten heeft als doel de 
veranderingen in besturing en beheersing bij PCM, een uitgever van kranten, te 
onderzoeken. PCM was begonnen aan een decentraliseringsproces, waarbij de afdeling die 
verantwoordelijk was voor de inkoop van advertentieruimte meer 
resultaatverantwoordelijkheid kreeg en in een horizontale klant-leverancierrelatie kwam te 
staan met de verschillende krantendivisies. Op basis van Vosselman’s (2002) TCE raamwerk 
over horizontalisering van management control is er een model opgesteld dat bepaalde 
interne transactionele kenmerken relateert aan een keuze voor een management control 
structuur rond een SSC-organisatie. Op basis van het type transactie (van standaard tot 
specifiek), de hoeveelheid en frequentie en de onzekerheid van de transactie kan een keuze 
worden gemaakt voor een bepaalde management control structuur. Belangrijke keuzeopties 
zijn: het uitvoeren van de dienst door de decentrale units (divisies), het inrichten van een 
SSC met horizontale klant-leverancierrelaties, en het laatste al dan niet met gedwongen 
winkelnering. Met name de keuze of de divisies verplicht worden intern af te nemen bij het 
SSC (gedwongen winkelnering) of niet (vrije winkelnering) bepaalt de mate van 
marktwerking in de management control structuur van de organisatie. Met vrije 
winkelnering is er altijd een dreiging dat de interne klant besluit bij een ander haar diensten 
af te nemen, waardoor het management van het SSC druk voelt om de prijs-kwaliteit 
verhouding concurrerend te houden. 
Het onderzoek toont aan dat het op TCE gebaseerde raamwerk in de onderzochte 
gevalstudie slechts een beperkte verklaringskracht heeft. TCE is een economische 
organisatietheorie die uitgaat van rationeel keuzegedrag. De gevalstudie laat zien dat de 
veronderstelde rationele keuzes niet worden gemaakt door het management van PCM. Niet 
alle alternatieven die op basis van de TCE benadering mogen worden verwacht worden in 
ogenschouw genomen. Met name de mogelijkheid tot vrije winkelnering wordt (nog) niet 
overwogen. De concentratie van diensten in een SSC wordt voornamelijk ingegeven door 
economische schaalvoordelen en niet door de betreffende transactiekosten die een 
management control keuze met zich meebrengt.  
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Het geplande decentraliseringproces blijkt geen lineair, ‘calculeerbaar’ en geleid proces, 
maar leidt een eigen leven in de organisatie. De (overigens relatief instabiele) management 
control structuur blijkt het resultaat van moeilijk planbare en voorzienbare netwerkeffecten. 
Het instrumentele efficiëntie denken, waarop TCE is gebaseerd, zou daarom aangevuld 
moeten worden met een relationeel perspectief van waaruit het complexe karakter van een 
management control- verandering aan het licht wordt gebracht. brengt. Een dergelijk 
relationeel perspectief kan indicaties geven voor de redenen waarom een instrumentele 
benadering niet effectief is. Een relationele benadering van veranderingen in management 
control opent ook de mogelijkheid om vertrouwen in de analyse mee te nemen. Uit de PCM 
gevalstudie kwam naar voren dat gebrek aan vertrouwen een rol speelde in de vorming van 
de control structuur. Dit onderwerp is verder uitgediept in de externe uitbestedingscase en 
wordt behandeld in de volgende paragraaf. 
Control, vertrouwen en het extern uitbesteden van facilitaire diensten (hoofdstuk 5) 
De gevalstudie naar een externe uitbestedingsrelatie betreft een producent van 
halfgeleiders (chips) die het management van facilitaire diensten uitbesteedt. Het onderzoek 
richt zich op een contractperiode van vier jaar en relateert controlinstrumenten en 
controlpraktijken aan vertrouwen. Controlpraktijken omvatten alle processen die enerzijds 
leiden tot controlstructuren en die anderzijds op basis van de controlstructuren worden 
uitgevoerd. In de casus staan contracterings- en her-contracterinsprocessen centraal waarbij 
onderhandeld wordt over te leveren diensten, te behalen doelen, prestatiemaatstaven, 
targets en de bijbehorende beloningsstructuur. Ook het feitelijk meten van, rapporteren 
over en evalueren van de activiteiten behoren tot de controlpraktijken. 
In dit proefschrift wordt voortgebouwd op de veronderstelde interactieve relatie tussen 
vertrouwen en control, zoals vanuit een rationalistisch perspectief geconceptualiseerd door 
Vosselman en Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). In hun modellering ligt het risico van 
opportunistisch gedrag tussen partijen aan de basis van het ontwerpen en onderhandelen 
van besturingsstructuren. Deze besturingsstructuren zouden moeten zorgen voor ‘dun’ 
vertrouwen. Het contract beschermt enerzijds tegen opportunistisch gedrag en vormt 
anderzijds een basis die het mogelijk moet maken positieve verwachtingen te ontwikkelen 
over de competenties en intenties van de andere partij. Deze positieve verwachtingen 
worden door beide partijen ontwikkeld door relationele signalen te sturen die signaleren dat 
er in het belang van de relatie wordt gedacht. Met name bij het optreden van onverwachte 
situaties, die niet contractueel zijn vastgelegd bestaat de mogelijkheid dat partners dusdanig 
handelen dat niemand er onevenredig voor- of nadeel van ondervindt. Hiermee wordt dan 
het signaal afgegeven dat niet slechts gehandeld wordt vanuit eigenbelang, maar vanuit een 
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gezamenlijk belang. Door dergelijke signalen op vrijwillige basis te geven laten partijen zien 
dat ze positieve verwachtingen hebben van de andere partij. Zo kan vertrouwen worden 
opgebouwd. Dit type vertrouwen wordt ‘dik’ vertrouwen genoemd.  
Uit de gevalstudie komt naar voren dat de grenzen tussen dik en dun vertrouwen niet zo 
duidelijk te onderscheiden zijn. Bij de onderhandelingen en het afsluiten van het 
oorspronkelijke contract was de partij die het contract uiteindelijk moest uitvoeren niet 
betrokken. De halfgeleider fabrikant was onderdeel van een groter concern en werd na het 
afsluiten van het contract verkocht. Hoewel er in het contract afspraken stonden over de 
controlstructuur, werden deze afspraken niet geaccepteerd en nieuwe 
contractonderhandelingen waren nodig. Het oorspronkelijke contract had niet geleid tot dun 
vertrouwen en dus niet tot positieve verwachtingen ten opzichte van de externe partij. 
Tijdens de nieuwe onderhandelingen met de betrokken partijen kwam een verbeterde en 
meer vruchtbare relatie tot stand. Contractonderhandelingen geven dus de gelegenheid tot 
relationele signalen en het werken aan positieve verwachtingen waarbij het onderscheid 
tussen dik en dun vertrouwen vervaagt. 
Het idee van relationele signalen als instrumenten in de handen van managers, is een 
ostensieve kijk op het inrichten van laterale relaties. Deze studie laat echter zien dat er 
dualiteit is tussen het ostensieve en het performatieve. De gevalstudie laat zien dat het 
contract gaat ‘leven’ en zo bepaalde effecten in de uitbestedingsrelatie bewerkstelligt door 
de translatie (vertaling) van dat contract in een netwerk van actoren in de relatie. Het proces 
van vertaling is een route van ostensieve aspecten naar performatieve aspecten. Voorts 
vormt de translatie in de praktijk weer de basis voor nieuwe contractonderhandelingen die 
leiden tot een nieuw contract: een route van performatieve aspecten naar ostensieve 
aspecten. Op deze manier zijn besturingsstructuren en contracten niet slechts instrumenten 
voor het voorkomen en/of bestrijden van tegenstrijdige belangen, maar ook voertuigen die 
onder andere de mogelijkheid geven om zowel voor- als na het afsluiten van het contract te 
komen tot een vertrouwensrelatie.  
Een theoretische bijdrage van de gevalstudie rond externe uitbesteding is een nieuwe 
conceptualisering van de relatie tussen vertrouwen en control op basis van het 
rationalistische model van Vosselman en Van der Meer-Kooistra (2009). In het nieuwe model 
worden ostensieve aspecten van control en vertrouwen gecombineerd met performatieve 
aspecten die ontstaan en zich ontwikkelen in controlpraktijken. Het nieuwe model laat zien 
dat instrumentele oplossingen die tot uitdrukking komen in een besturingsstructuur de 
controlpraktijken beïnvloeden en dat controlpraktijken, via (her)contractering, de 
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besturingsstructuur weer beïnvloedt. Tijdens dit circulaire proces ontstaat in samenhang 
met elkaar zowel dun als dik vertrouwen. 
Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat het ontwerp (gevolgd door implementatie) van 
besturings- en controlstructuren niet de uitkomst van de controlpraktijk bepaalt, alsof de 
controlpraktijk een kneedbare entiteit is. Het ontwerp veroorzaakt eerder een kettingreactie 
van activiteiten die uiteindelijk de controlpraktijk vormt. Het contract zorgt slechts voor een 
relatieve stabiliteit, waarvan het effect onverwacht en contextgebonden is. 
Dualiteiten en quasi-objecten (hoofdstuk 6) 
De onderlinge verwevenheid van vertrouwen en control komt in de casus goed tot 
uitdrukking in de tweede helft van de contractperiode als bepaalde gebeurtenissen de 
verhoudingen tussen beide partijen onder druk zetten. Verschillen in meningen bij de 
uitbesteder over de te volgen koers met de facilitaire dienstverlener zorgen voor interne 
organisatieveranderingen en een wisseling van management. De afgesproken management 
control structuur wordt door het nieuwe management aangepast en discussies over 
contractverlenging zetten de vertrouwensrelatie onder druk. 
Uit de gebeurtenissen in de casus is niet direct een eenduidig verband af te leiden tussen 
vertrouwen en control. Wel kan worden geconcludeerd dat control een effect heeft op 
vertrouwen en vertrouwen een effect op control. Het één kan nooit los worden gezien van 
het ander. Hiermee sluit de conclusie van deze thesis aan op het dualiteitsperspectief van 
Möllering (2005). Tevens past het bij de perceptie van vertrouwen als een quasi-object van 
control, waarbij de onderhandelde controlstructuren in de casus de objecten zijn waar 
vertrouwen aan gekoppeld is. Als het management van de uitbestedende partij de 
accounting maatstaven in twijfel trekt, wordt de rol van accounting als een actor in de relatie 
in twijfel getrokken. Omdat het vertrouwen in sterke mate aan de accounting maatstaven is 
gekoppeld verliest ook vertrouwen als quasi-actor in de relatie haar rol. De 
controlinstrumenten zijn dan niet meer in staat vertrouwen te produceren en stoppen met 
het mobiliseren van andere actoren. Uiteindelijk is een controlstructuur ook niet de stabiele 
uitkomst van een implementatieproces, maar het is de constante translatie van de 
controlstructuur die er voor zorgt dat de structuur werkt als een actor in het netwerk van de 
uitbestedingsrelatie. Op het moment dat alle actoren in de relatie waarde hechten aan de 
afgesproken controlstructuur en vertrouwen dat de metingen op basis van accounting een 
afspiegeling zijn van de geleverde prestaties, dan zal vertrouwen circuleren als een quasi-
object. Indien, zoals in de casus het geval is, vertrouwen niet meer circuleert, maar slechts 
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aanwezig is bij een enkele manager, dan is vertrouwen geïndividualiseerd en stopt de 
translatie van de controlstructuur. 
De bestaande controlstructuur in de externe uitbestedingsrelatie, waarbij via 
prestatierapportages gestuurd wordt op afstand, wordt door de uitbesteder op een bepaald 
moment niet meer als effectief gezien. De uitbesteder gaan eenzijdig over op andere 
vormen van control, wat een negatief effect heeft op het vertrouwen in de relatie. Dit ligt op 
zich niet aan het type of de mate van control, maar aan het feit dat control niet meer een 
mobilisator is in de relatie. Nieuwe onderhandelingen over contractverlenging zorgen ervoor 
dat control en vertrouwen weer worden gemobiliseerd, zodat vertrouwen weer kan groeien. 
Dit wordt ook als dusdanig ervaren door de actoren in de relatie.  
Samenvattend kan gezegd worden dat in de praktijk control en vertrouwen minder 
losstaande fenomenen zijn dan over het algemeen in de theorie wordt aangenomen. 
Conclusie (hoofdstuk 7) 
De analyse van zowel de interne- als de externe uitbesteding laat zien dat 
besturingsstructuren, control structuren en vertrouwen benaderd kunnen worden op zowel 
een ostensieve als een performatieve manier. Vanuit de ostensieve benadering zijn de 
controlstructuren een oplossing voor een probleem. De dimensies van transacties bepalen 
het ontwerp van een controlstructuur. Veranderingen in de organisatie worden dan gezien 
als een direct gevolg van de ontworpen controlstructuur. De PCM studie laat echter zien dat 
de veranderingen die leiden tot het SSC zeker niet lineair zijn en het karakter hebben van 
voortdurende onverwachte netwerkeffecten. 
Bestudering van dergelijke onvoorspelbare en grillige veranderprocessen kunnen vanuit een 
performatieve benadering tot nieuwe inzichten leiden. In deze benadering worden de 
relaties tussen actoren (zowel menselijke als anders-dan-menselijke) in een netwerk 
onderzocht. In deze dissertatie is aan de hand van gevalstudies geïllustreerd hoe 
besturingsstructuren, management control structuren en vertrouwen vorm krijgen binnen 
een netwerk, maar ook hoe ze zelf als een actor in het netwerk worden gevormd. Zo is het 
originele contract in de externe uitbestedingsrelatie een materiële actor, omdat die 
enerzijds wordt gevormd door de relatie, maar anderzijds de relatie ook vorm geeft. 
Hercontractering resulteert in nieuwe controlstructuren die werkrelaties opnieuw vorm 
geven. Vervolgens geven deze zelfde controlstructuren weer aanleiding tot verminderd 
vertrouwen in de intenties van de facilitaire dienstverlener. 
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Ten slotte 
In deze dissertatie zijn nieuwe wegen verkend door het combineren van verschillende 
theoretische invalshoeken. De verkregen inzichten zijn eerder een beginpunt dan een 
eindpunt. Ik hoop echter ook een bijdrage te hebben geleverd aan kwalitatief onderzoek in 
de management accounting door op een persoonlijke maar grondige manier verslag te 
hebben gedaan van mijn onderzoek in hoofdstuk 3. Het bestuderen van management 
control veranderingen binnen organisaties via langdurende gevalstudies is mijns inziens van 
belang voor de toekomst van het vakgebied en voor de praktijk. Ik sluit mijn proefschrift dan 
ook af door aan te sluiten bij Vaivio (2008) die het belang benadrukt van kwalitatief 
management accounting onderzoek. Door concrete managementprocessen te analyseren en 
betekenis te geven aan de invloed van menselijke en anders-dan-menselijke actoren, kan 
kennis worden gecreëerd die ons verder brengt dan beperkte en functionalistische 
‘tekstboek’- inzichten en kan een tegenwicht worden geboden aan eenzijdig op economische 
theorie gebaseerde besturingsvormen. Het kan zowel studenten als accounting professionals 
helpen te reflecteren op controlstructuren in organisaties die worden gepresenteerd als 
stabiele oplossingen voor een probleem, maar in werkelijkheid continu veranderen. Dit kan 
worden bereikt als accounting onderzoekers controlpraktijken bestuderen vanuit een 
performatief gezichtspunt, in uiteenlopende situaties en organisaties. Dit zal uiteindelijk het 
inzicht vergroten in de manier waarop accounting enerzijds wordt gevormd in organisaties 
en hoe accounting anderzijds organisaties vorm geeft. 
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